PHILOSOPHICAL, philosophical, philosophical. 1. adj. to philosophy in 1 value. “As for Marxist philosophical materialism, at its core it is directly opposed to philosophical idealism.” History of the CPSU(b). "... Philosophical materialism Marx... ... Ushakov's Explanatory Dictionary

PHILOSOPHICAL- Relating to philosophy. Dictionary of foreign words included in the Russian language. Pavlenkov F., 1907. PHILOSOPHICAL Reasonable; thorough; thinking. Explanation of 25,000 foreign words that have come into use in the Russian language, with their meaning... ... Dictionary of foreign words of the Russian language

philosophical- general philosophical, reasonable, serious, imperturbable, restrained, ideological, thoughtful, judicious, conceptual, calm, ideological Dictionary of Russian synonyms. philosophical 1. philosophical (obsolete) 2. see calm 1 ... Dictionary of synonyms

PHILOSOPHICAL- PHILOSOPHICAL, oh, oh. 1. see philosophy. 2. Characteristic of a philosopher (in 2 meanings), reasonable, reasonable and calm (colloquial). Philosophical calm. Treat everything philosophically (adv.). 3. transfer Deep-thought, serious (colloquial). Speak… … Ozhegov's Explanatory Dictionary

philosophical- and outdated philosophical... Dictionary of difficulties of pronunciation and stress in modern Russian language

philosophical- adj., used compare often Morphology: adv. philosophically 1. A philosophical text is a scientific essay in which the author sets out his or someone else’s ideas about the laws of development of nature, man or society. Philosophical work, treatise. |… … Dmitriev's Explanatory Dictionary

philosophical- deeply philosophical... Dictionary of Russian Idioms

Philosophical

Philosophical- I adj. 1. ratio with noun philosophy I, associated with it 2. Characteristic of philosophy [philosophy I 1., 3.], characteristic of it. 3. Containing worldview concept or a deep idea. II adj. decomposition 1. ratio with noun philosopher II associated with... Modern explanatory dictionary Russian language Efremova

philosophical- philosophical, philosophical, philosophical, philosophical, philosophical, philosophical, philosophical, philosophical, philosophical, philosophical, philosophical, philosophical, philosophical, philosophical, philosophical, philosophical, philosophical, philosophical,... ... Forms of words

philosophical- Philosopher... Russian spelling dictionary

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Vita Cogitans: Almanac of Young Philosophers. Issue 4. St. Petersburg: St. Petersburg Philosophical Society, 2004. P.158-163

In modern philosophical culture Translations of foreign texts are treated with increased demands. The translation should not only accurately convey the meaning of the text, but also involve the reader in the holistic context foreign language. When applied to philosophy, this rule is doubly effective, since we are talking not just about a text, but about a holistic system of thinking, which can often only be grasped and interpreted, and not read literally. And this applies not only to idioms and metaphors; we can talk about the use of the most common and common words, terms and expressions.

As R. Rorty noted, modern philosophers are more interested in problems of language than in problems associated with the analysis of experience and thinking. "Linguistic turn" in analytical philosophy carried out by philosophers

different directions, among which the supporters of the naturalistic theory seem to be the most consistent.

Since there are different language games, there are different ways of describing the world. When at least two different language games collide, a communication problem arises. Such a problem is usually called the “translation problem”, since it was so dubbed by U.V.O. Quine. He believes that “there is no other way of comparing linguistic meanings than in terms of people's predisposition to respond overtly to socially observable stimuli. The result of this limitation is that the translation problem faces systematic uncertainty." The savages of one of the tribes use the word "gavagai" to designate animals called "rabbits." When translating a word from one language into a word from another language, one can be completely satisfied with the objective similarity. Both “gavagai” and “rabbit” are words that mean the same thing living creature. Quine considers this approach to be fundamentally misleading. The similarity of objects, from his point of view, is completely imaginary. Let's say that "gavagai" denotes not only a white fluffy creature, but also a special case of rabbit racing, allowing an aborigine to notice a rabbit in the forest. This aspect is not included in the Russian meaning of the word “rabbit”, but, in turn, it may include features unknown to the native. Thus, in order to translate the phrase “White rabbits” into the Aboriginal language, it is necessary to carry out the translation so that one phrase fully conveys all linguistic context of another language. Such a “maximum program” seems to Quine to be logically impossible. Different languages ​​may thus contain competing systems of analytical hypotheses that prescribe different translations that are excluded by another translation system.

Modern supporters of naturalism in analytical philosophy, for example, D. Davidson, do not share this thesis in such a radical form. Translation is impossible, and this is true, Davidson notes, but the speakers

of different languages ​​communicate and understand each other. There is an aporia: speakers of different languages ​​will never be able to understand each other, and, nevertheless, life constantly provides confirmation of such an understanding. In light of this contradiction, representatives of naturalism seek to “supplement” the principle of systematic uncertainty of translation with the Humean principle of sympathy, or trust. Thanks to the presence of trust, we treat the interlocutor favorably and tend to understand him, even if we do not share his beliefs. Trust is the key to communication. Instead of confining himself within the framework of his language game (after all, logically, all attempts at translation are doomed in advance), a person does just the opposite - he strives to understand the Other, to establish communication. In making this addition, Davidson reinterprets Quine's principle: “Since we cannot reasonably say that the schemas are different, we cannot hold that the schema is the same... Of course, the truth of sentences is relative to language, but it is objective as far as possible." According to the principle of systematic uncertainty of translation, any translation is only a set of metaphors that does not pretend to be accurate. If we consistently apply this principle, we can come to the conclusion that metaphor is the main feature of language. However, metaphor does not have its own “metaphorical” meaning. It does not matter whether it describes the original complexity of the world itself, like some poetic metaphors, or whether it is created as a result of a play of the imagination. Its purpose is to help people come to agreement where literal translation is impossible. But since there is no “metaphorical” meaning, just like there is no “literal” meaning, then how do we put a certain meaning into a metaphor? The answer, from the position of natural philosophers, can be given as follows: within the limits of the linguistic imagination, there is a predisposition of people to a “liberal”, tolerant, trusting attitude towards the speaker of another language game. This provision does not pretend to be objective; rather,

