There was such an interesting, as impossible (in contrast to the collective campaign of our intelligentsia “to Sartre” in Moscow several years earlier), as it was not a coincidence meeting in Freiburg, in 1967.

About her - text from the site www.heidegger.ru
(I recommend adding to Favorites).

Vladimir Kudryavtsev

TOOTH OF THE MIND: DIALOGUE “ANDREY VOZNESENSKY - MARTIN HEIDEGGER”

A memory of a meeting with Heidegger, written many years later.

Like everything in this genre, it says more about the author than about Heidegger.

He glistens with a yellowish bony bald head, stocky, strong, sunk deep in a crimson chair, Martin Heidegger, molar German philosophy.

He lurks in a dark corner of my memory, deeply rooted, sitting in the twilight of a restaurant, trying on a Wiener schnitzel - sitting firmly. The last genius of European thought. Mind tooth.

I saw this polished gleam of it, without distinguishing the facial expression, from the stage during my speech at the University of Freiburg - it flickered to the right in its fundamental place, in a row of chairs as straight as a jaw, looking suspiciously at the artificial smiles of progress shining around. It was February 14, 1967.

Then we had dinner, and it would not be worth remembering if it weren’t for the sudden flash of some kind of dejection, a stocky frown, a haunted fear of communicating with people. It's obvious he's been through a lot.

The conversation took place at his home, in his office, where there were “silent, heavy volumes. like teeth in eight rows.” The owner was one of them. Martin Heidegger, gleaming with his brain periosteum, was still alive and did not stand on the shelf.

Our conversation was recorded by Count Podevils, President of the Bavarian Academy. He rushed from Munich to ladybug his Volkswagen, graceful, thin, with a French breeze in his hair, and, with a wink, announced that I had been chosen for the Academy. A polymath who had been a journalist in Paris for many years, he was in awe of his idol and took detailed notes on the conversation. Unfortunately, he wrote down the host shorter than the guest, but the guest’s words also show what interested the great philosopher in 1967.

The owner conducted the conversation in a businesslike manner, without warming up. This was a different Heidegger - powerful, but without arrogance, and at the same time somehow helpless and collapsed inside, with some kind of mental breakdown. “Quite quickly the conversation turns to the problem of technology, which Voznesensky introduces in a new way into the language of his poetry. Voznesensky, an architect by training, has the ability to think mathematically and is not alien to the technical sphere (unlike the avant-garde artists who only play with scientific and technical vocabulary).

HEIDEGGER: “Is the spirit capable of mastering technology?”

Voznesensky mentions that among the audience of thousands, a significant part is made up of representatives of the young technical intelligentsia of Russia.

HEIDEGGER: “Arch-tector! Tectonics. Within the meaning of Greek word This is a senior builder. Architecture of Poetry".

He even jumped up like a cock, shouting this: “arch-tector!”

More than once in his writings, the philosopher used the image of a temple standing on a rock as a metaphor for creation.

“A creation of architecture, the temple does not reflect anything. Through the temple, God dwells in the temple. God is not depicted in order to make it easier to take note of what He looks like; the image is a creation that allows God to abide, and therefore is itself God. The same is true for the creation of the word. Creation allows the earth to be earth.” Beauty is the way in which truth exists.

Reading now these Munich leaflets, lying in the count’s archive, I am amazed at the coincidence of the thoughts of the Freiburg master with the views of me at that time, who knew about Heidegger only by hearsay (his books are still not published in our country, to our shame). Today I read my words almost like the speech of a stranger. I then tried to read Heidegger in English, but I could break my head over his difficult-to-translate terms. True, at that time we were carried away by the scattered forbidden volumes of Berdyaev, Kierkegaard and Shestov, who wrote articles about Husserl, from whose nest the Freiburg philosopher hatched.

I knew, of course, that from Heidegger came Sartre, with whom fate had already brought me together.

I turn my pupils inward, peer into my memory, and distinguish not only the great frontal bone, but also the sharp lynx eyebrows, the bristles of a mustache that look like a nail pinch, a solid three-piece suit and intense eyes, which, as the conversation progresses, begin to warm up and glow with a cognac sparkle. . I look for in him the reflection of love for his Marburg student, the young existentialist, non-Arendt Hannah Arendt, and the tragedy of breaking up with her. But the face is impenetrable.

Meanwhile I asked him about Sartre.

He frowned, chewing the thought with his eyebrows. He grinned. What does Sartre give him - give him Chartres!

Sartre? The source of his original idea lies in his poor knowledge of the German language. Sartre made a mistake and mistranslated two terms from my works. This mistake gave birth to his existentialism.

The Count shook voluptuously at this passage. Sensing my distrust, the owner continues seriously.

“Voznesensky asks about Heidegger’s attitude towards Sartre. Heidegger points out the difference. His own thinking is the comprehension of “here-being.” Sartre is a representative of “existence”. The difference is already in the language. Heidegger’s understanding of “existence” is ecstatic being as openness to the present, past and future.”

This is close to what he wrote in Istok artistic creation": "...man in his existence ecstatically allows himself into the unconcealment of being."

“Voznesensky, picking up this idea, speaks of an “open poem,” which relies on the activity of the listener or reader.”

HEIDEGGER: "Interconnection in the poetic sphere."

VOZNESENSKY: “Magnetic field.”

For Heidegger, the poem here is only an ideal example of creation, this is his old thought: “the creative truth that puts creation inside. The poetic essence is such that art spreads an open space in the middle of existence, and in this openness everything is completely unusual.” That is, “openness to the inside.”

Here the nervous face of Sartre, like a broken mirror, floats onto the stocky figure of Heidegger. They were the same size. Their smoky faces, having lost their bodies, stand on the same level in my memory, like two glasses of glasses with different diopters.

At that time, the world was puzzled by the spiritual phenomenon of our poetry readings, when stadiums listened to a solitary poet for several hours. Both philosophers shared the same interest in this phenomenon.

Sartre attended a reading and discussion of “The Triangular Pear” in the library at Elokhovskaya. Then in an interview he called this the event that most struck him in Moscow. Like a madman, with his eyes wide, he peered intently into the listening faces of the students. Sartre arrived with the monumental Simone de Beauvoir in tightly packed bouquets and E. Zonina, who was the mysterious “m-me Z” to whom “Words” are dedicated.

The teacher who spoke at the discussion criticized my poems for the use of words that no one understood - “scuba,” “transistor,” “surplice” and for disrespect for the generalissimo. The young audience burst into laughter. Sartre leaned over to me and whispered: “You probably hired her for such a philippic.”

He liked the passionate speech in defense of poetry delivered by the young poet Sasha Aronov. Curly-haired Sasha looked like a young lyceum student reading under Derzhavin. Derzhavin was Simone de Beauvoir, heavy with curls.

For several years I was fascinated by Sartre. I was interested in existentialism at that time. Sartre had a greed for sensations. In Paris, he showed me “Paris without shells”, took me to the “Alcazar”, to a striptease of young men turned into girls. During the intermission, I was dragged backstage, where powdered guys with magnificent busts were flirting with the guests. It smelled like men's sports sweat. Simone's nostrils trembled.

I took them to Kolomenskoye, where the architect applied the principles of “hidden-open beauty.” The Great Bell Tower is obscured until the last second by the silhouette of the gate and, unexpectedly appearing, stuns you. The same technique is used in Japanese temples. Without knowing it, Sartre echoed Russian poetry. “Poetry is when the one who loses wins,” isn’t Pasternak’s “and you yourself should not distinguish defeat from victory” heard behind this?

Sartre wrote: “I am often reproached for neglecting poetry: proof, they tell me, is the fact that the Tan Modern magazine publishes almost no poetry.” Refuting this, he published my selection in Tan Modern. He despised descriptive journalism in poetry: “One should not imagine that poets are busy searching for and presenting the truth. This is about something else. An ordinary person, when speaking, is on the other side of the word, close to the object, but a poet is always on this side. Not knowing how to use a word as a sign of one or another aspect of the world, he sees in it the image of one of these aspects.”

In the poem “Paris Without Rhyme” I described it this way:

And Sartre, our dear Sartre,

Thoughtful, like a meek grasshopper.

The grasshopper is silent on the leaf

With insane agony on his face.

“Well, what kind of grasshopper is Sartre? - I. G. Ehrenburg was surprised. “The grasshopper is light and graceful, but Sartre looks more like a toad.” - “Have you seen the grasshopper's face? His face is an exact copy of Sartre’s surreal face,” I defended myself. A week later, having seen Brem’s head of a grasshopper, Ilya Grigorievich said: “You’re right.” And in a terrible time for us New Year After Khrushchev’s crackdown on the intelligentsia, Ehrenburg sent me a telegram: “I wish you to frolic in the meadow with all the grasshoppers of the world in the new year.”

