We think of every being as definite. We talk about the existence of the material, endowing it with such features as objectivity, extension, temporality, etc. Specific types of material existence, say field or substance, can be endowed with additional features: permeability, heaviness, etc. Distinguishing ideal existence from material existence , we also resort to the signs that determine the latter: purposefulness, subjectivity, etc. Within the framework of the opposition thinking-being or consciousness-matter, any form of existence has relative certainty. If any type of being can become the subject of judgment for us, then by indicating the predicates of being in the judgment, we thereby think of it as relative: as relating through predicates-signs to another type of being. However, such reasoning turns out to be very problematic when it comes to transcendental existence.

The idea of ​​transcendental existence arose in philosophy long before Kant. However, I begin with Kant because, unlike his predecessors, he viewed the transcendental as a special existence of human subjectivity. The peculiarity of such existence is its non-predicative nature, so that it cannot be the subject of complete judgment. Transcendental existence is thought of as existence in general, as absolute existence. It can be expressed in the form "X is", while relative existence is expressed in a proposition like "A is B".

The idea of ​​the transcendental Self is introduced by Kant in the context of solving the problem of possibility synthetic judgments a priori, the possibility of knowledge about the world in general. Kant discovers the transcendental in human consciousness as a certain absolute condition of knowledge. The transcendental self is justified by Kant by the continuity and objectivity of experience. The continuity of experience as a subject-object relationship presupposes the continuity of the object, subject and their relationship. The continuity of an object means its self-identity in experience. The objective basis of self-identity are the laws of nature, in particular causal laws, thanks to which we can say that the object has remained unchanged or, if it has changed, then we can indicate this change within the boundaries of experience. The presence of a constant, uninterrupted connection between subject and object means, generally speaking, their mutual inevitability, so that one could talk about one and the same experience. Finally, the subjective condition for the continuity of experience is the self-identity of the subject of experience. If the first two conditions of continuity are absent, then the possibility, albeit apparent, of continuity still remains. If the last condition is absent, then the continuity of experience will not be given to us in any way. Since “no one’s” experience exists, then, according to Kant, the main condition for the continuity of experience is the third condition: the continuity of the existence of the Self, conscious of itself as a self-identical existence. Since subjectivity is always fluid and changeable, the guarantor of the continuity of subjective states is a certain unchanging core, which we call “I”. Schizophrenia of consciousness is unacceptable. According to Kant, the act of self-consciousness “I think” is a necessary (although - note - not sufficient) condition for the continuity of experience. Moreover, Kant argues that the act “I think” is a necessary condition for both the existence of experience and its objectivity. According to the logic of Kant’s reasoning, we can assert the objectivity of something only by establishing a distinction between the existence of an object and the concept, knowledge about it. Therefore, even before experience with an object, the concept of the object must already exist. The objectivity of experience is thus conditioned by the presence of self-identical acts of consciousness.

Kant dissociates himself from the subjectively idealistic interpretation of experience, emphasizing that he does not question the existence of the external world and does not try to prove its existence from the premise “I think” - as was the case with Descartes. The very existence of the acts “I think” or “I am”, as a condition for experience and obtaining knowledge about the world, “is known to us only because,” Kant points out, “it is necessary for us for the possibility of experience.” “I think” forms the basis of the unity of consciousness and self-awareness. That unity of self-consciousness, which Kant considers as necessary condition the possibilities of objective experience, he calls transcendental (transcendental unity of apperception). According to Kant's definition, the transcendental takes place in the sphere of the conditions of possibility of experience (and not experience itself). The a priori concepts of the understanding relate generally to the conditions of experience itself. Space and time are a priori conditions of contemplation for the external and internal senses. But the transcendental is a special form of the a priori, thanks to which we know “that certain ideas (contemplations or concepts) apply and can exist exclusively a priori, as well as how this is possible.” Very important feature the transcendental subject in the act “I think” is its uncertainty and indefinability: “...Thinking my existence, I can only serve as a subject of judgment; but this... judgment says absolutely nothing about the way I exist.” So in acts of self-consciousness there is always the knowledge that “I am”, but How I exist - it is impossible to know this.

In this regard, it is interesting to pay attention to the difference in the positions of Kant and Descartes. Descartes’ “I think, therefore I exist” has a logical meaning if, Kant notes, this conclusion is preceded by the large premise “everything that thinks exists,” which cannot be considered true. Existence cannot, according to Kant, be a consequence of thinking. For Kant, “I exist” and “I think” are identical. The existence of the transcendental in the acts “I think” or “I am” is an existence of a special kind, which - in Kant’s own terms - is neither an “appearance”, a phenomenon, nor a “thing in itself”, a noumenon. This existence is not categorical, that is, it cannot be defined by categories (in particular, by the category “substance”, to which Kant devotes a considerable number of pages of the Critique of Pure Reason). The existential judgment “I am” serves as an expression of the “indefinite empirical intuition” that precedes experience. “...Indefinite perception here means only something real, given only for thinking in general, ... not as a phenomenon and not as a thing in itself (noumenon), but only as something that really exists and is designated as such in the judgment I THINK” . Thus, Kant’s analysis of the experience of consciousness leads to the idea of ​​the need to recognize some special existence associated with acts of awareness of “I am.” Within the framework of the thinking-being opposition, this special existence (of the transcendental Self) finds no place for itself. Just as phenomenon-essence does not find a place for itself in opposition. The transcendental I turns out to be neither one nor the other member of the opposition.