on the contrary, it emphasizes concerns about the insufficiency of our imaginative abilities and the metaphorical capabilities of language. A completely marginal language community is as impossible as creating an electronic translator that will accurately translate a phrase from one language into a phrase from another.

Now let's turn to some applied issues related to the translation of English philosophical texts. First of all, it should be noted that the English language has a different semantic structure than the Russian language. English is stricter and more structured. Unlike the Russian language, in English there is a certain word order. Thus, the Russian synonymous phrases “Plato studied with Socrates”, “Plato studied with Socrates”, “Plato studied with Socrates” can be translated by a single English phrase “Plato was taught by Socrates”. In English, you also cannot omit the connective verb “is” and possessive pronouns. Compare:

“Socrates is a man” vs. “Socrates is a man"

“Kant wrote the book in 1781.” vs. “Kant wrote his book in 1781”

In such cases, the translation inevitably loses the logical rigor inherent in the English language; however, it is impossible otherwise. This is especially noticeable when translating from Russian into English, when students “copy” Russian word order into English. In this regard, the requirement of most English teachers to take home reading only on books written by the British or Americans, and not on translations (including into English from other languages), is also justified.

Another difficulty is associated with the polysemy of most English philosophical terms. J. Austin noted that most philosophical concepts are also words of ordinary language; therefore, they can be included in various language games, changing the way they are used. For example, the word “sense” is translated as “feeling”, “feeling”, “meaning”; “thing” - as “thing”, “phenomenon”, “essence”, “creature”, “subject”; “mind” - as “mind”, “mind”, “consciousness”; “rationality” - as “rationality” and “thinking”; “think” - as in “to think”, “to think”,

“think”, “count”; “argue” - as in “believe”, “believe”, “count”; - how to “prove”, “argue”, etc. In such cases, it is necessary to take into account the context and try to understand what the author is talking about. Sometimes this can only be done by knowing the author's philosophical views. Thus, the title of G. Ryle’s book “The Concept of Mind” was translated as “The Concept of Consciousness,” which is erroneous, since Ryle had in mind the doctrine of the mind of Descartes and the rationalists.

In the English language there are also words and constructions that are fundamentally untranslatable into Russian. So, to emphasize confidence in their opinion, the English insert the verb “to do” before the semantic verb. Therefore, the phrase “He does think so” should be translated “He really thinks so." The substitute verb “to do” or the substitute pronoun “one” should be translated as the verb or noun that they replace. Some philosophical terms are formed from nouns or adjectives using the suffix “-ness” (“goodness”, “selfness”). These words can only be translated with an inevitable loss of meaning. In general, if there is a word or expression that is difficult to translate, the English original should be given in parentheses.

Note also that some English-language categories have already received “canonical” translations. For example, “sense-data” is translated as “sense data”, “particulars” - as “individuals”, “in weak sense” - “in a weak sense”, “proposition” - as “statement”, “sentence” - as “ proposal”, “judgement” - as “judgment”, etc.

IN lately More and more monographs and articles are being translated from English, which in itself is a positive fact for Russian philosophy. However, most translations often ignore Lomonosov's recommendation to replace all foreign words possible with Russian ones. Hence the overload of modern translations with foreign words, their ponderousness, and sometimes pseudoscientific quality. In the translations of our time one can find such neologisms as “internalist”, “rigid”, “suggestive”, “comparative”, etc. In most cases, such a “translation” completely distorts the meaning of the original. In our opinion, translation should be whenever possible

literary, accurate and Russian, and not a bad copy of a foreign language. Belinsky noted this when discussing the poetic translations of Pushkin and Zhukovsky.

In conclusion, we note that the author of this article is not a philologist and is not very versed in the intricacies of this important science. However, in the case of philosophical texts, in our opinion, it is more important to preserve the purity and integrity of the ideas and language of the original when translating, rather than strive for literalness and accuracy. Absolute accuracy of translation is as unattainable as absolute truth. But, to a certain extent, translation is still possible. A good translation is no less valuable than the original itself.

LATIN-ENGLO-RUSSIAN DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHICAL TERMS

In the proposed, very incomplete, dictionary of medieval philosophical terms, an attempt is made to convey the content of the terms, most of which were used in ancient times, in the sense in which they were used by medieval thinkers. For this purpose, original texts not translated into Russian were also used. medieval philosophers and theologians, and mainly those works that are included in the Anthology. The disclosure of terms is associated with a certain author’s concept of understanding medieval philosophy as unique, irreducible to the receptions of ancient or modern philosophy. The following were used in compiling the glossary: ​​R. Eisler. Wörterbuch der Philosophischen Begriffe. Bd. 1-3. Berlin, 1930; Friedrich Ueberwegs Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie. Bd. 2. Base/Stuttgart, 1967; Neretina Dictionary of Medieval Culture // Good and Truth: Classical and Non-Classical Regulators. M., 1998.