Alas, my contact with Sartre ended because of Pasternak. Having refused the Nobel Prize, Sartre, accusing the Swedish Academy of politicking, casually attacked Pasternak. This caused rejoicing in the camp of our retrogrades, who until then had stigmatized Sartre.

Soon he invited me to a dinner that was given in his honor at the Central House of Writers. Sharp corners and showdowns are always difficult for me. I called the guest away from the table and said: “You understand nothing about our affairs. Why did you insult Pasternak?” And to cut off the path to reconciliation, he added insolence: “After all, everyone knows that you refused the prize because of Camus.” Albert Camus received the prize before Sartre and in his Nobel speech admired Pasternak. I was wrong in my boyish rudeness. Sartre and I never met again. Towards the end of his life he fell into Marxistentialism.

But let's return to the Freiburg records:

“There is a conversation about metaphor, which, according to Heidegger, belongs to the poetic sphere, the original source of language, where the word was open and multifaceted. Uniqueness is a narrowing that came with science and logic.”

Metaphor has always been for me not a technical means, but a connection between “being here” and “being there.” It is no coincidence that Job expressed his most heartbreaking thought with a metaphor: “Oh, that my cries were truly weighed and that my suffering were put on the scales along with them! It would surely carry over the sand of the seas!”

From this terrible metaphor was born best book Shestov, one of the fathers of existentialism. “Metaphor is the motor of form,” I passionately declared in 1962.

Nowadays metaphorism is the most creative and diverse direction in our “new wave”. There are “fetometaphorists”, “metametaphorists”, “metaironists”, “photometaphorists”, “mahometaphorists”, “Magometaphorists”, but behind all this one is groping for one thing - establishing a connection between “here-being” and “there-being”. Metaphobia is also observed.

I tried to explain to Heidegger the basics of melometaphorism, in which I was trying my hand at that time.

VOZNESENSKY: “The written word is like a musical notation that comes to life in sound. He talks about his belonging to the “musical” direction in modern Russian poetry, this line comes from ancient traditions, bards, singers (for comparison, we can recall the Celtic west of Europe, Ireland). Alexander Blok and Mandelstam read their poems aloud, emphasizing the rhythm, before publishing them. It is to this school that Voznesensky feels his involvement. Responding in Munich to the accusation of “declamation,” allegedly alien to the European tradition, Voznesensky pointed to this Russian tradition and to the fact that his reading is, as it were, a reproduction, a recreation of the poem as a creative act with maximum internal concentration.”

I thought then: well, what could I understand? German philosopher in a semi-Asian Russian speech and technique unfamiliar to him, when he listened attentively, the bony top of his head gleaming from the dark gum of the first student audience?

Probably, as his detailed academic analysis showed, he saw in Russian poetics only confirmation of his theses. “I am Goya” he perceived as an expression of a proto-language with a two-ended “I”, which for him were the Greek “beginning” and “ending” - that is, two common principles creations. “Like a pencil sharpened at both ends,” I remember. Probably red and blue, or maybe they have different pencils in Germany? I didn’t always understand, I just nodded in agreement. Later, while reading his works, I heard his voice through the text. “Language is not poetry because there is primordial poetry in it, but poetry resides in language because language preserves the original essence of poetry. truth directs itself into creation.”

A hundred sweats fell off me on stage while I was reading in Freiburg. I really wanted him to understand the poems.

My poems were translated in the classroom by Sasha Kempfe, a dear fellow, translator of Solzhenitsyn’s books and the “new wave”. He was bubbling in his shirt and pants, puffing, and was the complete contrast to the polite count. When the count spoke, Sasha became jealous and crumpled the damp handkerchief in his palm.

I had the opportunity to talk with many significant thinkers of the century. Each person's speaking style speaks volumes about their unique personality. Pope John Paul II Wojtyla in conversation seemed to be trying to bring harmony into your thoughts - for example, when I asked him about Unidentified Flying Objects in the sacrament of the Vatican Library, he, shaking his straw locks from under his white cap, calmly explained to me how teachers explain the subject At school. Lanky as a television tower, McCluhan was television in his formulas. He amazed you with his aphorisms and video clips. The brilliant pink Adorno, Heidegger's opponent, radiated wit and businesslike energy among the white coats of his Frankfurt institute. Heidegger was an armchair in the style of the 19th century; he seemed to be looking for the truth together with his interlocutor. The visual metaphors of “Oza” turned out to be closer to him, perhaps because it was more translatable or resembled the structure of the poetics of his youth and corresponded to his hatred of scientific and technological revolution. “A thoroughly transparent object,” in his terminology.

The Count dryly comments on the conversation:

“In a conversation with Heidegger, as in the opening address to his concert at the University of Freiburg, Voznesensky touched upon the problem of translation. Even the best translation remains imperfect. But the same applies to poetry itself, which translates things, the “voice of things” into the sphere of the poetic word. But at the same time, there is always a remnant of mystery, something incomprehensible (precisely because the translation does not take place into an unambiguous language of logic). (Here Heidegger nodded.) Nevertheless, people understand poetry, especially when listening to it, almost in the same way that Latin or ancient Greek liturgy becomes understandable, even if it is performed in an unfamiliar language.

Heidegger asks about the meaning of the word “truth.”

I replied that the truth is in the creation.

VOZNESENSKY: “Truth is the truth, but also justice, correctness, an indication of how to act and do. The word "truth" comes from the root "is". Here we mean reality, being, existing. Poetry deals with revealing truth.”

HEIDEGGER: “Poetry does not reproduce anything, it shows.”

And here we come to the main property of poetry according to Heidegger. He defined it with the word “outlining” or, more accurately, “outlining”, “designing” the future.

I would call this property ESKIZENTIALISM POETRY.

The existentialism of poetry, as philosophy understands it, manifests itself in sketching, guessing the future, thus participating in history, creating it. The essentialism of poetry is unspoken, hasty due to the short duration of life among the silent Universe.

From Khlebnikov we read: “The laws of time, the promise to find them was written on a birch tree (in the village of Burmakin, Yaroslavl province) with the news of Tsushima. A brilliant success was the prediction made several years earlier about the collapse of the state in 1917.”

Poetry can feel not only the echo after the event, but also the echo that precedes the event, let's call it POECH. Poecho, like animals anticipating an earthquake, predicts phenomena.

Overheard at the beginning of the century by the poet “Shagadam, Magadam, benefits, piz, pats.” foresaw both “Magadan, the capital of the Kolyma region” and the clicking of bullets on the icy stones.

And Khlebnikov’s poem “Razin”, where the whole huge complex snow avalanche each of its sweeping lines of chapters reads backwards, forwards and backwards - she foresaw the reverse course of the revolutionary process, thereby “outlining” history.

Heidegger translated in his own way the Heraclitean formula of the Oracle - “does not speak and does not hide.” “Neither directly reveals nor simply hides, but reveals while hiding.” Such is the dark speech of poetry, illuminating the future.

The fathers of totalitarianism were not only criminals, but also victims of ignorance. By destroying the peasantry, they destroyed the basis, the “earth,” as the philosopher defined it: “We call this basis the earth. Neither the idea of ​​soil, nor even the astronomical idea of ​​the Planet should be confused with what this word means. The earth is that within which the blossoming-blooming hides everything that blossoms as such.”

Truly, “Russia suffered through Marxism.”

The twin regimes, having strangled their thinkers, replaced philosophy departments with companies of propagandists. Hegel predicted the death of art, but, alas, philosophy was destroyed first. Now the bowels of the “foundation” are on strike; behind the poverty of the homeless below the poverty standard is the poverty of not only the economy, but also the poverty of the spirit of a society without philosophy.

Russian thought, expelled from Russia, made nests overseas. I had the opportunity to visit and talk with Archbishop Fr. John of San Francisco, born Prince Shakhovsky, brother of Zinaida Shakhovskaya, preacher, subtle poet, published under the pseudonym Wanderer. He helped me with theological advice while working on Juno and Avos, and letters from him helped.

The philosopher’s favorite thought is confirmed that the body is not matter, but a form of the soul.

Some new energetic existence is being felt. Idealistic materialism, or something. Science and political instructors are unable to explain this. As Heidegger believed, the “univocity of science and logic” does not exhaust these signals of new truth. And these phenomena cannot be turned into just morning exercises - a kind of hathayogart.

Ontological truth looks at us from the threshold, dressed today not in an ancient toga, but in the supports of God’s homeless man. Who can master our most monstrous experience of unfreedom and attempts at freedom for us?

Will the tooth erupt? new philosophy Or will it all end with scratching the gums?

Mind tooth?

SUBRAINT?

Berdyaev solves it in his own way: “My topic was: is it possible to move from the creativity of perfect works to the creativity of a perfect life?”