Analysis of the concept of the transcendental self leads many researchers of Kant's theory of knowledge to the conclusion that this concept is contradictory. For example, V. A. Lektorsky captures this inconsistency as follows: “On the one hand, it is considered as some deep force of myself, in this; On this point, Kant is similar to Husserl and Fichte. However, the transcendental subject is also a thing in itself (the above quote from Kant says that such an assessment is not accurate. - I.N.), some otherworldly entity. And here it already appears as something located not only in me, but also outside of me, as “consciousness in general,” as an objective structure underlying all individual consciousnesses.” Once again: a deep, hidden power within me and something absolute outside of me - these are the characteristics of the transcendental existence of the subject. It is important to note that Kant is talking not only about the transcendental existence of the subject, but also about the transcendental existence of an object given in the form of a transcendental idea. Both the subjective and object existence of the transcendental are determined by the above characteristics, which tell us nothing about the mode of existence of the transcendental. The only knowledge about it is the knowledge that it There is.

The categorical indefinability of transcendental existence served as a reason to deny the legitimacy of Kantian transcendentalism by some philosophers or to search for a “third” reality (neither material nor ideal) by others.

Before moving on to consider the fate of Kant's transcendentalism in post-Kantian philosophy, we note that the negative attitude towards the concept of a transcendental subject is associated with a strict and unambiguous “binding” of the concept of the transcendental to apriorism and agnosticism. This connection takes place in Kant. However, the main function of transcendental ideas is seen by Kant as a regulatory function in relation to the activity of the mind in the process of applying a priori concepts to objects of experience. Often the expression “a priori ideas” in Kant’s text is separated only by a comma from the expression “ideas that do not have an empirical origin” (pp. 84, 158, etc. “Critique of Pure Reason”). For Kant, a priori ideas and ideas that do not have an empirical origin are one and the same thing. However, in modern philosophy recognizing the existence of ideas of non-empirical origin does not mean following Kantian apriorism. The problem of the transcendental must, generally speaking, be considered independently in relation to apriorism.

It is also widely believed that transcendentalism leads to agnosticism. However, an unbiased, not conditioned by the dogmas of the “materialist reading” of Kant does not confirm such an opinion. Firstly, Kant himself foresaw a number of accusations of agnosticism and responded to them. The pathos of his “Critique of Pure Reason” lies in showing how the world is knowable and knowable, how knowledge about the world is possible and how to “discipline” the mind for the purpose of effective and deeper knowledge of the world. Where, as they say, Kant limits reason in order to make room for faith, in reality we are talking not about the limitation of reason, but about those boundaries beyond which it, as an instrument, turns out to be powerless and even self-destructive. True, this is a separate topic. In addition, we talk about the unknowability of the world in both absolute and relative senses. The idea of ​​the omnipotence of reason does not contradict the idea of ​​​​the infinity of knowledge, which means that it may well be consistent with the fact that the unknown will always exist, therefore, there will be something that we can never know. As for relative unknowability, this is the flip side of relative knowability. With respect to any specific form, specific method of cognition, there is always a reality that “falls out” of the sphere of the knowable. The unknowable reality as a fact of our consciousness should not irritate or frighten, but is an important factor in the determination of knowledge by ignorance. Finally, we note that agnosticism can be justified independently of the recognition of transcendental existences.

Further development of the ideas of transcendental philosophy was associated with attempts to interpret the nature of the transcendental subject.

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Ontological turn" in the interpretation of the transcendental
In post-Kantian philosophy, the idea of ​​apriorism undergoes degeneration, as philosophers sought to reveal the nature of the aprioristic. The originality of modern Western philosophy

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Spontaneity of the transcendental

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Non-existence of the transcendental Self
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Absolute frame of reference in the theory of relativity
With the emergence of A. Einstein’s special theory of relativity, it became possible to talk about the relativity of the existence of such properties that were considered in classical natural science

Paradoxes of the relativity of the subject's existence in quantum physics
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Absolute standards in gauge field theory
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Multidimensional world of observation
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Experience and time in the natural sciences
Analyzing a number of methodological and epistemological problems of classical and modern natural science, I sought to show that the fact of the existence of knowledge about an object of nature is associated with the condition

Polysubjectivity and objectivity of cognition
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Types of subject transcendence
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Creativity and knowledge
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Spontaneity and irreversibility of cognition
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The problematic nature of human existence
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Existential meaning of knowledge
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Symbol and concept

