To exist means to be perceived by scientific articles. Theme: To exist is to be perceived (Berkeley). Berkeley's criteria for truth

Among philosophers who profess empirical and idealistic views, one of the most famous is George Berkeley. His father was an Englishman, but George considered himself Irish, since it was there, in the south of Ireland, that he was born in 1685. From the age of fifteen young man a period of college education began, with which he would be connected in one way or another for a long period of his life (until 1724). In 1704, Berkeley Jr. received a bachelor's degree, and three years later - a master's degree with the right to teach in the junior teaching staff. A few years later he becomes a priest and then - a Ph.D. and in college.

Subjective idealism

Even in his younger years, D. Berkeley, choosing between materialistic views, took the side of the latter. He became a defender of religion and in his writings showed the dependence of a person's perception of matter on how it sees and feels the soul (mind, consciousness), formed by God. Even in his youth, works were written that became significant for development and glorified the name - George Berkeley.

Philosophy and the search for truth became the meaning of the life of the Irish thinker. Among his works are interesting: "Experience of a new theory of vision", "Treatise on the principles of human knowledge", "Three conversations between Hylas and Philonus". By publishing a work on the new vision, the young philosopher set himself the goal of belittling the significance of the primary qualities that prove independence from our consciousness and the reality of matter. In contrast to Descartes' theory of the length of bodies, which had already gained popularity at that time, he reveals the dependence of the perception of distance, shape and position of objects through vision. According to the philosopher, the connection between different sensations is an area of logic that is formed empirically.

Significant works of the philosopher

Among the works of the thinker were various reflections, including those with a theological bias. But one of the most interesting works is the "Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonus" (George Berkeley - philosophy), briefly about which we can say this: the author raised the question of the metaphysical perception of the relativity of comprehension of reality, as well as phenomenalism. In Motion, Berkeley challenges Newton's views on the abstract understanding of motion. George's philosophical approach is that movement cannot be independent of space and time. Not only this concept was criticized by the philosopher, but also many other categories of Newton.

Two more works by Berkeley also deserve attention: a conversation between freethinkers “Alkifron” and philosophical discussions about tar water, where he raises the issue of the medical benefits of tar, and also retreats towards abstract free topics of a philosophical and theological nature.

A family

The philosopher's wife was Anna Forster, a judge's daughter (her father was an Irish chief litigation judge). It is worth noting the easy, friendly and cheerful nature of George. He was loved by friends and acquaintances. In his care soon there was an educational house, founded by royal charter. His wife bore him seven children. However, in those days, many children did not live to adult, conscious age due to illness. At Berkeley, only three survived, and the rest died.

When George Berkeley received his inheritance, he proposed to found a school where pagans would be converted to Christian faith. At first, the mission was accepted and approved by Parliament in every possible way, and also supported by aristocratic circles. However, when the missionary with his associates retired to the island, she was gradually forgotten. And without proper funding, the scientist-philosopher had to stop missionary work. Gradually, he leaves his affairs and spends more time with his son. George Berkeley lived sixty-seven years and died in 1752. It is named after him in one of the states of America - California.

Berkeley ontology

Many thinkers fell under the influence of the worldview of the great philosopher, including Kant and Hume. The main idea that Berkeley preached in his views was the importance of the sense of touch of the soul and the images formed by it. In other words, any perception of matter is a consequence of its perception by the human soul. His main doctrine was the theory of subjective idealism: “There is only me and my sensory perception of the world. Matter does not exist, there is only my subjective perception of it. God sends and forms ideas, thanks to which a person feels everything in this world ... ".

In the understanding of the philosopher, to exist is to perceive. Berkeley's ontology is the principle of solipsism. According to the views of the thinker, the existence of other souls, having a "final" form, is only a plausible probable conclusion, the basis of which are analogies.

Inconsistency of views

However, there is some inconsistency in the teaching of the philosopher. For example, in the same substance "I" he used the same arguments to criticize the material and to prove the indivisibility and unity of the beginning. However, his follower David Hume formalized these ideas into a theory, where he transferred the concept of matter to the spiritual component: the individual "I" is a "bundle of perceptions". Can't get away from materialistic view when you study the works that the philosopher George Berkeley wrote.