HEIDEGGER: “Poetry is the offering of gifts, the foundation and the beginning. This means not only that art has a history. but this means that art is history in an essential sense: it lays the foundations of history.”

In this sense, the essentialism of the poetry of the 60s sketched out the foundations for some of today's spiritual processes. Through metaphor, rhythm, and the search for a new linguistic structure that opposed the stereotype of the System, poetry predicted the chaos of today's processes, chaos seeking constructiveness. Poetry represented “a personalistic revolution, which had not yet truly happened in the world, it meant the overthrow of the power of objectification, a breakthrough to another world, the spiritual world.”

There are misunderstandings. Sometimes poetry was mistaken for its applied role - politics. At that time, the poetic stage was the only public place with a thousand circulation that was not checked by censorship, unlike newspapers, lectures, and the theater, where a permitting stamp was required. Of course, if the poet violated the ban too much, the next evening he was banned. This happened all the time. But often they were banned not for the main thing that poetry communicated at that time. So the Galilean was arrested for insulting the Caesar, but his teaching was not about that at all, although, of course, it also insulted the Caesar along the way. This is evidenced by the hasty existentialism of the evangelists' records.

"There's a subject here philosophical knowledge existential. In this sense, my philosophy is more existential than Heidegger’s.” (Berdyaev). Berdyaev more than once returns to sorting out his relationship with Heidegger, recognizing his talent, but noting his rationality and the incomparability of their existential experience. I found a different Heidegger, who survived the break with Hannah - alas, even geniuses become slaves of family ties, slander - who survived her departure from Marburg to study first with Husserl, and then with Jaspers, and then from Nazi Europe, who survived the collapse of illusions, ostracism crowd, first right, then left - the existential experience mentally broke him. Hannah called his thought “passionate.”

Rational philosophy is a tooth without nerves. Schopenhauer is a nightmare of nighttime toothache.

The classics of Russian literature are characterized by a craving for German philosophy. But only V.A. Zhukovsky had a chance to come to Goethe. The Weimar Privy Councilor was slightly stung to learn that the visiting poet was a Privy Councilor of the Russian Empire.

Why did I go to Heidegger?

In the flood of the sixties, I wanted fundamental ontological truth, there was still a year left before the Prague collapse of hopes, but anxiety was already felt, and in the name of the last German genius the sounds “x”, “gg”, “r”, rare for the Russian language, magically crunched, at one time so admired the people. Even Velimir “in the land called Germany, found the sound “g” to determine the seeds of Word and Reason.” In addition, I was probably latently captivated by the parallel with my Peredelkino idol, who studied philosophy in Marburg with Cohen. In the 20s, the same Marburg department was already headed by Heidegger. I was also captivated by the outcast nature of the thinker, who fell from grace with the crowd - but what can I say, the Freiburg meeting gave me a lot and confirmed me in many ways. The pace of the trip did not allow me to stop and understand what I heard. Heidegger’s speeches were layered with conversations with M. Fried, the “new left,” which were close to me, despite our fierce disputes (many of them were already read by Hannah Arendt), with V. Kazak, then cursed by our officialdom, with young G. Uecker, who created masterpieces from nails, which seemed to me anti-Kizhi, the antipode to the wooden Russian masterpiece built without nails.

It must be said that Munich, where the Academy was located, seemed to our military propaganda of those years to be a nest of revanchism; there was a jammed Radio Liberty station there. Meanwhile, it was the Munich Academy and Count Podevils himself who tried to bring our cultures closer together. For the first time, the Academy then decided to elect writers from our country to its composition. My election almost coincided with the election of A.I. Solzhenitsyn. Kempfe asked me about Solzhenitsyn, because of whose translations he was not allowed to visit us. Sasha was interested in everything, everything about the author of “Gulag”. I told what I knew. I did not have the chance to know him closely. Yu. Lyubimov introduced us in his office, where Solzhenitsyn had risen from the auditorium after watching the play “Anti-Worlds”. That's when we talked for the first time.

Then Solzhenitsyn wrote me a note at TsGALI, allowing me to read his novel “In the First Circle,” which had already been confiscated.

The words “Munich” and “academy” today give me a noise in the back of my head and a headache, a taxi driver’s cry: “Get down, damn it!”, a blow, a blackout, and the sight of my caked white cap being cleaned of blood by the snow. On a highway near Moscow we crashed into a refrigerator. I escaped with severe bleeding and a concussion. There was no need to rest, because four days later there was a charity evening held by the Tagans in Luzhniki to raise funds for the Vysotsky Foundation, and a week later we had to go to Munich to perform at the Academy during Russian Week. Since then the headaches have remained.

God is revealed within creation, Heidegger teaches. Today the name of the philosopher means little to our public.

Heidegger? “Haryu, the bastard, has he eaten away?!” “Hardrocker?!” The Heidegger Society flourished in Cologne. Do we have a Berdyaev Society?

Europe is now experiencing a Heidegger boom, newspapers are publishing strips about him, books are being published. Environmentalists, the “greens,” take it by their name. Young Americans are attracted to his character, who remains himself despite any environmental influences. If only they knew what a price it comes with and what’s going on inside him! “Language creates man” - this influenced many French lettrists and the overseas “Langwich School”. But in the 1960s, European intellectuals ignored him.

Once, in the House of Writers, I was stopped by a miniature woman who looked like a copper-haired troll in doll trousers. “I am Renata, professor of history in Freiburg. As a student I saw you and Heidegger. Frankly, we were not very interested in him then. We ran to look at you." A visiting foreigner was more interesting to them than a domestic genius!

He was accused of being blinded by the Reich. Are Shostakovich, Pasternak, Korin, who lived and worked under the regime, guilty of Stalinism?

However, reading his code concepts “earth”, “soil”, “beingness”, it may indeed seem that we are dealing with a retrograde, albeit an educated one. After all, the Nazis bought into these symbols. He spends half a page lovingly praising peasant shoes. But, alas, these shoes of the peasants and people were painted not by a sad copyist, but by Van Gogh, a “degenerate” and a devilish obsession for retrogrades. Hannah Arendt called him almost the murderer of Husserl in a letter to Jaspers. Heidegger sensed the power of the national element and confessed it. We who ignored it are now reaping the benefits. The Nazis already figured out the philosopher in 1935, removing him from the leadership in Freiburg, putting an end to the illusion of their commonality.

Hannah kept him from becoming interested in the Italian futurists, considering them similar to Mein Kampf.

In 1935 he writes: “There is poetry. undertaking. Art allows truth to flow. can art be a source and should it be a leap forward, or should art remain a creation that adds and complements, so that it can then be next to us like any cultural phenomenon that has become familiar and indifferent?

This type of backward-facing art did not only exist today. Let's call this phenomenon ex-truthism. And let us not succumb to its dark temptations.

How is Russian existentialism different from Western? Let’s expand on Berdyaev’s “Self-Knowledge”: “...for me, existential philosophy was only an expression of my humanity, humanity that had acquired a metaphysical meaning. In this I differ from Heidegger, Jaspers and others.”

The fathers of Russian God-directed existentialism, Berdyaev and Shestov, see the meaning of truth in creativity: “...man must himself become God, i.e. to create everything from nothing,” having written this phrase, L. Shestov immediately after it quotes the mysterious words of Luther: “...blasphemy sometimes sounds more pleasant to the ear of God than even Hallelujah or whatever solemn doxology you want. And the more terrible and disgusting the blasphemy, the more pleasing to God.” It seems that Yesenin’s “blasphemy” (“I spit on these icons” and other lines, worse) sound much more pleasing to God than insipid penmanship. This is the poet's relationship with God - it is not for the uninitiated. Yes, any metaphor-illumination of Yesenin, Zabolotsky, Dali or Filonov comes “from God”, and is perceived by the uninitiated as blasphemy due to illiteracy. Our guardians are trying to imagine the artist in their own image, to dirty him, sharing their dirt with him in a brotherly way: “He is small, like us, he is vile, like us! You're lying, scoundrels." - as if Pushkin wrote this today.

“Creation is preserved in the truth created by itself. The preservation of truth is carried out by descendants."

I witnessed how an African in a purple toga suddenly passionately started a discussion about Heidegger. It was on a hill in Budapest, where the Getty Cultural Foundation was holding its next meeting, founded by the modern Western Tretyakovs - the beautiful, dreamy Anne Getty and the publisher Lord George Weidenfeld, who had published Lolita in his time and fought for it at the trial. They are driven by the mission of preserving the truth.

West truth? East-truth?

Dostoevsky’s thought: “I, we, Russia have two homelands: the West and the East.”