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I. Kant sets the task of establishing the difference between objective and subjective elements of knowledge, based on the subject itself and its structure. In the subject, he distinguishes 2 levels: empirical and transcendental. The empirical includes the individual psychological characteristics of a person (sensory experience), the transcendental includes the inherent (attributive) properties of a person. These attributive properties associated with the activity of cognition, with cognitive activity, are properties that form the structure of the “transcendental subject,” which is a supra-individual principle in man. The objectivity (truth) of knowledge is determined precisely by this structure. According to Kant, philosophy should not study “things in themselves,” but investigate cognitive activity, thinking and its boundaries. In this sense, Kant called his philosophy “transcendental” and his method “critical”. Thus, he brings to its logical conclusion the orientation of modern philosophy towards the theory of knowledge, replacing ontology with epistemology.

Ideas:

The fact that all knowledge begins with experience does not mean that all knowledge arises only from experience;

Knowledge is possible thanks to the complementary activity of the senses.

Kant believes in his critical philosophy that it is precisely overcoming the extremes of rationalistic and empirical epistemology that allows us to develop a correct idea of ​​the process of cognition.

Kant believes that the immediate objects of perception are caused in part by external “single things” that give rise to sensory sensations.

Kant calls a thing that exists objectively (transcendentally) “thing-in-itself.” The way a thing is given to the subject in perception and thinking is called “thing-for-us.” If the “thing-in-itself” exists outside of knowledge, then the “thing-for-us” is the content of consciousness, the subject.

The phenomenon of “things for us” consists of 2 parts.

Phenomenon – this is the appearance of a thing through sensory perception, due to the impact of the thing on the senses; it is how the “thing for us” is experienced.

Noumenon - this is that in the phenomenon of a thing that is opposite to the phenomenon; this is the a priori structure (essence) of a thing, independent of experience, the form of a thing comprehended by the mind, existing a priori. The noumenon is not a sensation and does not depend on the transcendental environment, on the randomness of perception. Noumenon is the content of the transcendental subject, common and natural for all empirical subjects, and in this sense the aprionic form of any possible experience.

Name the issues related to the field of epistemology.

transcendental subject

one of the main concepts of post-Kantian metaphysical logic. Introduced into philosophical use by Kant, it denotes the “highest principle” of a priori synthetic judgments. When considering the pure “I” as the “highest principle” of synthetic knowledge, one could assume that T.S. exists before the object, as many interpreters of critical philosophy subsequently did. However, if we follow Kant himself, this turns out to be meaningless, since in this case it would be impossible to judge the application of the certifying “synthetic unity” as the only function of the subject, therefore, we would not know anything not only about the object, but also about the subject. Hence the awareness of the synthesis of ideas in an a priori synthetic judgment, or the “unity of reflection on phenomena” is not just a self-sufficient unity, but an “objective unity of self-consciousness.” This feature of T.S., its purely logical essence and lack of independence, is determined by the fact that it represents, according to Kant, the “highest principle”, the acting logical principle and nothing more. From the position of critical philosophy, T.S. precedes the objective world only in epistemological, or rather logical, terms. The mental activity that puts into practice the pure “I” as a principle that certifies the synthesis is called “understanding” by Kant. The “reason” carries out this activity using “concepts” that constitute the “unity of pure synthesis.” In concepts, reason expresses, firstly, the synthesis of diversity in pure intuition, i.e. unity in one contemplation; secondly, the synthesis of this diversity through the faculty of imagination, in other words, unity in one judgment. Hence, the concept captures the reliability of the synthesis both at the level of sensibility and at the level of thinking. So, according to Kant, it is in “reason” that the entire completeness of a priori synthesis lies. As a result, “reason,” having the ability to think of an object as a transcendental object, i.e. as a reliable object, and not just true, represents T.S. In post-Kantian metaphysical logic T.S. is no longer interpreted as a logical form of a priori synthetic judgments, but as a form of synthetic conclusions (they are always a priori). In Hegel, for example, in his dialectical logic, transcendental consciousness, i.e. The “logical” subject is understood as a form of dialectical sorites (a form of multi-link definitional specification), which determines its direction, in other words, as a form of any mental mediation. “Essentially, man exists as spirit not directly, but as a return to himself,” “restlessness is selfhood” are some of Hegel’s few statements on this matter. T.S., thus, is “not some kind of abstraction from human nature,” but the very movement of definitional specification towards complete and final individuality, singularity, i.e. activity of logical processing of all content knowledge. So, in Hegelian metaphysical logic, such an aspect of “consciousness” as its historicity begins to stand out. This is no longer the “transcendental unity of apperception”, as the highest logical form of a priori synthetic judgments, but a certain spirit that determines the general direction of its synthetic conclusions, i.e. having a special logical history. The logical story of T.S. (“absolute spirit”) coincides with natural processes up to isomorphism. Therefore, the identity system relies on the unity of logic and ontology. The concept of "T.S." was also widely used in post-Hegelian transcendental philosophy, while it was understood as an instance that allows for the logical processing of any empirical content to potentially infinite limits. For example, in Windelband’s critical philosophy, “normal consciousness” must compare “representations” with “values” (a special form of a priori synthetic knowledge) in such a way that literally all conceivable “representations” can be involved in this process. In Husserl's phenomenology "transcendental consciousness", "ego"