ABLATIO- denial - denial.

ABSOLUTE(absolutely) - absolutely; has a variety of meanings: an attribute is absolute (as opposed to relative) when it applies to all representatives of a given genus; an attribute is absolute or indecomposable when it concerns the subject itself, not as relating to something else, but as being itself; words differ absolutely when they mean different things, and slightly when they mean the same thing but in different respects; in so many different senses the concept<абсолютный>opposes concepts<зависимый>, <гипотетический>, <модальный>, <всеобщий>, in space and time.

ABSTRACTIO(abstraction) - abstraction, mental separation of certain aspects of a thing from its integrity; something taken separately from the thing with which it is inextricably linked, which means: taken abstractly. According to Boethius,<когда мы занимаемся делением или абстрагированием, мы мыслим не то, что есть на самом деле; но при этом само мышление ни в коей мере не является ложным: Но дух, принимающий от чувств в себя все вещи нерасчлененными и перемешанными с телами, собственной своей силой и размышлением расчленяет их. Ибо все бестелесные вещи: получающие свое бытие в телах, чувство передает нам вместе с самими телами. Но зато дух, наделенный способностью связывать разъединенное, а соединенное разлагать, так расчленяет переданные ему вещи, спутанные чувствами и связанные телами, что они предстают перед ним сами по себе в бестелесной своей природе, отдельно от тел, с которыми срослись>(Boethius. Commentary on Porphyry, pp. 26-27). The process of formation of universals is abstract. Peter Abelard anticipates the problem of universals:<Но прежде - об абстракции. Итак, нужно знать, что материя и форма всегда существуют вместе, вперемешку, но мышление обладает такой способностью, что то созерцает материю саму по себе, то переносит внимание на одну только форму, то постигает их в смешанном виде. В двух первых случаях это происходит благодаря абстракции, когда нечто извлекается из общей связанности, чтобы можно было рассмотреть его собственную природу. В третьем случае это происходит благодаря конъюнкции. Возьмем, к примеру, субстанцию вот этого человека. Она и тело, и живое существо, и человек, она облачена в неопределенное множество форм: покуда я обращаю внимание на материальную сущность субстанции, разграничив все формы, я произвожу понятие с помощью абстрагирования. И когда я обращаю внимание, наоборот, только на телесную целостность, которую я связываю в субстанцию, то это понятие, хотя и произошло с помощью конъюнкции сравнительно с первым, касавшимся только природы субстанции, также образуется благодаря абстракции, отделяющей телесную целостность от других форм, на которые я не обращаю никакого внимания, то есть на то, что она - живое существо, чувственность, разумность, белизна. Такого рода понятия, полученные с помощью абстракции, могли бы, пожалуй, казаться ложными или пустыми, потому что они изображают вещь иначе, чем она существует. Ведь поскольку они касались особо либо только материи, либо только формы, тогда как ни материя, ни фрма не существуют отдельно друг от друга, то очевидно, они воспроизводят вещь совсем иначе, чем она есть, и, следовательно, пусты: Но при абстракции происходит не это. В самом деле, если я рассматриваю этого человека только в качестве субстанции или плоти, а не в качестве живого существа, человека или грамматика, то я не постигаю ничего, кроме того, что в нем есть, это <только>refers only to attention, but in no way to the way of existence> (Logic<для начинающих>, With. 86-87). According to Thomas Aquinas,<мыслительные абстракции бывают двух видов: по одному, всеобщее отвлекается от особенного, как животное от человека, по другому, форма отвлекается от материи, как, например, форма круга отвлекается в мышлении от чувственной материи>(Sum. Theol. 1, q. 40, a. 3 concl.).

ABSTRACTIVUM- abstractive - abstract; According to nominalists, in particular Ockham, abstract rational knowledge is knowledge by which a thing is comprehended not in itself, but through the genera and types of other things, this is knowledge that is opposed to intuitive knowledge, by which a thing is comprehended immediately as it is.