So, Africa started talking about Heidegger. The sky-high Dürrenmatt, wiping his glasses from the high-altitude fog, said that the national wave only carried the philosopher along with the flow and, due to the incomprehensibility of philosophy, they tried to use him.

M. Kruger said that his generation and the rebels of 1968 did not honor Heidegger and missed his philosophy. The Nobel laureate, the amazing poet Czeslaw Milosz, and the gray-bearded Rob Grillet, and Adam Michnik, a favorite of the forum, the Solidarity faun, an avid reader of Russian literature, and the South African prose writer Nadine Gordimer, and Susan Sontag, were carried away by the conversation.

When I told about my meeting with Heidegger, it suddenly turned out that not one of those present had had the opportunity to talk with him. And, indeed, it is strange that it was not a German, but a Russian who read out excerpts from his conversation with a European philosopher. Then I decided to publish these pages - it would be criminal to hide even the slightest thing about a genius.

There are also grains of hitherto unknown information in the graph's notes. For example, not once in his works has Heidegger mentioned Sigmund Freud. Although they have a lot in common, and Freud's students, especially the Swiss Binswanger, openly connected Freud with Heidegger.

Freideggers?

The Count wrote:

“Voznesensky asks about Heidegger’s attitude to psychoanalysis. Heidegger speaks negatively. He resolutely separates himself from Freud and his students.

Voznesensky says that when Oza was published, three psychoanalysts came to his home to examine his mental state. They saw mental anomalies in several fragments of the poem. However, fortunately for him, all three expert opinions contradicted each other.”

Naive Count! He believed that all our psychiatrists are psychoanalysts. Alas, Freud was banned in our country in those years. Most families in the West have their own psychoanalysts. I don't think we're mentally healthier.

After the war, Hannah sent Heidegger an unsigned postcard: “I’m here.” They met. “Hannah hasn’t changed a bit in 25 years,” he noted dryly. He was the passion of her life. His portrait stood on the table in Jerusalem where she wrote about the Eichmann trial. She forgave Heidegger. In her diary she called him "the last great romantic."

I turn over the last page of the notes. The Sudeten count who wrote them, Sasha’s offended bubble, the vest of the great unsolved owner - the earthly shells of ideas - dissolve in memory. They disappeared, leaving us with questions. Is it possible to sketch the truth?

“Are we historically located in our here-being, at the source? Do we know the essence of the source, do we listen to it? Or, in our attitude to art, do we rely only on learned knowledge of the past?”

What is our existentialism today? Is Francis Bacon a sketch of the embryo of the future? Can art create a third reality? What kind of revelation of thought will give birth to our monstrous existential experience?

Will posterity identify the skull of our era by Heidegger's brilliant molar?

To the question, what can you talk about with a man who has not read Heidegger? given by the author spread the best answer is Are there really such things? I always have several of his books on my nightstand... Of course, this is not all, but only those that I leaf through before going to bed...
Heidegger, M. Time and Being: Articles and Speeches / Comp. , trans. with him. and comm. V.V. Bibikhina. - M.: Republic, 1993. - 447 p.
Heidegger, M. Conversation on a Country Road: Selected Articles of the Late Period of Creativity. - M.: Higher School, 1991.
Heidegger, M. Articles and works different years/ Per. , comp. and entry Art. A. V. Mikhailova. - M.: Gnosis, 1993.
Heidegger, M. Prolegomena to the history of the concept of time / Transl. E. V. Borisova. - Tomsk: Aquarius, 1997.
Heidegger, M. Being and time / Trans. with him. V.V. Bibikhina - M.: Ad Marginem, 1997. Reprint. : St. Petersburg. : Science, 2002.
Heidegger, M. Being and time / Trans. with him. and preface G. Tevzadze; Ch. redol. according to art lane or T. relations within the Georgian Writers' Union. - Tbilisi: B. and. , 1989.
Heidegger, M. What is philosophy? / Per. , comment. , afterword V. M. Aleksentseva. - Vladivostok: Dalnevost Publishing House. University, 1992.
Heidegger, M. Statement of Foundation / Trans. with him. O. A. Koval. - St. Petersburg. : Lab. metaphysis research under Philos. fak. St. Petersburg State University: Alteya, 1999.
Heidegger, M. Correspondence, 1920-1963 / Martin Heidegger, Karl Jaspers; lane with him. I. Mikhailova. - M.: Ad Marginem, 2001.
Heidegger, M. Introduction to Metaphysics / Trans. with him. N. O. Guchinskaya. St. Petersburg : Higher religious and philosophical school, 1997.
Heidegger, M. Basic problems of phenomenology / Transl. A. G. Chernyakova. St. Petersburg : Higher religious and philosophical school, 2001.
Heidegger, M. Explanations of Hölderlin's poetry. - St. Petersburg. : Academic project, 2003.
Heidegger, M. Nietzsche. Tt. 1-2 / Per. with him. A. P. Shurbeleva. - St. Petersburg. : Vladimir Dal, 2006-2007.
Heidegger, M. Nietzsche and emptiness / Comp. O. V. Selin. - M.: Algorithm: Eksmo, 2006.
Heidegger, M. Kant and the problem of metaphysics / Trans. O. V. Nikiforova. M.: "Russian Phenomenological Society", 1997.
Heidegger, M. What is called thinking? / Per. E. Sagetdinova. - Moscow: Academic project, 2007.
Heidegger, M. What is metaphysics? [Sat. ] Moscow: Academic Project, 2007.
M. Heidegger. Plato’s teaching about truth // Historical and philosophical yearbook. 1986. M.: Nauka, 1986, p. 255-275
Heidegger, M. Hölderlin and the essence of poetry / Translation and notes by A. V. Chusov // Logos. - 1991. - No. 1. - P. 37-47.
Heidegger, M. Interview with Express magazine / Translation by N. S. Plotnikov // Logos. - 1991. - No. 1. - P. 47-. (1 (1991), 47-58)
Heidegger, M. My path to phenomenology / Translation by V. Anashvili with the participation of V. Molchanov // Logos. - 1995. - No. 6. - P. 303-309.
Heidegger, M. Zollikoner seminars / Translation by O. V. Nikiforov // Logos. - 1992. - No. 3. - P. 82-97.
Heidegger, M., Boss, M. From conversations / Preface and translation by V. V. Bibikhin // Logos. - 1994. - No. 5. - P. 108-113.
Heidegger, M., Jaspers, K. From correspondence / Preface and translation by V. V. Bibikhin // Logos. - 1994. - No. 5. - P. 101-112.
Heidegger, M. Research Wilhelm Dilthey and the struggle for a historical worldview in our days. Ten reports read in Kassel (1925) // Questions of Philosophy. - 1995. - No. 11. - P. 119-145.
Heidegger, M. Basic concepts of metaphysics / Translation and notes by A. V. Akhutin and V. V. Bibikhin // Questions of Philosophy. - 1989. - No. 9. - P. 116-163.
Heidegger, M. Nietzsche’s words “God is dead” // Questions of Philosophy. - 1990. - No. 7. - P. 143-176.
Heidegger, M. What is philosophy? // Questions of philosophy. - 1993. - No. 8. - P. 113-123.
Heidegger, M. Seminar in Le Thor, 1969 // Questions of Philosophy. - 1993. - No. 10. - P. 123-151.
Heidegger, M. Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra? (translation, notes, introductory article by I. A. Boldyrev) // Bulletin of Moscow State University Ser. 7. (Philosophy). 2008. No. 4. pp. 3-25.
OP
Enlightened
(44007)
Did you make me laugh? Yes, I poured out my whole soul here... And here again, no one understands me...))

Answer from 22 answers[guru]

Hello! Here is a selection of topics with answers to your question: what can you talk about with a man who has not read Heidegger?

Answer from Prosody[guru]
Only about sex.

Answer from ***Lydia***[guru]
About the fact that he needs to read Heidegger....

Answer from Yergey Zakrepa[newbie]
....hera....yes...still a long way to go

Answer from Eurovision[guru]
About the same thing as with the woman who didn’t read Main Kamf!

Answer from I put a CLEAR LOOK on everything![guru]
So what? I also know an author with a cool surname - Kuchelbecker. Pushkin himself knew him. I don’t shout about this at every corner, do I?

Answer from NatLi[guru]
HeideWHAT? ..silence is gold....

Answer from MurrrCa[guru]
Well, try Dunce Scott, they are close... Lastly about Nietzsche... Why not? Well, turn on football for him! ABOUT! - quieted down! I always knew that you can find an approach to every child, you just need to have patience and imagination!

Answer from Elena[guru]
I have a woman friend who has read, but I, who has not read, have nothing to talk about with her. As for me, it’s much worse when a man has read Castaneda, but lives like Gobsek...

Answer from Gyulchatay[guru]
Start with Pinocchio, then use his example to move on to Heidegger.