capable of transforming absolutely any object into a flow of phenomena and determining the principles of their flow. In Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics, “actual-historical consciousness,” by definition, absorbs all the specifics of hermeneutic experience. In any model of transcendental philosophy and its modifications one can find its analogues to the concept of “T.S.” The only current of transcendentalism that does not accept the logical principle of T.S. in any form is transcendental pragmatics. Its representatives (Apel, Habermas) as a general metatheory philosophical discourse stopped using metaphysical logic, proposing instead modern methods of informal logic, so the need for the concept of “T.S.”, from their point of view, disappears by itself.

Transcendental subject

The materialistic hypothesis that a person’s spirit is dependent on the substance of his body in general and his brain in particular is supported by the same number of phenomena as the opposite, spiritualistic hypothesis, which makes a person’s body dependent on his spirit. It follows from this that there is no causal connection at all between the phenomena of a person’s bodily and spiritual life (neither the phenomena of the life of his body are determined by the phenomena of the life of his spirit, nor vice versa), that there is only parallelism between them; and since this is possible only if these phenomena represent the product of the activity of one common cause, then the supporters of dualism would have to adhere to Leibniz's pre-established harmony.

The dualism of body and spirit represents only one of the types of dualism of matter and forces, the resolution of which is primarily the task of the philosophy of natural science, and then of transcendental psychology. If the dualism of matter and force is resolvable, its reason must lie not in the nature of things, but in the nature of our soul. Matter and force, taken separately, the first in the sense of dead matter, and the second in the sense of immaterial force, represent empty abstractions of the human mind, which is why they never occur as such in the field of experience. Their apparent dualism comes down most closely to the dualism of his ability to perceive, generated by the psychophysical threshold of human consciousness, to which of the two sides of the material world, force or material, sides that, taken by themselves, objectively always exist together and which can exist separately only in our thinking, it is perceived by it. It follows from this that each of the forces acting on us must have something corresponding to it on the material side of the world of things, but not perceived by our senses, that is, that not everything not perceived by our senses is immaterial. Only beings whose threshold of consciousness is not crossed by all the forces acting on them, which some of them perceive sensually, while others only comprehend, and can mentally separate force from matter, can create abstractions that are impossible for beings (whether they are or not), which they themselves are not separated by the threshold of consciousness, that is, they perceive all the forces acting on them. Before beings of the latter kind, thoughts directed at them must materialize and appear, at least in the form of hallucinations, while beings who, like us, have a threshold of consciousness, depending on the intensity of the forces acting on them, either perceive only tangible matter or do not perceive Nothing.

However, it seems that in the field of the most exact natural science, preparatory work is being carried out for the appearance of monism in it. Apparently, in the writings of Crookes and Jaeger* there are already the makings of a physics and a chemistry in which force and matter will not represent enemies for some reason doomed to live together in the world of things, but only the final steps of the same ladder. Once we resolve the dualism of force and matter, any metaphysics, if we look at it from the point of view of another, not our, faculty of perception, will have to turn into physics, and the question of whether a person can look into the metaphysical essence of things will receive an affirmative answer if it turns out that the threshold of his consciousness is capable of movement. The latter happens when a person is in somnambulism, which is why in this state he sensually perceives something that is not perceived by him in his other states, for example, the flows of odic light accompanying magnetic passes. But we cannot determine the limits to which the capacity of human perception can extend; only one thing can be said, namely: if all matter is visible force, and all force is invisible matter, then the decision of the question of whether a given person can read the thoughts of a stranger (as Cumberland did recently in Vienna, who was looked upon as everyone who does not know that the ability he discovers represents an almost normal property of all somnambulists) or cannot feel even its strongest blows, is exclusively dependent on the position of the threshold of his consciousness.

* Crookes. Die Strahlende Materie. Leipzig, 1882. – Jaeger. Die Neuralanalyse. (Entdeckung der Seele. II). Leipzig, 1884.

This means that when materialists look at matter from the point of view of human feelings, identifying the real and the sensory, this is pure arbitrariness on their part. With the same right, one could look at it from the point of view of such feelings that one would have to recognize neither gaseous nor liquid matter and assert that only objects with which one can punch a hole in the head are material.

In order for matter to be perceived by our senses, a very high degree of accumulation of its particles is necessary. The more an object reveals its material side to us, such as a piece of granite, the more its power side disappears for us, and then we talk about dead matter. And on the contrary, the more the force side of an object appears before us, as is the case when we perceive thought, the more its material side disappears for us, and then we talk about immaterial force. But this ideal bifurcation of force and matter, spirit and body cannot at all be considered real and one cannot look at the two sides of one as two independent persons.