ACCIDENTS(accident) - accident, accident, chance; one of the ways of distinguishing; adventitious sign of an object,<который обозначает некую внешнюю природу и вовсе не сказывается о субстанции>and which may, if not in reality, then<в уме и мысленно>and be present and absent in the subject, without destroying it (Boethius. Commentary on Porphyry, pp. 75, 103). In Boethius’s interpretation, Aristotle brought together the 2 highest genera: substance and accident, which in turn was divided into 9 genera (which together amounted to 10 categories). As a type of accident, they have equal rights with substances, although there is nothing in common between them except the name: each of them can be said to exist (ibid., p. 11). Being, thus, turns out to be outside the brackets of any category, which fundamentally changes the role of accident: it becomes completely involved in being, since<глагол <есть>it is said about everyone the same> (ibid., p. 12). Accidents can be inseparable (snub nose, scar) and separable (move, sleep). Separable accidents are called general distinctive features, inseparable ones - proper ones. Both produce the otherness of a thing, but do not create anything else. Separable and inseparable accidents happen by nature (tall growth) or by will (walk, run). The analysis of accidents in Boethius is closely connected with the idea of ​​equivocation, or ambiguity (see), as well as with the analysis of the definition and description of things that seem to be equal. Accordingly, this analysis is associated with the analysis of the predication of things through genus, species (necessary for definition), as well as proper and distinctive characteristics (necessary for description). The meaning of this analysis in Porphyry: the predicates of greater predication speak about all the smaller ones (genus - about species and distinctive characteristics, distinctive character - about species and individuals, species - about individuals, proper attribute - about species and individuals, adjunctive attribute about species and individuals -<чернота>, inherent in a single raven, is transferred to the raven as a species). The meaning of analysis in Boethius:<сказуемые, равные по предикации, взаимозаменяемы>. In his case, gender and accidents turn out to be equal in predication. If genus as a universal concept affects everything inferior, then accident, standing over individual individuals, also affects higher predicates, that is, proper and distinctive features, form and gender as a universal concept.<Так что если Сократ есть животное, разумное, способное смеяться и человек, и если Сократ лыс, что является его привходящим признаком, то этот привходящий признак будет сказываться о животном, о разумном, о способном смеяться и о человеке, то есть об остальных четырех сказуемых>(ibid., p. 108). Porphyry dealt with direct predication, while Boethius dealt with indirect or inverted predication. The most seemingly unreliable feature - accident - turns out to be no less evidence of the universality of a thing than genus-species predications; the description turns out to be no less accurate than the definition. Comp. PRAEDICABILIS, SUBSTANTIA, PER SE.

ACCIDENTALITER- accidentally - accidentally, accidentally; things differ by chance when their individual representatives belong to the same genus, as, for example, Socrates and Plato. Substance appears randomly through contact, like clothing on a person, it appears as the driving force of change, like an angel in relation to the body in which he is incarnated. The opposite of concepts is essentially, substantially.

ACCIDERE- to happen - to happen; in the sense that random qualities manifest themselves in substances without essentially affecting them, without degenerating them.

ACCIPERE- to receive or undertake - to receive or undergo; in particular, according to Anselm, to receive from God; therefore to be conditioned by him from whom each receives his existence.

ACTIO- action - action; more precisely, the actualization of force, since existence is the actualization of substance or essence. Therefore, it is opposed to suffering. According to Thomas Aquinas (Sum. Teol. 1, q. 41, a. 1, ad. 2; and also ad. 3, and 1, q. 42, a. 2 concl.): “Action, by definition, indicates the origin movement, just as movement carried out under the influence of something is called suffering, so movement itself, since it comes from something else and is limited by what changes, is called action. Therefore, if movement is introduced from somewhere, action means nothing. other than the order of origin, according to which something develops from some cause or principle into that which proceeds from that principle." Sometimes actions are divided into two types, some actions have access to external matter, such as heating or drying; actions of another kind are performed in the agent, for example, thinking, feeling, desire; the difference between the two types of being is that the first is not part of a changing substance, but belongs to a thing, subject to change, actions of the latter type are related to the actor himself. So, the last type, related to matter, is called actio, and the first type is factio. - Both types are processes. Comp. factio, operation.

ACTU- act, actuality - act, reality, state, reality; both denote a process (action) as an act of thinking or believing (according to Occam); the act in this sense is something secondary, opposed to the force or ability that is its immediate principle, and through which the process is carried out; or that which predetermines things and makes them, for example, the soul is the reality, perfection and entelechy of the body, and in this sense a formal reality. Therefore, sometimes an act is considered as the essence and existence of a thing; and in this sense there is nothing other than what exists, as an essential act.

AD ALIQUID- relative to something - relative to something; The fourth of the 10 categories is connected with this - relation (relatio, proportio). According to Thomas Aquinas, a relation is the relationship between two things being compared on the basis of their similarity or difference (Thomas Aquinas. De Trin., pr. 1, 2 ad 3).

ADEAQUATIO- adequation, commensuration - equating, proportionality, correspondence of two quantities, an attempt to establish identity, for example, words and things; internal desire for equality, opposed to the desire for external similarity. Thus, truth is the correspondence between a thing and thinking. The correspondence of a thing and a word about a thing is one of the most important judgments of Robert Grosseteste, Thomas Aquinas and others about truth. Closely related to the idea of ​​communion (see communio). According to Robert Grosseteste, true correspondence is the correspondence of the word in internal speech and the thing, as opposed to the correspondence of the external word and the thing. Correspondence in the first sense would mean the identity of word and thing and would be truth itself (Robert Grosseteste. On Truth, pp. 7-8).

ADEAQUABILITAS- adequability - adequacy.