< ... >But what holds us in our essence holds us only while we, on our part, ourselves hold what holds us. And we hold it until we let it out of our memory. Memory is a collection of thoughts. Thoughts about what? About that which holds us in our essence insofar as we think about it. To what extent should we think about what holds us? And in the way in which from time immemorial it is something that must be comprehended. When we comprehend it, we endow it with a memory, because it is desired by us as a call of our essence.

We can think only when we desire what must be comprehended within ourselves. In order for us to get into this thinking, we, for our part, must learn to think. What does it mean to study? A person learns when he brings his way of action into conformity with what is addressed to him in this moment in its essence. We learn to think when we subordinate our attention to what is given to us for comprehension.

< ... >What needs thinking most?< ... >What requires comprehension manifests itself in the fact that we do not yet think. We are still not conceivable, although the state of the world increasingly requires comprehension. True, it seems that the course of events favors a person to act rather than< ... >revolve around only ideas about what should be and how it should be done. Therefore, what is lacking is action, not thinking.< ... >

< ... >Yet the assertion that we do not think seems presumptuous. It says: what most requires comprehension in our time is manifested in the fact that we still do not think. This statement indicates that what most requires understanding manifests itself.< ... >What requires comprehension is what allows one to think. It calls us to turn to it, thinking. What requires comprehension is in no way created by us. It is in no way based on what we imagine it to be. What requires comprehension allows us to think. It gives us what it has in itself. It has what it is itself. That which most of all allows us to think from itself, that which most of all requires comprehension, must manifest itself in the fact that we still do not think. What does this tell us? It says: we have not yet intentionally entered the sphere of what can originally be thought before all else. Why haven't we gotten there yet? Perhaps because we, people, have not yet turned enough to what still requires comprehension?< ... >

The fact that we still do not think is in no way due to the fact that man has not sufficiently turned to what can be thought from himself. The fact that we still do not think is rather due to the fact that what should be comprehended has itself turned away from man, moreover, having already turned away a long time ago, maintains this position.

But we want to know when and how the turning away happened? First of all, we want to know how we can even know about such an incident. Questions of this kind are too rash - after all, we are talking about what most requires comprehension: what, in fact, was given to us in order for us to comprehend it, turned away from a person not at some point in time that allows for historical dating, but from the very beginning that which requires comprehension, turning away, maintains such a state. Turning away occurs where turning has already happened. If that which most of all requires comprehension continues to turn away, then this happens within its turn, i.e., in such a way that it has already given us the ability to think. That which requires comprehension, although turning away, has nevertheless already turned the axis to the essence of man. Therefore, the man of our history has always thought essentially.< ... >What requires comprehension remains entrusted to this thinking, albeit in a special way. Namely: until now thinking has not at all comprehended that what should be thought is nevertheless removed and how it is removed.

< ... >None of this has anything to do with science.< ... >science doesn't think. She does not think, because her mode of action and her means will never allow her to think - to think the way thinkers think. The fact that science cannot think is not its disadvantage, but its advantage. Only this alone gives her the opportunity to explore the subject area and settle in it. Science doesn't think. For ordinary ideas, this statement is indecent, although science, like all human actions, is dependent on thinking. The relationship of science to thinking is only true and fruitful when the gap that exists between science and thinking becomes visible. There are no bridges from science to thinking, only a leap is possible. And it will bring us not only to the other side, but also to a completely different area. What will be revealed with it cannot be proven. Anyone who wants what is obvious, since it itself appears, while hiding at the same time, who also wants to prove it, does not judge by the highest and strict standards of knowledge. For we too will correspond to that which reveals itself only in the fact that it appears in self-concealment. This simple demonstration is the main feature of thinking, the path to what allows people to think.< ... >

Most of all, what requires comprehension manifests itself in our time that requires comprehension in the fact that we still do not think. We still do not think because that which requires comprehension has turned its axis away from man, and not at all because man has not sufficiently turned towards that which requires comprehension. What requires comprehension turns away from a person. It evades him by hiding. But what is hidden is already constantly in front of us.< ... >And in general, we are only us, such as we are, when we point to this self-removal. This pointing is our essence. We are what we indicate in care. As someone pointing there, man is a pointer. And it is not the case that a person is first of all a person, and then a pointer, thus pointing into departure, for the first time a person becomes a person. Its essence lies in being such a pointer. That which in itself is something indicating we call a sign. Drawn into the pull of self-removal, man is a sign.< ... >

If the statement is true that we do not yet think, then it also says that our thinking does not yet move in its inherent element, namely because what requires comprehension evades us.< ... >There is only one thing left for us to do: wait until what must be thought turns to us. However, waiting here in no way means that we are postponing thinking. Waiting here means: in what is already thought, looking out for the unthought, which is still hidden inside what is already thought. If we are waiting for it like that, then we are already thinking while on the way to what should be thought.< ... >How can that which most needs to be understood show itself to us?< ... >Until now we have not entered into our own essence of thinking in order to settle there. In this sense, we are not yet truly thinking. But this just means: we are already thinking, but, contrary to all logic, we are still entrusted with the actual element in which for real thinks thinking. Therefore, we still do not know enough in what element thinking still occurs, since it is thinking. The main feature of thinking that has existed so far is perception. The ability to do this is called intelligence.

What does the mind perceive? In what element does perception reside, so that thinking occurs through it? Perception from Greek means: to notice something present, take it and accept it as present. In Parmenides's interpretation of thinking (which still largely determines the essence of Western European thinking), what we would call thinking is not in the first place. On the contrary, the definition of the essence of thinking is based on what thinking perceives as perception, namely, on the being in its being.< ... >From the words of Parmenides it follows: thinking receives its essence - perception - from the being of beings. But what does the existence of beings mean?

for the Greeks, and for Western European thinking? The answer to this question, which has not yet been posed, sounds like this: the being of a being means the presence of the present, the presence of the present. This answer is a leap into the unknown.< ... >The main feature of the thinking that has existed so far is representation. By ancient teaching about thinking, representation occurs in logos. Perception unfolds in representation. The representation itself is a re-presentation. The fact that thinking is based on representation, and representation on representation, has a long origin. It is hidden in the event: at the beginning of history Western Europe the being of beings appeared for its entire flow as presence, as presence. This phenomenon of being as the presence of the present itself is the beginning of Western European history. Being means presence.

< ... >The present is the lasting, which enters into non-ness and exists within it. Presence occurs only where Unconcealment already reigns. But what is present exists insofar as it, as present, is extended into unconcealment. Therefore, presence includes not only unconcealment, but also the present. (the present that dominates the presence is a property of time, the essence of which, however, in no way allows itself to be comprehended in traditional concept time.

But in being, which has appeared as presence, neither the unconcealment reigning in it, nor the essence of the present and time are still thought of. Probably, unconcealment and the present as the essence of time belong mutually. Since we perceive existing things in their being, since we, in the language of the New Age, represent objects in their objectivity, we already think. We have been thinking this way for a long time. But still we do not yet truly think as long as that on which the being of a being is based when it appears as presence remains unthought.

What does it mean to think? The article analyzes M. Heidegger's approach to understanding thinking. It is shown that, turning to the origins European philosophy, Heidegger is trying to rehabilitate the path to the truth of being, which was rejected by Parmenides as the path of opinion. Thinking, according to Heidegger, is not only the work of the mind, but a special state of human existence, which allows one to embrace being as such. Heidegger's doctrine of thinking is considered as a methodology for comprehending meaningful being (cultural being).

“What requires comprehension manifests itself in the fact that we do not yet think. We are still not conceivable, although the state of the world increasingly requires comprehension. True, it seems that the course of events is conducive to a person acting rather than making speeches at conferences and congresses, and revolving only in ideas about what should be and how it should be done. Consequently, what is lacking is action, and in no case thinking.”

To understand the content and meaning of Heidegger’s teaching on thought, it is necessary to constantly keep in mind two important nodes in the development of European philosophy.

The first node is the philosophy of Parmenides, which forms the ontological paradigm of philosophy (paradigm on he on), for which the question of being as being becomes a question constitutive of the entire body of philosophy, and to which Heidegger constantly refers.

The second node is the philosophy of Descartes and Kant, within the framework of which the epistemological paradigm (cogito paradigm) is formalized and approved, which shifts the attention of philosophy to the existence of knowledge and creates the philosophy of thinking that became the basis of modern scientific knowledge. Thinking is interpreted as cognition in concepts, and thought acts as a representation. For Descartes, res cogitens thinks a thing by imagining it, and it represents it not because it imagines, but because an otherwise thinkable thing does not exist for the mind.