The presence of a person in a normal state is determined by the presence of the threshold of his consciousness in a normal position, which also determines the normal place and passage of the boundary line between force and matter. And since any movement of this threshold for him is accompanied by a movement for him of this boundary line, then the resolution of the dualism that exists for us between force and matter must be expected from a special section of transcendental psychology about the opposition between spirit and body, which represents a particular type of this dualism, and it will follow , as soon as it is proven that our transcendental subject can be looked at as the common cause of the appearance of both our body and spirit. In the process of my thinking, my self-awareness perceives its force side; but if this process could be observed by a stranger to me, he would only perceive the molecular changes taking place in my brain, only the material side of this process would be visible to him. Here, despite the objective inseparability of both sides of the process, its internal observer would take the side of spiritualism and the denial of its material side, the external observer would take the side of materialism and the denial of its force side.

Since the shifting of the threshold of his consciousness that occurs in a person while he is in somnambulistic states is accompanied not only by new influences of things on him, but also by new reactions to these influences, then in these states he experiences an expansion of his mental subject. From this follows the conclusion that our self-consciousness does not contain our entire subject, but only our self immersed in the phenomenal world; it contains our mental reactions, evoked in us only by the influence of things we perceive sensually, while our abilities, corresponding to the influences of other things on us that remain under the threshold of our consciousness, usually remain in a state hidden from us. This means that we must distinguish our transcendental subject from the content of our sensory self-consciousness, from our sensory self. But although by admitting the existence of this, which lies at the basis of all our sensory manifestation of the subject, we unquestionably resolve the dualism that exists between our organism and our organically mediated consciousness, this immediately creates another, even deeper, dualism: the dualism between our transcendental being, with on the one hand, and an organic form of detection of our subject, including our sensory consciousness, on the other. Thus, here there is a kind of transformation of a planimetric problem into a stereometric one, and therefore we must first of all understand this new dualism, and then resolve it monistically.

So, transcendental psychology needs to direct its research mainly to our transcendental consciousness that lies beyond the boundaries of our normal consciousness, which can be observed thanks to the ability of our threshold of consciousness in some exceptional states to change its position. Since the phenomenon of the latter kind usually occurs with a weakening of our sensory consciousness, which occurs while we are in sleep and in other states related to it, then our sleep, or, better said, the dream that takes place in us, represents the gates of that dark kingdom in which in which we will find our metaphysical root.

We have already noticed before that every researcher is led to this gate by one of the most ordinary phenomena of our life in a dream. Namely. Since every dialogue we have in a dream is obviously a monologue dramatized due to the splitting of our dreaming subject, it is logically conceivable and psychologically possible that our subject splits into two persons, of which only one is actually accessible to our self-consciousness. Thus, it is enough to refer to this everyday phenomenon of human life to immediately prove that the division of its subject into persons can serve as a metaphysical formula for its solution.

If we take a quick review of the previous one (these are the chapters of our study: “The Metaphysical Meaning of Dreams”, “The Transcendental Measure of Time”, “The Dream is a Doctor”, “Memory”, etc.), it becomes clear enough that it is nothing more than as proof of the existence of our transcendental subject. And the results we obtained are sufficient to lay the foundation of the system, the construction of which is the goal of our present work.

If in reality there is no dualism between force and matter, then our transcendental subject cannot be a purely spiritual being, and the transcendental world cannot be a purely immaterial world. This means that a purely spiritual relationship cannot exist between this being and this world; between them there is a physical-psychic relationship that is transcendental for us.

Just as our sensory organism corresponds to the laws of physics known to us, our transcendental subject corresponds to those law-like properties of things that are transcendental for us and which can be perceived by us only by moving the threshold of our consciousness, expanding the boundaries of our sensuality, whether this is accomplished through somnambulism or thanks to a process of biological development that contributes to the fact that our supersensible will sooner or later acquire sensory evidence for us, and our transcendental abilities will sooner or later become our normal property.

Only in Lately, which must be attributed to the fact that we have natural scientists who consider the study of Kant unnecessary, natural scientists, at the initiative of one of their famous brothers, began to talk about the boundaries of natural science. Kant proved that there are not boundaries, but limits to natural science, and that the difference between these two concepts is significant and very important. He says: “As long as the knowledge of the mind remains homogeneous, which, translated into modern language, means: while the threshold of our consciousness remains in a normal position, it is impossible to imagine definite boundaries for it. And indeed, in mathematics and natural science, the human mind recognizes limits, but not boundaries , that is, he only recognizes that here, outside of him, there is something that he can never achieve, and not that he himself, in his internal process, has ended somewhere, although the expansion of mathematical knowledge and the possibility of new ones. discoveries in mathematics are endless, just as the process of discovery and unification through constantly continuing experience by our mind of new properties of nature, new forces and its laws is endless, but one cannot help but see limits here, since mathematics deals only with phenomena, and the fact that , like the concepts of metaphysics and ethics, cannot be an object of sensory perception, is completely outside its scope and can never be achieved by it."*

*Kant. Prolegomena. §57.