AENIGMA- a riddle as a way of representing and understanding the world in the Middle Ages; the literary genre of questions and answers built on the principle of delayed metaphor, pun or parallelism; mediation between the Divine and human worlds, which is not expressed purely logically, but tropologically (see TROPUS): on the profane level the world seemed mysterious and conceived, on the sacred - miraculous; an attempt to discover an invisible, but no less real, element behind the visible shell of things (the world existed in a dialectical combination of riddle and answer, in which any answer presupposed a riddle, but the riddle did not always presuppose a answer due to the incomprehensibility of truth); is closely related to the idea of ​​the communing or believing mind, since it carries out the transfer of qualities from the creative subject to the created thing. Many medieval riddles, constructed in the form of short stories (<Римские деяния>), suggest a triad: father, daughter and claimant, where the father is a sign of non-involvement, the basis in itself, allowing others to comprehend themselves, the daughter is a sign of participation, or the possibility of justification, expressed in a test that allows claimants to participate in the object of claims, the claimant - seeking or appealing for justification, participating in its search to varying degrees. A riddle is also the result of logical divisions. Discussing the 5 predicates (genus, species, proper, distinctive and accessory characteristics), Boethius writes that, contrary to Porphyry, who builds a genus-specific tree according to the principle of descent (<сказуемые большей предикации сказываются обо все меньших>), we can consider these 5 predicates not only as<равные>, but also<взаимозаменяемые>. If, for example,<род сказывается об отличительных признаках, и о видах, и о собственных, и о привходящих признаках>, That<и наоборот - привходящий признак сказывается обо всех остальных; он стоит над отдельными индивидами и сказывается также о стоящих выше его [сказуемых]: так что если Сократ есть животное, разумное, способное смеяться и человек, и если Сократ лыс, что является его привходящим признаком, то этот привходящий признак будет сказываться и о животном, о разумном, о способном смеяться и о человеке, то есть об остальных четырех сказуемых>(Boethius. Commentary on Porphyry, pp. 107-108). As a result, the sentence (definition) turns out to be composed of polynomial substitutes for the subject (predicate) by custom of speech (<лысое - способное смеяться>), which is a mystery. A way of switching the logical into the tropological is discovered.

AEQUALITAS- equality - equality; things are equal when they agree in quantity; this can happen in two ways: in size and in essence, so quantity is of two types: modal and essential. According to Thomas Aquinas (Inlib. 1 Sent. d. 19, q. 1, a. 1sol.): Since equality is based on the unity of quantity, it is the same for a thing: to be equal to something else or to have its own quantity; it is one and the same thing: to be similar to something, or to have its own quality>. The equality of things can be quantitative (according to the law of commutativity) or proportional (according to the law of distributivity). Since proportionality is the equality of proportions, the most important of the two usages is the strict definition, according to which those things are equal that have the same quantity, equality is a kind of proportion, since equality itself is the proportion of things that have the same quantity. Comp. SIMILITUDO, QUANTITAS, ANALOGIA, PROPORTIO, AEQUIPARANTIA.

AEQUIPARANTIA- comparison, equiparance, equivalence - comparison, equivalence, equivalence; includes all symmetrical relations in which both extremes are designated equally, as relations of similarity and equality; contrasted with RELATIO DISPARANTIAE, all asymmetrical relationships in which opposite sides are designated in various ways, such as the relationship between father and son, greater and lesser.

AEQUALITAS AEQUIPARANTIAE- comparative equality - comparative equality based on absolute quantitative certainty: the relation existing between two quantities of the same measure, such as the equality of two yards to two yards, is contrasted with AEQUALITAS PROPORTIONIS, proportional equality, for example, the equality of the fingers,<которые не являются равными с точки зрения абсолютной количественной определенности, ведь если один палец наложить на другой, его действие усиливается, тем не менее, их равенство является пропорциональным, т. к. размер одного пальца соответствует его функции, а размер другого пальца - его>. (Thomas, In lib. IV Sent. d. 32, q. 1, a. 4 sol; cf. also In lib. IV Sent. d. 32, q. 1, a. 3 sol.).

AEQUIVOCUM- equivocal - noun;<соименными называются те вещи, у которых и имя общее, и соответствующая этому имени речь о сущности одна и та же, как например, <живое существо>(dzoon) is both a man and a bull. In fact, both man and bull are called by a common name -<живое существо>, and the talk about their essence is the same>. (Aristotle, Cat. 1, 1a); So<медведица>is both a constellation and an animal. Comp. UNIVOCA.

AEQUIVOCATIO- equivocation - unity by name;<Там, где есть чистая двусмысленность, там нет сходства в вещах, но только - единство имени>(Thomas, Cont. Gent. 1, p. 33.).

AESTIMATIO- estimation - judgment; the ability of the sensory soul, which allows one to judge usefulness and agreement, harmfulness and opposition by perceiving the constituent qualities of a thing that are not perceived by any other senses; In intelligent beings, this function develops thanks to the ability of thinking and especially reason.

AETERNITAS- eternity - eternity; the principle (ratio) of eternity consists in possessing the entire fullness of being, omitting the beginning and the end; in an absolute sense refers only to God;<совершенное и полное одновременное обладание бесконечной жизнью>(Boethius, Consol. phil. V, prosa 6).

AEVUM- aeon - eternity; continuous duration, unchangeable in its nature, having a beginning but no end (Simplicius, B Phys. IV, 154). According to Thomas (Quaest. Quodl. V, q. 4, a. 7 concl.):<Вечность (aeon) есть не что иное как причастие к божественной вечности, так что субстанциальная вечность является атрибутом самого Бога, но aeon означает причастие к вечности, духовным надвременным сущностям>. Aeon is the mediator between time and eternity. Thomas points out (Sum. Theol. 1, q. 10, a. 5 concl.):<Так как вечность (eternity) есть мера непрерывного бытия, в том смысле, что все исходит из неизменного бытия, а следовательно из вечности, то конкретные вещи исходят из неизменности бытия таким образом, что их бытие является субъектом изменения и состоит из изменения, и вещи этого сорта измеряются временем, как например, движение и подобие составляют бытие всех изменяющихся вещей. С другой стороны, конкретные вещи менее исходят из неизменности бытия, так как этому бытию не присуще ни изменение, ни оно само не является субъектом изменения. Тем не менее, сами вещи ограничены в изменении как актуально, так и потенциально. Это особенно ясно в случае с божественными телами, чье субстанциальное бытие неизменно; хотя наряду с неизменным бытием они имеют способность изменяться в зависимости от места. Особенно это ясно в случае с ангелами, потому что они имеют вечное бытие наряду с изменчивостью в зависимости от предопределения, насколько это свойственно их природе и в согласии с их интеллектом, включенностью и местом в ангельской иерархии. Следовательно, вещи подобного рода имеют критерием или мерой вечность (aeon), которая является посредником между божественной вечностью (eternity) и временем. Бытие, измеряемое вечностью, как не является изменчивым, так и не имеет отношение к изменчивости. Так время бывает предшествующим и последующим: вечность не содержит в себе предшествования и последования, они объединены в нем; божественная вечность не имеет предшествования и последования и несовместима с ними.>