Truth needs a person, namely a person, and his mind. This conclusion of Heidegger opens up a new path of truth, which differs from the path once commanded by Parmenides. Heidegger himself believes that he is only reviving the true teaching of the founder of the Eleatic school, but it seems that the twentieth-century philosopher is solving the great problem of philosophy - the problem of thinking and being on fundamentally different grounds. The living thought of a person introduces him into existence, revealing its temporality, historicity, and thereby the place of man himself in this historicity. Introducing to eternity and immortality takes on a completely different meaning for a mortal person

In system modern culture The demand for knowledge of the humanitarian type is clearly growing, without which even the accumulation of natural science knowledge becomes meaningless, the use of which without orientation to values human life becomes threatening to civilization generated by knowledge of the natural science type. Humanitarian knowledge is the knowledge of a significant being, that being that cannot, in principle, be torn away from a person, therefore its knowledge and its truth require a completely different way of thinking.

Marx. According to the textbook.

The main drawback of all previous materialism - including Feuerbach's - is that the object, reality, sensuality is taken only in the form of an object, or in the form of contemplation, and not as human sensory activity, practice, not subjectively.

Materialistic doctrine that people are products of circumstances and upbringing, that, therefore, changed people are products of other circumstances and changed upbringing - this teaching forgets that circumstances are changed by people and that the educator himself must be educated. It therefore inevitably comes to the point that it divides society into two parts, one of which rises above society (for example, in Robert Owen). The coincidence of changing circumstances and human activity can only be viewed and rationally understood as a revolutionary practice.

Social life is essentially practical. All mysteries that lead theory into mysticism find their rational resolution in human practice and in the understanding of this practice. The greatest thing that contemplative materialism achieves, that is, materialism that understands sensuality not as practical activity, is its contemplation of individuals in “civil society.”

People in no way begin by “standing in this theoretical relation to the objects of the external world”... They begin not by “standing” in some relation, but by actively acting, mastering, through action, certain objects of the external world. peace.

Man is a being, not only in the sense that both practically and theoretically he makes the species his subject - both his own and other things, but also in this sense - and this is only another expression of the same thing - that he treats himself as a universal being and therefore free.

The ancestral life of both man and animal physically consists in the fact that man (like the animal) lives by inorganic nature, and the more universal a man is in comparison with an animal, the more universal is the sphere of that inorganic nature by which he lives. Just as, in a theoretical sense, plants, animals, stones, air, light, etc. are part of human consciousness, partly as objects of natural science, partly as objects of art, so is his spiritual inorganic nature, the spiritual food which he previously must be prepared so that it can be tasted and digested - so in practical terms they form part of human life and human activity. Physically, man lives only on these products of nature, be it in the form of food, heating, clothing, shelter, etc.

In practice, the universality of man is manifested precisely in the universality that transforms all of nature into his inorganic body, since it serves, firstly, as a direct means of life for man, and secondly, as the matter, object and weapon of his life activity. Nature is the inorganic body of man, namely, nature to the extent that it itself is not human body. Man lives by nature. This means that nature is his body, with which a person must remain in constant communication in order not to die. That the physical and spiritual life of man is inextricably linked with nature means nothing more than that nature is inextricably linked with itself, for man is a part of nature.

The alienated labor of man alienates from him 1) nature, 2) himself, his own active function, his life activity, thereby alienating the race from man: it turns the race life for man into a means for maintaining individual life. Firstly, it alienates generic life and individual life, and secondly, it makes individual life, taken in its abstract form, the goal of generic life, also in its abstract and alienated form. The fact is that, firstly, labor itself, life itself, production life itself turns out to be for a person only a means to satisfy one of his needs, the need to preserve his physical existence. And production life is tribal life. This is life giving birth to life. The nature of life activity contains the entire character of a given species, its generic character, and free conscious activity precisely constitutes the generic character of a person. Life itself turns out to be only a means to life.

An animal is directly identical with its life activity. It does not distinguish itself from its life activity. It is this life activity. Man makes his life activity the subject of his will and his consciousness... His life activity is conscious. This is not a certainty with which it immediately merges into one. Conscious life activity directly distinguishes man from animal life activity. It is precisely because of this that he is a generic being. Or we can also say this: he is a conscious being, that is, his own life is an object for him precisely because he is a generic being. Only because of this is his life activity free activity. Alienated labor inverts these relationships in such a way that man, precisely because he is a conscious being, turns his life activity, his essence, into nothing more than a means for maintaining his existence.

What does it mean to think?

Heidegger M. Conversation on a country road. M., 1991, p. 134-145

We get into what is called thinking when we think for ourselves. For us to succeed, we must be willing to learn to think.

As soon as we take up this teaching, we immediately understand that we cannot think. But still, a person is considered, and rightfully so, to be a creature that can think. For man is a rational being. But reason, ratio, unfolds in thinking. Being a rational being, a person must be able to think if he wants to. However, a person wants to think, but cannot. Perhaps a person, by his desire to think, wants too much, and therefore can do too little.

A person can think because he has the opportunity to do so. But this possibility alone does not guarantee that we can think. Because to be able to do something means to allow this something into its essence and constantly keep this access open. However, we can always only do what we want. 2 , something to which we are so disposed that we allow it. In fact, we desire only that which we ourselves desire, desire in our essence. At the same time, this something inclines towards our essence and thus becomes more demanding. This tendency is conversion. It calls to our essence, calls us into our essence and thus keeps us in it. To hold means to actually protect. But that which holds us in our essence holds us only while we, on our part, ourselves hold that which holds us. And we hold it until we let it out of our memory. Memory -

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it is a collection of thoughts. Thoughts about what? About what holds us in our essence insofar as we think about it. To what extent should we think about what holds us? And in the one in which from time immemorial it is what should be comprehended 3 .When we comprehend it, we gift it with memory 4 We give him the memory because it is desired by us as a call to our essence.

We can think only when we desire what must be comprehended within ourselves.

In order for us to get into this thinking, we, for our part, must learn to think. What does it mean to study? A person learns when he brings his way of action into line with what is addressed to him at a given moment in his essence. We learn to think when we subordinate our attention to what is given to us for comprehension.

Our language calls that which belongs to the essence of another and comes from it, friendly 5 . Accordingly, we will call that which must be comprehended in itself, requiring comprehension 6 . Everything that requires comprehension allows us to think. But it gives us this gift only because from time immemorial it is the very thing that must be comprehended. Therefore, from now on we will call that which allows us to think constantly, because once and for all, that which allows us to think, above all else and thus forever, most of all requires comprehension 7 .

What needs thinking most of all? How does it manifest itself in our time that requires reflection?

What requires comprehension manifests itself in the fact that we do not yet think. We are still not conceivable, although the state of the world increasingly requires comprehension. True, it seems that the course of events is conducive to a person acting rather than making speeches at conferences and congresses, and revolving only in ideas about what should be and how it should be done. Consequently, what is lacking is action, and in no case thinking.

And yet it is possible that man has been acting too much and thinking too little for centuries.

But how can we say today that we are not yet thinking, today, when there is a lively interest in philosophy everywhere, which is becoming more and more active, so that everyone wants to know how things stand with philosophy there.

Philosophers are thinkers. They are called so because thinking occurs mainly in philosophy. No one will deny today's interest in philosophy. But is there anything left today that a person would not be interested in in the sense in which the word “be interested” is understood by today’s people?
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Inter-esse means: to be among things, between things, to be in the center of a thing and to stand steadfastly with it. However, today's interest values ​​only the interesting. And it is such that it may already next moment become indifferent and be replaced by something else that concerns us just as little. Today, people often believe that when they find something interesting, they deign to pay attention to it. In fact, such an attitude reduces what is interesting to the level of indifference and is soon discarded as boring.

Interest shown in philosophy in no way indicates a readiness to think. And the fact that we have been persistently studying the works of great thinkers for years does not guarantee that we think or are at least ready to learn to think. Practicing philosophy can even give us the persistent illusion that we are thinking, since we are “philosophizing.”

Yet the assertion that we are not yet thinking seems presumptuous. However, it sounds different. It says: what most requires comprehension in our time that requires comprehension is manifested in the fact that we still do not think. This statement indicates that what most requires understanding manifests itself. This statement in no way goes so far as to see everywhere only the reign of thoughtlessness. The statement that we do not yet think does not want to stigmatize some omission. What requires comprehension is what allows one to think. It calls us to turn to it, namely, thinking. What requires comprehension is in no way created by us. It is in no way based on what we imagine it to be. What requires comprehension gives - it allows us to think. It gives us what it has in itself. It has what it itself is. That which most of all makes it possible for us to think, which most of all requires comprehension, must manifest itself in the fact that we still do not think. What does this tell us now? It says: we have not yet intentionally entered the sphere of what can originally be thought before everything else and for everything else. Why haven't we gotten there yet? Perhaps because we, people, have not yet sufficiently turned to what still requires comprehension? Then what we do not yet think would only be an omission on the part of people. Then it would be necessary to eliminate this deficiency by applying appropriate measures to the person.