Thus, the limits of natural science are laid down for us by the very nature of our cognitive organ, the nature of our feelings and brain, and are transgressable only to the extent that the threshold of our consciousness is mobile. The boundaries of natural science are transgressed by us as the historical development of the sciences occurs, in which knowledge of nature remains homogeneous: they are transgressed by us historically; its limits, if we do not take into account our somnambulistic states, can be transgressed by us only through a corresponding shift in the threshold of our consciousness, which can only be produced by our biological development: they are transgressable by us only biologically. Thanks to somnambulism, the limits are crossed by the human individual, thanks to biological development - by humanity; but at the basis of both processes lies the movement of the threshold of our consciousness. In somnambulism, a person’s individual immersion occurs in that very transcendental world, which should open to all of humanity after his consciousness completes everything necessary for that path of biological development. Our biological development consists in our gradual adaptation to the world of things, now still transcendental for us; in the process of this adaptation, our consciousness approaches the consciousness of beings belonging to this world. But man, as a subject, is in him even now, and therefore the biological development of his consciousness can only be accomplished by borrowing his consciousness from his transcendental subject. The sixth sense that can appear in a person will only be the feeling that he, as a transcendental being, already possesses; future man will be adapted to the very world in which modern man lives only with the transcendental part of his being. Both our somnambulism and our biological development transfer our previously existing irritations across the threshold of our consciousness. Therefore, the abilities of somnambulists represent secret hints not only about the nature of our subject and the nature of the future form of organic life on earth, but also, insofar as this form can be realized somewhere other than on earth, about the nature of the inhabitants of the worlds.

If a person biologically adapts to that very transcendental world to which he as a subject already belongs, and if the identity of these two worlds follows from the fact that this subject represents the core and bearer of the form of his earthly existence, then this core, being a monistic producer and its physical manifestation and its earthly consciousness, must determine both organically and spiritually the nature of a person’s future existence, constantly leading him into the depths of the transcendental. However, on the way to the acceptance by people of such a view there is an obstacle, consisting in their tendency to look at every supersensible existence as immaterial, and at every material existence as grossly material; but this obstacle will disappear immediately as soon as we recognize that the dualism of force and matter does not exist in itself, but only for our perception. If force and matter are only two undivided sides of the whole, then we cannot consider our transcendental subject to be completely immaterial, but must attribute to it some materiality, either by understanding matter, for example, as the fourth state of bodies, or by imagining an organism at the extreme step of the biological ladder of the future , the mode of existence of which will be similar to the present mode of existence of our transcendental subject. If, taking this point of view, we look at the process of successive development of the kingdoms of nature, we will see that in it, from stone to man, there is a gradual refinement of matter, from which the conclusion logically follows that our posthumous existence, similar to the present existence of our transcendental subject, cannot be diametrically opposed to our earthly existence. We must consider the difference between our lifetime and posthumous states as insignificant as possible, since a logically permissible existence differs little from the present one. In addition, about pure spirit, as Kant already developed at the beginning of his work “Dreams of a Spiritual Seer,” we cannot formulate any concept for ourselves: immortality becomes understandable only after renouncing any thought about the dualism of force and matter, spirit and body.

So, if we renounce the dualism of force and matter, then our posthumous existence will cease to be completely incomprehensible to us, since it will be similar to our present transcendental existence and will come even closer to our earthly existence, if we take into account what takes place in it It is not the first time that our abilities are acquired by us after our death, that we possess them unconsciously even now, and that our somnambulistic state represents a preliminary to our posthumous existence. Our death cannot produce a fundamental change in our mental being, since this would contradict the gradualism we observe in all nature; it can only by removing the obstacle to the flowering of the abilities that are within us and now in a latent state of ours cause their flowering in us. But such an obstacle is our bodily organism, its consciousness: our body does not facilitate, but hinders the discovery of our somnambulistic abilities, since their activity in us can only manifest itself if our sensuality is weakened. Our body constitutes unnecessary ballast both for the bearer of our transcendental abilities and for our future form of life. We can attribute only such materiality to both this vehicle and this form that in this case matter turns into pure force for our gross feelings. Of course, it is impossible to give reasons for the unconditional necessity of such an idea of ​​the future man. If we assume that the process of biological development on earth must end with a process of historical development, for example, the process of continuous development of the human brain, then in this case we can combine transcendental psychology and Darwinism in the doctrine of Schelling’s immortality, a doctrine based on the idea that that in the life of humanity, taken in its entirety, there is a successive change of three states, namely: the first stage of human life is the real, one-sided, bodily life of a person; the second is also a one-sided, spiritual image of his existence; the third life, which combines both previous ones.* Thus, according to Schelling’s teaching, with the onset of the last period of human life, our transcendental abilities should become the normal property of the inhabitants of the whole world.

* Beckers. Die Unsterblichkeitslehre Schellings. 56-58.