AFFECTIO- affection (in the sense of modification), condition, affect state, inclination, affect; the inclination of the soul towards something; affectio and affectus have to do with the final cause, and effectio and effectus have to do with the efficient cause; in other words, affect is the disposition of any thing, expressed in terms of its end, contrasted with its antecedent states.

AFFECTUS- affect - affect, feeling, emotion, desire; a state of body or mind in relation to which the inclination or affection is process, or love; sometimes used to denote an emotional state of mind.

AGERE- to do, to work, to act - to do, work, act; to act is nothing more than to do something actually; this is achieved through form; this is due to the fact that the active force is actual in accordance with its capabilities. Usually different from facere, in the sense that it does not have access to external matter, but is often used and synonymous with the latter. Comp. FACERE, ACTIO.

AGENS- agent - driving force, active cause, efficient cause; compare INTELLECTUS AGENS.

ALIQUID- something - something; defined by Thomas Aquinas as the distinction of one thing from another. Comp. RES.

ALIUD- another, transformed, obtained in the case when two things are separated by a substantial difference. Wed. ALTERATUM.

ALLEGORIA- allegory, one of the allegories, which includes a symbol and has such properties as attachment, stability (for example, assigning certain moral qualities to animals); a figure meaning an allusion to another figure, an indication of what is not in a given thing, like the Gospel parables; spiritual assimilation; one of the options for commenting on the text. In Peter Comestor, who presented the world as a palace with three chambers (auditorium, refectory and bedchamber), the parts of the refectory are presented as follows: the foundation is history, the roof is tropology, and the soaring wall connecting the floor and ceiling is allegory,<которая выражает одну мысль посредством другой>, <при этом аллегорией оказывается также воинствующая церковь>(Peter Comestor. Scholastic history. - Neretina mind. Book of Genesis and Salic law, pp. 283-284). According to Joachim of Flores,<аллегория есть уподобление малых вещей великим, например, дня - году, недели - веку, человека - сословию или городу, племени, народу и множеству подобного: Авраам обозначает Бога Отца, Исаак - Сына, Иаков - Духа Святого. Но и Захария означает Отца, Иоанн - Сына, человек Иисус Христос - Святого Духа. И это именно в духовном понимании, которое, собственно, и называется аллегорией>(This edition, p. ???).

ALTERATIO- alteration - change; movement or change in quality category. Comp. MOTUS, PASSIO.

ALTERATUM- other; any difference between one thing and another. When a species-forming difference is added to this difference, the thing turns into something else. Wed. ALIUD.

AMOR- love - true virtue, completeness of virtues; execution of the Law; the manifestation of grace as virtues to the soul, thanks to which a person’s communion with God is realized; the opposite of hatred, which brings a person into contact with<ничто>. The fulfillment of the Law by love proves that love is a global distinctive force that goes beyond the covenant, thanks to which the distribution of things in two-valued being - finite and eternal - occurs on a hierarchical basis:<этот добрый муж лучше другого доброго мужа>(Peter Abelard. Dialogue between Philosopher, Jew and Christian, pp. This power allows on the basis of grace<прибавить нечто к предписанному долгом>(ibid., p. 367); ease in the execution of the Law; basis of salvation (<Никто, обладающий любовью, не гибнет, но ни один в ней не уравнивается с другим>(ibid., p.; selective ability of the soul. The state of the soul in which the contemplation of God occurs; love has no measure or boundaries, does not belong to any category; transcendental; one of the faces of truth.<Называется ли эта обретенная любовь, которая в небесной жизни, случаем или каким-либо иным качеством, не принесет никакой пользы ни одно из определений, потому что нельзя истинно познать ее иначе, чем на опыте, ибо он далеко превосходит всякий смысл любой науки. Столь ли важно для блаженства, считаем ли мы ее случайностью или субстанцией, или ни тем, ни другим, и, хотя мы кое-что говорим, сама она никак не изменится и не уменьшит нашего блаженства. И если ты тщательно взвесишь то, что ваши философы назвали акцидентальными и субстанциальными формами, то никакой субстанциальной формы ты не обнаружишь, потому что любовь присуща не всем, как не обнаружишь и акцидентальной формы, потому что, раз появившись, она не может более исчезнуть: Мы становимся истинно блаженными, принимая участие в видении Его и наслаждаясь Им. В этом видении при созерцании Его на нас изливается та Его высшая любовь>(ibid., p. Love is connected with activity, with knowledge. According to Augustine,<философ есть человек, любящий Бога>, <поскольку философия стремится к жизни блаженной, по любви к Богу находя в Боге наслаждение>(Aurelius Augustine. About the City of God. T. II, pp. 23, 18). According to Augustine,<знание полезно лишь тогда, когда есть любовь; без любви же оно кичит, то есть приводит к гордости чрезмерно напыщенной>(ibid., p. 94). Augustine posits the unity of love, no matter what word it is expressed, for in God all love is identical. Closely related to the idea of ​​good (see BONUM).