The fact that we still do not think is in no way due to the fact that man has not sufficiently turned to what can be thought from himself. The fact that we are still unthinkable rather comes from the fact that what should be comprehended has itself turned away from man, moreover, having already turned away a long time ago, maintains this position.

But we immediately want to know when and how the turning away that is meant here took place? First of all, we want to know how we can even know about such an incident. Questions of this kind are too rash - after all, we are talking about what most requires comprehension: what, in fact, is given to us in order for us to comprehend it, turned away from a person not at some point in time that allows for historical dating, but from the very beginning , which requires comprehension, turning away, maintains this state. However, turning away occurs only where turning has already occurred. If that which most of all requires comprehension continues to turn away, then this happens already within its turn and is possible only within the turn, i.e. in such a way that it has already given us the ability to think. That which requires comprehension, although turning away, has nevertheless already turned to the essence of man. Therefore, the man of our history has always thought essentially. He even thought the deepest things. What requires comprehension remains entrusted to this thinking, albeit in a special way. Namely: until now thinking has not at all comprehended that what must be thought is nevertheless removed and how it is removed.

But what are we talking about? Wouldn't what is said be just a chain of unsubstantiated statements? Where is the proof? Do the propositions put forward have any relation to science? It would be good if we held out for as long as possible in this defensive position in relation to what is being said. Only in this way will we maintain the necessary running distance from which one of us will be able to make a leap into the thinking of what most requires comprehension.

Because the following is true: everything said earlier and all subsequent discussion have nothing to do with science, unless, of course, it dares to become thinking. This state of affairs is based on the fact that science does not think. She does not think, because her mode of action and her means will never allow her to think - to think the way thinkers think. The fact that science cannot think is not its disadvantage, but its advantage. Only this alone gives it the opportunity to explore the current subject area and settle in it. Science is unthinking. For ordinary ideas, this statement is indecent. Let us leave this statement with its indecent character, although we will immediately add that science, like all actions
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A person is dependent on thinking. The relationship of science to thinking is true and fruitful only when the abyss that exists between science and thinking becomes visible, and such an abyss over which a bridge is impossible. There are no bridges from science to thinking, only a leap is possible. And he will bring us not only to the other side, but also to a completely different area. What will be revealed with it cannot be proven, if to prove is to draw a conclusion about a certain state of affairs from suitable premises. The one who wants what is obvious, since it itself appears, while at the same time hiding, who also wants to prove it and have it proven, does not judge by the highest and strict standards of knowledge. He measures everything with only one measure and, moreover, an inappropriate one. For we too will correspond to that which reveals itself only in the fact that it appears in self-concealment 8 ; we can correspond to it in one and only way: to point to it and at the same time order ourselves to allow what shows itself to appear in its inherent unconcealment 9 . This simple demonstration is the main feature of thinking, the path to what from time immemorial and forever allows people to think. Everything can be proven, that is, deduced from suitable premises. But only a little allows him, and very rarely, to show himself with such an indication that would clear the way for him.

Most of all, what requires comprehension manifests itself in our time that requires comprehension in the fact that we still do not think. We still do not think because that which requires comprehension has turned away from man, and not at all because man has not sufficiently turned towards that which requires comprehension. That which requires comprehension turns away from a person. It evades him, hiding. But what is hidden is already constantly in front of us. That which is removed, thus concealing itself, does not disappear. But still, how can we know anything about what is so slipping away? How is it that we can even name it? That which is removed refuses to come. But self-removal is not nothing. Removal is here a manifested concealment, and, as such, an event. That which is removed addresses a person more essentially, and, seeking, demands him more deeply than any being that concerns him and to which he is related. This reference to the real is readily accepted as what constitutes the reality of the real. But this reference to reality can precisely close a person’s path to that which addresses him, addresses him in some mysterious way, so that this appeal turns away from the person, evading him. Therefore, this withdrawal, the self-removal of what should be comprehended, is perhaps currently more modern as an event than everything that is relevant.
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The truth is that what avoids us in the described way leaves us. But it just carries us along with it and in its own way attracts us, captivating us. That which evades seems completely absent. But this appearance is misleading. What goes away comes 10 , namely in such a way that it attracts us, captivating us, whether we notice it immediately or not notice it at all. What attracts us has already arrived. When we fall into the pull of withdrawal, we find ourselves drawn to that which attracts us, while avoiding it.

But since we are drawn into the pull towards... pulling us, then our essence has already been minted, namely: through this “in the pull towards...”. Minted in this way, we ourselves point to the self-removing. And in general, we are only us, ourselves, as we are, when we point to this self-removal. This pointing is our essence. We are what we indicate in care. As someone pointing there, a person is a pointer. And besides, it is not the case that a person is first of all a person, and then, in addition to this, also by chance and a pointer, but drawn into self-removal, into a pull into it, and thus pointing into departure, for the first time a person becomes a person. Its essence lies in being such a pointer.

That which in itself, in its deepest composition, is something indicating, we call a sign. Drawn into the pull of self-removal, man is a sign.

However, this sign indicates that which is evading, so this sign cannot directly indicate that which is moving away from here. So the sign remains without interpretation. In a sketch for one hymn, Hölderlin says:

“We are a meaningless sign,
We feel no pain and almost
We lost our language in a foreign land.”

The sketches for this hymn bear such titles as: “Snake”, “Nymph”, “Sign”, and also “Mnemosyne”. We can translate this Greek word into German as "memory". German the word "memory" is neuter. In German, the words “die Erkenntnis” (consciousness), “die Befugnis” (right) are feminine, and the words “Begr” äbnis"(grave) and "das Geschehnis" (incident) - middle. In Kant, the word “Erkenntnis” (cognition, consciousness) is either feminine (“die Erkenntnis”) or neuter (“das Erkenntnis”). We can, therefore, translate without much force μνημοσύνη according to Greek feminine like "Ged" ä chtnis"(memory - with a feminine article).
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This is a Greek word μνημοσύνη - the name of one of the Titanides. She is the daughter of heaven and earth. Mnemosyne, as the bride of Zeus, became the mother of the muses in nine nights. Drama and dance, singing and poetry came from the womb of Mnemosyne, memory. Obviously, this word names something other than simply the psychologically understood ability to hold the past in imagination. Memory thinks about what is thought. But the name of the mother of the muses does not mean any thinking about anything that can be thought. Memory here is a collection of thoughts about what is already thought in advance, for it can be thought constantly and before everything else. Memory is a collection of memories of something that should be comprehended before anything else. This collection hides and conceals within itself that which should always be thought first, everything that exists and addresses us, calls us as existing or past. Memory, the collected recollection of something that requires comprehension, is the source of poetry. Accordingly, the essence of poetry has its basis in thinking. The myth, that is, the legend, tells us about this. His saying names the oldest, the earliest, not only in the sense of counting time, but also because by its very essence it was, is and will be most worthy of thought. Of course, until we imagine thinking in the words of logic, until we seriously understand that logic itself is already based on a certain type of thinking, until then we will not be able to see how poetry is based in memory.

Everything said in poetry originates from a recalled memory. Under the title "Mnemosyne" Hölderlin says:

“We are a meaningless sign...”

Who are we? We, today's people, people today, which has been going on for a long time (and will continue for a long time), from such a long time that history can no longer indicate the boundary - the beginning. The same hymn “Mnemosyne” says: “ Time has been going on for a long time" - namely, the time when we are a meaningless sign. Isn’t it enough to understand that we are a sign and at the same time meaningless? Perhaps these subsequent words of Hölderlin refer to the same thing in which we find ourselves most in need of understanding, to the fact that we still do not think. Then what we do not yet think is based on that. that we are a meaningless sign and do not feel pain, or perhaps we are a meaningless sign and do not feel pain,
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since we are not yet thinking? If the latter is true, then thinking would be the thing through which pain would initially be given to mortals and through thinking the sign that they are would receive meaning. This thinking would for the first time introduce us into a dialogue with poetry and poets, whose sayings, like nothing else, await a response in thinking. But even if we dared to introduce the word of Hölderlin’s poetry into the sphere of thought, we should still beware of thoughtlessly equating what is said in Hölderlin’s poetry with what we were going to think. What a poet says and what a thinker says are never the same. But both can speak in different ways, one thing. This succeeds, however, only when the gap between poetry and thinking gapes clearly and definitely. This happens when poetry is high and thinking is deep. What Hölderlin knew about this we can conclude from his two stanzas entitled
"Socrates and Alcibiades"

“Why do you bow down, O blessed Socrates,
In front of this young man? Is there really no nobler man in the world?
Why, with love, as if for God,
Are you looking at him?