Moving from our transcendental subject to our transcendental world, we must here also assume the smallest possible difference between this world of ours and our sensory world; our transcendental world cannot differ from our sensory world toto genere, and it must be material in its own way. This means that if we want to be true monists and renounce the dualism of force and matter, we must certainly agree with the following words of Schelling: “Not ours, spiritual world must be as material in its kind as our material world is spiritual in its kind."** But a clearer idea of ​​this world is impossible for us, since for such an idea of ​​it we would need to have the corresponding feelings. We cannot we can abandon the traditional idea of ​​our transcendental world as a kingdom of spirits, spatially separated from our sensory world, therefore, as soon as the inconsistency of this idea was personally proven by modern science, we threw out the child with the bathwater and became materialists. , just as our transcendental subject is in ourselves and controls the unconscious life of our soul, our transcendental world is in our sensory world. Our other world represents a continuation of our this-worldly world, but a continuation that lies beyond the threshold of our consciousness. Man, as a biological form, is adapted. only to his this-worldly world; his other world is hidden from his cognitive organ, just as the experimentally demonstrable continuations of the solar spectrum are hidden from his eye, the adaptation of which has not extended beyond the colors of the rainbow. We must transfer our existing concept of the threshold of our consciousness from our individual feelings to our entire organism and look at the latter as the limit of all our knowledge. Just as, for example, in an oyster its organism serves as a threshold separating it from most of the sensory-perceptible world, in a person its organism serves as a threshold separating it from the world that is transcendental for it. The following can be said about the spatial otherworldliness of our transcendental world: since, taking into account the teachings of Kant and Darwin, we must look at changes in space as forms of our knowledge acquired by us through our biological development, we can assume that our transcendental world can extend and into the fourth dimension. If our body represents a barrier between us and reality, then eo ipso this barrier is not only our individual feelings, but also their place of concentration - our brain, along with its forms of cognition: space and time. As for the hypothesis of the fourth dimension itself, various reasons are given in its favor: Kant - philosophical, Gauss and Riemann - mathematical, Zellner - cosmological; being under such patronage, she does not need the approval of “enlightened” people.

* Schellings. Werke. A. IX. 94.

The question of how much the threshold of our consciousness hides reality from us should relate not only to the external world, but also to the internal one. At the same time, it turns out that this threshold separates us both from our world, which is transcendental for us, and from our subject, which is transcendental for us. Kant is quite clear about this. As for the content of our self-consciousness, he, as we will see later, believed a sharp distinction between our subject and our face. Regarding the content of our consciousness, he says the following: “Since it is impossible to say that something is part of a whole, with the other parts of which it does not have any connection (for otherwise there would be no difference between real unity and imaginary unity), the world really represents one whole, then a creature that is not in connection with a single thing in the whole world cannot belong to this world except in our thought, that is, it cannot be part of it if there are many such creatures. and if they are in mutual relation to each other, a completely special whole, a completely special world will be formed from them. Therefore, people who preach from philosophical pulpits that from a metaphysical point of view can exist only one world... The reason for such a misconception. , undoubtedly, lies in the fact that, reasoning in this way, they do not pay strict attention to the definition of the world. After all, according to the definition of the world, only that which is in actual connection with the rest of its parts belongs to it, but with proof that it is one, they forget about this and classify everything that exists in general as one and the same world.”* With these words of Kant, the need to assume the extension of our transcendental subject is eliminated.

*Kant. Von der wahren Schatzung der Lebendigen Krafte §8.

Since now this other world, to which man as a sensory being has no relation, but to which he belongs as a subject, must also be conceivable as material in its own way, and since the same applies to the human subject, then transcendental-psychological A person’s abilities are stripped of their veil of miraculousness and become the same lawfully acting abilities as his other abilities. The lawfully acting forces that rule over our supersensible world serve at the same time as the forces with the help of which our subject orients himself and acts in it. This means that the rule of the law of causality must also apply to this world and to the relationship that exists between it and our subject, if we do not limit the concept of cause to the causes operating in our sensory world. The stereotypical phrase of the so-called enlightened people that the phenomena of somnambulism contradict the laws of nature is based on the application of the scale of the natural laws known to us to the transcendental world for us. They contradict only the laws of our sensory half of the world; taken by themselves, they are as law-like as the fall of a stone. What is miraculous for a half-hearted worldview can be consistent with laws for a whole worldview, which is why it is not surprising that the clairvoyance of somnambulists seems to “enlightened” journalists the same miracle that, for example, telegraphy seems to a savage. Already the church father Augustine defined a miracle with the words that “a miracle is not in contradiction with nature, but with what we know about nature.”*

* Augustinus. De civitate Dei. XXI. 8.

Armed with the results obtained, we can gradually move along the path of understanding the existing relationship between our worlds of this world and the other world and along the path of preparing the ground for the solution to death, this sphinx standing on the border of two worlds. However, now it is necessary to make a retreat.