AMPHIBOLIA- amphibology - ambiguity; a phrase or statement that has more than one interpretation.

ANALOGIA- analogy - correspondence, resemblance, likeness; Bonaventura contrasts it with univocation (eponymousness). Applies when the word has different meanings, however, implies a principle on which the general uniting these meanings depends. This is how they talk about health, by analogy correlating with animals, medicine, pulse, since all this is related to health. Derived from the Greek. analogia, proportion. Comp. AEQUIVOCA, UNIVOCA.

ANALOGIA ATTRIBUTIONIS- attributive analogy - attributive analogy; analogy in which concepts are derived from what the signified refers to; to which concepts are addressed as a basis, for example, food, medicine, pulse are related to a healthy lifestyle by attributive analogy, because the word<здоровый>comes from the word<здоровье>which is inherent in an animal being.

ANALOGIA PROPORTIONIS- proportional analogy - proportional analogy; analogy in which concepts stem from one common name, where the denoted is expressed by other concepts through the similarity or order that exists between the terms, for example, a living being and food, or a living being and pulse - are related to health by proportional analogy, because health, although expressed in different terms, is present in them..

ANIMA- soul; the opposite of flesh. According to Augustine, man is a trinity of spirit, soul and flesh, and in this trinity the whole of man is required by God.

ANIMAL- animal - animal; a corporeal creature having a soul; sensory substance; in man as an animal, the rational soul complements sensuality. The two fundamental characteristics of life are sensuality and movement. According to Albertus Magnus:<Душа рациональна, когда она действует, не используя тела, и животна, когда использует органическое тело>.

ANIMUS- spirit, intelligence, mind, face, personality. Often synonymous with mens and spiritus.

APPARENTIA- evidens - evidence, clarity, certainty; in the logical sense, the evidence or certainty of a statement; and also in the sense of appearance, phenomenality.

APPETITUS- appetite - appetite; instinctive, natural need; the force or inclination that naturally directs the body towards good, so does matter tend towards form; conscious need arises from knowledge. Comp. APPREHESIO.

APPREHENSIO- apprehension - understanding, ability to grasp, representation; the simplest act of comprehending a thing without any affirmation or negation; all behavior of living beings are reactions of apprehension or instinctive reactions.

APROPRIATUM- apropriated quality or aspect - inherent quality; just as in the Divine Trinity in creation there are qualities characteristic of each of the people, such as unity, truth, goodness.

APTITUDO- aptitude - suitability, inclination; natural ability, behavior, reaction towards something.

APTITUDINALIS- aptitudinal - inclined.

ARBITRIUM LIBERUM- free decision, free choice, free will. Augustine not only recognized<что Бог даровал ее нам>, but what<ее надлежало даровать>(On Free Will. Part II, Chapter XVIII, 47). For Augustine, the statement about the absence of free will on the basis of the primacy of Divine predestination, or foreknowledge, makes no sense, because<нельзя сказать, что предузнавший нечто, предузнал ничто>, since the meaning of knowledge is to recognize something that exists. From this Augustine concludes:<если предузнавший, что имеет быть в нашей воле, предузнал не ничто, а нечто, то несомненно, что и при Его предведении нечто в нашей воле есть. Поэтому мы нисколько не находим себя вынужденными ни отвергать свободу воли, ни отрицать (что нечестиво) в Боге предведение будущего, отвергая свободу воли. Мы принимаем и то, и другое>(Aurelius Augustine. On the City of God. Vol. 1, p. 258). Anselm of Canterbury, challenging the idea of ​​free will as the freedom to choose between sin and virtue, wrote that the free will of God, who is Greater Good, cannot sin, therefore the ability to sin does not belong to the definition of freedom of choice.<Ни свобода, ни часть свободы не есть способность греха>(Anselm of Canterbury. On Free Choice, p. 199). According to Peter Abelard, the basis of free choice is the idea of ​​intention as the conscious intent of an action, voluntary consent to it. Bernard of Clairvaux believed that consent, will and free will are identical. Freedom of choice is freedom from necessity. Free choice means that God can grant salvation, and man can accept it or not. Free choice is determined by reason and is accompanied by judgment, or judgment. Thomas Aquinas connects the definition of freedom with the definition of voluntary action. Since every action has a goal, then the action that is performed with knowledge of the goal is voluntary. Arbitrariness in this sense is identical to freedom and is characteristic only of rational beings. Freedom, by definition, cannot be forced to choose a goal. The will, in its conjunction with the intellect, is doomed to choose the goals that the mind sets for it as good. It can be prevented by external action, but inner freedom violence cannot be committed. See VOLUNTAS.

ARGUMENTUM- argument - argument, argument; the process of thinking from the known to the unknown; according to Boethius, thinking about doubtful things leads to faith; argument motivates the intellect to follow the truth; This is evidenced by the etymology of the word - from evidence of reason (arguere mentem) to agreement with something; in more in a broad sense- this is thinking from premises to conclusions; where the conclusion is drawn from the premises; according to Bacon, this is one of two types of knowledge, the other being experience.