The answer is given in the second stanza:

« Only those who have thought about the depths will love living things,
You will understand lofty youth only when you look at the light.
And often the wise man inclines toward the beautiful.»

The line that is relevant to us is:
“Only those who have thought about the depths will love living things.” But we can too easily miss the truly telling and therefore the main words in this line. Saying words are verbs. We can hear them if we emphasize them in a different way, not usual for hearing:

"Only the one who is deep thought, will love alive."
The close proximity of the verbs “thinks” and “loves” forms the middle of the line. Therefore, love is based on the fact that we have thought the deepest. Such mentality probably comes from that memory on the thinking of which even poetry, and with it all the arts, are based. However, what does it mean to think? What it means, for example, to swim, we do not learn from a swimming manual. What it means to swim, a jump into the river will tell us. Only in this way will we for the first time learn the element in which swimming should take place. But what is the element in which thinking occurs?
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If the statement is true that we do not yet think, then it also says at the same time that our thinking does not yet specifically move in its inherent element, namely because what requires comprehension evades us. What is thus hidden from us and therefore remains unthought, we ourselves cannot force to appear, even in the favorable case if we have already clearly prepared in thought

ways 11 what is hidden from us.

So, there is only one thing left for us, namely: to wait until what must be thought turns to us. However, waiting here in no way means that we are still postponing thinking. Waiting here means: in what has already been thought, looking out for the unthought, which is still hidden inside what has already been thought. If we are waiting for it like that, then we are already thinking while on the way to what should be thought. You can get lost along this path. But still, only this one path is configured in such a way as to respond to what is given to us for comprehension.

But still, why should we even notice what, from the very beginning, above all else, gives a person to think? How can that which most of all requires comprehension show itself to us? And it was said: that which most of all requires comprehension manifests itself in our time that requires comprehension most of all, in the fact that we still do not think, we do not think in such a way as to specifically respond to that which most of all requires comprehension. Until now we have not entered into our own essence of thinking in order to settle there. In this sense, we are not yet truly thinking. But this precisely means: we are already thinking, but, contrary to all logic, we have not yet been entrusted with the actual element in which thinking truly thinks. Therefore, we still do not know enough in what element thinking still occurs, since it is thinking. The main feature of thinking that has existed so far is perception. The ability to do this is called intelligence.

What does the mind perceive? In what element does perception reside, so that thinking occurs through it? Perception is a translation of the Greek word uoetu, which means: to notice something present, noticing, taking it before oneself and accepting it as present. This taking-before-it perception is representation in a simple, broad and at the same time essential sense, in which we let the present stand and lie before us as it stands and lies.
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In the interpretation of thinking by Parmenides (that early Greek thinker who still largely determines the essence of Western European thinking), in no case does what we would call thinking come first. On the contrary, the definition of the essence of thinking is based directly on what will henceforth be decisive for its essence, on what thinking perceives as perception, namely, on beings in its being. Parmenides says (Phram. VIII, 34/36):

“After all, the same thing is perception and that
for the sake of which it (perception) exists.
For without the being of beings, in which
it affected (i.e. perception),
you will not find perception.”

From these words of Parmenides the following emerges: thinking receives its essence - perception - from the being of beings. But what does the existence of beings mean? What does it mean here, and for the Greeks, and for all Western European thinking - until the very last time? The answer to this question, which has not yet been posed because it is too simple, sounds like this: the being of a being means the presence 12 present, presence present. This answer is a leap into the unknown.

What thinking perceives as perception is what is present in its presence. Based on it - presence - thinking takes measures for its essence - for perception. Therefore, thinking is the presentation 13 present, which hands us what is present in its presence and places it before us, so that we can stand before the present and endure this standing within presence. As such a presentation, thinking hands over to us what is present and restores it in relation to us. Therefore, presentation is re-presentation. The word repraesentatio is a later common name for representation.

The main feature of the thinking that has existed so far is representation. According to the ancient doctrine of thinking, representation occurs in λόγος , this word here means statement, judgment. Therefore, the doctrine of thinking, about λόγος , is called logic. Kant simply accepts the traditional characteristic of thinking - representation,
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When it defines the basic act of thinking, judgment as a representation of the representation of an object (Critique of Pure Reason. A. 68, B. 93). For example, when we express the judgment “This path is rocky,” in this judgment the representation of an object, i.e., the path, is represented from a certain side of the representation, namely from the side of rockiness.

The main feature of thinking is representation. Perception unfolds in representation. The representation itself is a re-presentation. Why is thinking based on perception? Is it because perception unfolds in representation? Why is representation a re-presentation?

Philosophy behaves as if there is nothing to ask here.
But the fact that thinking is still based on representation, and representation on re-presentation, all this has a long origin. It is hidden in an inconspicuous event: at the beginning of the history of Western Europe, the being of beings appeared for its entire course as presence, as presence. This phenomenon of being as the presence of the present is itself Start 14 Western European history, if, of course, we imagine history not as mere incidents, but think of it primarily in accordance with what was sent through history from the very beginning and dominates everything that happens.

Being means presence. But this easily pronounced main feature of being, presence, after a moment becomes mysterious again, as soon as we awaken and turn to what our thinking refers to by what we call presence.

The present is the lasting, which enters into unconcealment and exists within it. Presence occurs only where unconcealment already reigns. But what is present exists insofar as it, as present, is extended into unconcealment.

Therefore, presence includes not only unconcealment, but also the present. The present that dominates presence is a property of time, the essence of which, however, in no way allows itself to be comprehended in the traditional concept of time.

But in being, which has appeared as presence, neither the unconcealment that reigns in it, nor the essence of the present and time that reigns in it, is still inconceivable. Probably, unconcealment and the present as the essence of time belong mutually. Since we perceive beings in their being,
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Since we, in the language of the New Age, represent objects in their objectivity, we already think. We have been thinking this way for a long time. But still we do not yet truly think as long as that on which the being of a being is based when it appears as presence remains unthought.

The origin of the essence of being of beings is unthinkable. What truly requires understanding most of all is still hidden. For us it has not yet become worthy of thought. Therefore, our thinking has not yet reached its own element. We are not yet thinking in in its own sense words. So we ask: what does it mean to think?

Notes

1 Report “Was hei βt Denken? broadcast in May 1952 to Bavarian radio, published in the magazine “Mercury” (VI, 1952), based on a series of lectures “What does it mean to think?”, read in the 1951/52 academic year at the University of Freiburg, which were published in the 8th volume of the Collection . Op.
2 hei βen- to know, to be called. An example of M. Heidegger’s characteristic play on the polysemy of a word, in which one meaning reveals the meaning of the other. The question “What does it mean to think?” (“What is called thinking?”) is clarified by the question “What is called thinking?” (“What calls him?”), which refers us to being. Being turns to thinking, seeks it, demands it. Thinking is a response, response, response to this call of existence, correspondence to it.
2 M. Heidegger deduces this statement from the fact that in German to wish, to want - m ögen; be able, be able - verm ögen.
3 zu-Bedenkende - that which is given for comprehension, that for the sake of which thinking exists.
4 Andenken. Play on words: denken - think, andenken - remember.
5 das Freundliche (substantivized adjective).
6 das Bedenkliche - subject to comprehension.
7 das Bedenklichste - most subject to thought.
8 Sichverbergen
9 Unverborgenheit - unconcealment. The negative particle un - in Unverborgenheit (Heidegger’s version of the translation of the Greek. ἀ ληθεια - truth) Heidegger understands also in the sense of strengthening and in the sense of assimilation. Unconcealment is not a property, a state, but an event, an accomplishment (Geschehnis, Ereignis). Unconcealed, unconcealed - this is especially, unusually hidden, “emphasized and clearly hidden.”
10 wesen is a neologism by M. Heidegger. A verb formed by the noun essence (Wesen) and presence (Anwesen). In the verb wesen one hears spontaneous growth, the growth of the essence. Other translation options: to exist, to come into being. This neologism by M. Heidegger is an attempt to overcome the traditional distinction between essence and existence and reintroduce the temporal nature of being.
11 vordenken - to think in advance, preparatoryly, i.e. that is, looking ahead and preparing the way for what is to come. Vordenken is preparatory thinking, by its very existence it helps to come to what will appear.
12 Agshezep - presence, presence, is understood as the arrival, the arrival of the “essence”, its rooting, protrusion, the exit of beings into “unconcealment”.
13 Pr äsentation- presentation, the act of presenting, presenting, putting in front of oneself.
14 der Anfand - means for M. Heidegger more than just a starting point in time or history, it is a beginning that is preserved in the fact that it begins and determines it, a source from an inexhaustible source, in other words, it has the meaning of the Greek. arche.

Translation: A. S. Solodovnikova

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