The internal self-contemplation of somnambulists could not be critical if a person did not have a scale of comparison, that is, if he did not have an idea of ​​​​the pattern of the normal structure of his body; their predictions regarding the course of their illnesses would be impossible without their intuitive knowledge of the laws of inner life; their medical self-prescriptions would not have meaning if they did not come from his subject, critically contemplating his body and knowledgeable of laws the development of his diseases. But the last three phenomena would in turn be impossible if the transcendental subject of man were not also the organizing principle in him. But this by no means puts the metaphysical principle in place of Darwinian factors of development; the importance of these factors and their activities is in no way diminished by the fact that they are means to the achievement by our organizing principle of its goals. This principle must comply with the laws of matter on which it has to influence; therefore, the very detection itself outside its activity must be consistent with laws.

Thus, with the recognition of the existence of a transcendental subject in us, two doctrines banished by modern natural science are resurrected: the doctrine of purpose and the doctrine of vital force; but they are resurrected in a completely new form. I cannot look at a long-term dispute about one and the other other than as an idle voluble: it is known that with every concept various ideas are connected; expediency and vitality can be taken in such a sense that they become completely invulnerable to their opponents; therefore it is necessary to agree on what we wish to understand by them.

one of the main concepts of post-Kantian metaphysical logic. Introduced into philosophical use by Kant, it denotes the “highest principle” of a priori synthetic judgments. When considering the pure “I” as the “highest principle” of synthetic knowledge, one could assume that T.S. exists before the object, as many interpreters of critical philosophy subsequently did. However, if we follow Kant himself, this turns out to be meaningless, since in this case it would be impossible to judge the use of a certifying “synthetic unity” as the sole function of the subject - therefore, we would know nothing not only about the object, but also about the subject. Hence the awareness of the synthesis of ideas in an a priori synthetic judgment, or the “unity of reflection on phenomena” is not just a self-sufficient unity, but an “objective unity of self-consciousness.” This feature of T.S., its purely logical essence and lack of independence, is determined by the fact that it represents, according to Kant, the “highest principle”, the operating logical principle and nothing more. From the position of critical philosophy, T.S. precedes the objective world only in epistemological, or more precisely, logical, terms. The mental activity that puts into practice the pure “I” as a principle that certifies the synthesis is called “understanding” by Kant. The “reason” carries out this activity using “concepts” that constitute the “unity of pure synthesis.” In concepts, reason expresses, firstly, the synthesis of diversity in pure intuition, i.e. unity in one contemplation; secondly, the synthesis of this diversity through the faculty of imagination, in other words, unity in one judgment. Hence, the concept captures the reliability of the synthesis both at the level of sensibility and at the level of thinking. So, according to Kant, it is in “reason” that the entire completeness of a priori synthesis lies. As a result, “reason,” having the ability to think of an object as a transcendental object, i.e. as a reliable object, and not just true, represents T.S. In post-Kantian metaphysical logic T.S. is no longer interpreted as a logical form of a priori synthetic judgments, but as a form of synthetic inferences (they are always a priori). In Hegel, for example, in his dialectical logic, transcendental consciousness, i.e. The “logical” subject is understood as a form of dialectical sorites (a form of multi-link definitional specification) that determines its direction - in other words, as a form of any mental mediation. “Essentially, man exists as spirit not directly, but as a return to himself,” “restlessness is selfhood” are some of Hegel’s few statements on this matter. T.S., thus, is “not some kind of abstraction from human nature,” but the very movement of definitional specification towards complete and final individuality, singularity, i.e. activity of logical processing of all content knowledge. So, in Hegelian metaphysical logic, such an aspect of “consciousness” as its historicity begins to stand out. This is no longer the “transcendental unity of apperception”, as the highest logical form of a priori synthetic judgments, but a certain spirit that determines the general direction of its synthetic conclusions, i.e. having a special logical history. The logical story of T.S. (“absolute spirit”) coincides with natural processes up to isomorphism. Therefore, the identity system relies on the unity of logic and ontology. The concept of "T.S." was also widely used in post-Hegelian transcendental philosophy, while it was understood as an instance that allows for the logical processing of any empirical content to potentially infinite limits. For example, in Windelband’s critical philosophy, “normal consciousness” must compare “representations” with “values” (a special form of a priori synthetic knowledge) in such a way that literally all conceivable “representations” can be involved in this process. In Husserl's phenomenology "transcendental consciousness", "ego"

capable of transforming absolutely any object into a flow of phenomena and determining the principles of their flow. In Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics, “actual-historical consciousness,” by definition, absorbs all the specifics of hermeneutic experience. In any model of transcendental philosophy and its modifications one can find its analogues to the concept of “T.S.” The only current of transcendentalism that does not accept the logical principle of T.S. in any form is transcendental pragmatics. Its representatives (Apel, Habermas) stopped using metaphysical logic as a general metatheory of philosophical discourse, proposing instead modern methods of informal logic, so the need for the concept of “T.S.”, from their point of view, disappears by itself.

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