ARGUMENTUM A PRIORI- a priori argument - a priori (pre-experimental, initial) argument; according to Occam, inference from cause to effect, from the preceding to the subsequent. Equivalent to propter quid in later use.

ARGUMENTUM A POSTERIORI- a posteriori argument - a posteriori argument; inference from the subsequent to the antecedent, from the effect to the cause (Occam). Equivalent to quia in later use.

A.R.S.- art - art, skill, skill (Greek technology). Augustine gives an interesting explanation of this term. He believes that<добродетель есть искусство жить хорошо и справедливо. Поэтому от греческого слова aret>, which means virtue, the Latins are believed to have borrowed the term ars, artis, art> (Aurelius Augustine. On the City of God. Vol. II, p. 208). Art in the Middle Ages was any knowledge, collectively designated as<семь свободных искусств>, which included trivia (grammar, rhetoric, dialectics) and quadrivium (arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, music) and was naturally viewed from the angle of the idea of ​​​​creating the world from nothing with the dexterous, skillful hands and words of God the Creator, who, by virtue of the act of creation, transferred the creative ability to man . God was thought of as a Master with the indispensable property of every master to be a Passion-Bearer, suffering from his creation due to the fact that everything created with free will is also endowed with free will, which does not coincide with the will of the Creator. According to Hugon of Saint-Victor,<есть три вида творений: творение Бога, творение природы и творение мастера, подражающее природе>. This<мастер создает свое творение, разделяя соединенное или соединяя разделенное>, that is, performing philosophical work. Philosophy was not just one of the free arts: all the others were its modes. The difference between human creation and Divine creation lies in the quality of effort expended on it. God said and did<труды же человеческие представляются долгими и тяжкими. Можно ради примера кратко разъяснить это. Кто статую отлил, долго человека изучал, кто дом построил, гору наблюдал: человеческий разум тем и славен, что проявил изобретательность: Таким образом было открыто все, что тебе нынче известно из лучших творений человеческих. Так возникли рисование, ткачество, литейное дело, скульптура и бесконечное число других искусств, вызывающих восхищение мастерством человека>(Hugon of Saint-Victor. Seven books of edifying teaching, or Didaskalikon // Anthology of pedagogical thought of the Christian Middle Ages. T. II. M., 1994, pp. 59-60). The idea of ​​art included the idea of ​​doing, physical effort, which implied not just the free floating of the mind, but hard work, which at the same time turned out to be a sacred act. Tertullian distinguished the creation of man from other creations as a man-made creation, where physical effort is especially noticeable. Gregory of Nyssa compares this effort to a mechanical one that transfers energy to a person, who is compared to a statue. Connected with a similar understanding of art is the idea of ​​craft (artificio), naming a craftsman (artifex), like God, a master, and a thing submitted for the title of master a masterpiece. Peter Abelard calls knowledge ars, scientia, disciplina, revealing the transition from knowledge as art to disciplinary knowledge. According to Thomas Aquinas, art is<истинное основание любой сделанной работы, истинное основание вещей, которые надлежит сделать. От искусств происходят формы вещей, которые живут в душах художников, мастеров. Противопоставленные добродетелям, или силам, искусства являются сотворенными или созданными на основе опыта (experientia, peritia), следовательно, они возможны без знания, присущи мастерству, хотя и подразумевают знание>(Thomas Aquinas. Sum. theol., 1a, 2ae, q. 57, lat. 3 concl.). Elsewhere, Thomas writes that logic is the art of arts.<Поскольку искусство кажется ничем иным, как определенным посвящением разума, с помощью которого человеческие действия развиваются в направлении нужного результата. Но разум может управлять не только действиями субъект-субстанции, но и своими собственными действиями: В этом и состоит искусство логики как рациональной науки. Она рациональна не только потому, что присуща разуму, но и потому, что едина для всех искусств. Она представляется искусством искусств именно потому, что направляет нас в действиях нашего разума, от которого проистекают все искусства>(Thomas Aqunas. In lib. I An. Post. lect. 1). Art as such was opposed to mechanical art. In the 1st century Hraban the Moor limited<механические искусства>the creation of metal, wood and stone products, which he places in the quadrivia group along with medicine. In the 11th century Rudolf of Arden divided the mechanical arts into 7 departments: everything related to meeting the needs of life (agriculture, slave fishing, hunting), weaving, architecture, casting, medicine, trade, warfare, auxiliary means (work tools, vehicles). Comparing the liberal arts with the mechanical ones, Hugon of Saint-Victor writes that the first are called free either because<обращены к вольным, ищущим душам, способным проникать в причины вещей, либо потому, что издревле лишь свободные благородные люди изучали их, а плебеи, дети неблагородных родителей, занимались, благодаря своему опыту, механическими искусствами>, which are defined as imitative,<поскольку осуществляются трудом мастера, заимствующего формы у природы>(Hugon of Saint-Victor. Seven books of edifying teaching, or Didaskalikon // Anthology of pedagogical thought of the Christian Middle Ages. T. 2. M., 1994, p. 73). The dual division of the arts led to the understanding of the liberal arts as<божественного>skills, and mechanical ones - as skills<дьявольского>. Hugon produced the term<механические искусства>not from Greek mechane, mechanicos, machine, machine, and from the Greek. moichos (lat. moechus), that is, adulter - false, dishonest, feigned, adulterous. Cp. FACTIO, NATURA, DISCIPLINA, SCIENTIA, QUADRIVIUM, TRIVIUM.

Virgo