Quotes of the theologian and thinker inspire the idea of the eternity and significance of God in a person's life, his dependence on the Almighty. However, at the same time one comes across some inconsistency and inconsistency in Berkeley's works, which is revealed in the critical statements of many philosophers.

Continentality and the philosophy of Berkeley

Berkeley came to the conclusion about the existence of God, who alone generates sensations in the souls of people by his will. In his opinion, a person has no power over his feelings, even if he thinks so. After all, if a person opens his eyes and sees the light - it does not depend on his will, or if he hears a bird - this is also not his will. He cannot choose between "seeing" and "not seeing", which means that there is another will, a higher level, which produces feelings and sensations in a person.

Studying the works written by George Berkeley, some researchers came to the conclusion (which, however, is not conclusively confirmed, but has the right to exist) that the philosopher's views were formed on the basis of Malebranche's theory. This makes it possible to consider D. Berkeley an Irish Cartesian, rejecting the presence of empiricism in his teaching. Since 1977, a magazine-bulletin has been published in Ireland in honor of the great philosopher.

Historical place in philosophy

The teaching that George Berkeley left behind, the biography of the thinker - all this is of great interest and value for the historical development of philosophy. His theory gave a new impetus, a new spiral of development in the direction of philosophical thought. Schopenhauer considers Berkeley's merits immortal and calls him the father of idealism. also for a long time was impressed by the philosophical thought that George Berkeley preached. The main ideas of the philosopher will be studied by more than one generation of thinkers. However, many of them, including Thomas Reid, subsequently began to criticize them.

Berkeley's doctrine was included in textbooks on philosophy as empirical views. More than one generation of philosophers will be impressed by his theory and then accept, develop or refute it. His views gained the greatest popularity on the territory of Poland, but in many Slavic countries his philosophy was widespread and occupied worthy place among such works.

Berkeley Berkeley (Berkeley) George (1685-1753) - English. philosopher and religious figure, one of the most prominent and consistent representatives of immaterialism in modern times. Since 1734 - Bishop of Cloyne (Ireland). Major works: "Experience of a new theory of vision" (1709), "Treatise on the beginnings of human knowledge" (1710), "Three conversations between Hylas and Philonus" (1713); "Alsiphron, or the Petty Philosopher" (1732), "Seiris, or the Chain of Philosophical Reflections and Researches" (1744).
One of the main goals of B. is to substantiate the thesis "God is close to each of us" with the help of epistemology. This closeness is directly revealed in the coherence and harmony of the world, as it appears to each person. This kind of harmony is due, according to B., Divine Providence. In this sense, God is the most immediate and obvious presupposition of man's most elementary orientation in the world. Man exists and knows in God. In this setting, B. does not go beyond the occasionalism of N. Malebranche, to whom he owes a lot. All original English. thinker lies in the way in which he substantiates this attitude. Despite the adherence to the empiric-nominalistic tradition, the initial premise of his philosophy - a statement of one's own existence on the basis of a reflexive act - makes one recall R. Descartes. It does not need proof, is immediately obvious, and fully meets the requirements of Cartesian rational methodology. B., like Descartes, considers the subject, some I as a carrier of consciousness, thought. In addition to its own existence, the subject is also directly given the content of consciousness - ideas. The latter are considered to be quite homogeneous. B. rejects, following P. Bayle in this, the division of ideas into "primary" and "secondary". All of them are equally "secondary" to the extent that they belong to consciousness and only to it. At the same time, the ideas in question are understood in accordance with the sensationalistic model of cognition as elements of perception. The ideas a subject has are all that we can have reliable knowledge of. To assert that there are objects outside of consciousness that initiate the appearance of ideas in consciousness means, firstly, to go beyond the limits of certainty and, secondly, to go against logic, combining two incompatible propositions: that a) there is a sensually perceived object and that b) this object exists independently of perception. Since B. understands ideas only as ideas of perception (abstract ideas are interpreted by him within the framework of the representative theory of abstractions, that is, as the same ideas of perception, but carrying additional functions), their existence is entirely due to their perception. The philosopher formulates the famous principle: “To exist is to be perceived” (Esse est percipi). Since B. is talking only about objects of sensory perception, this principle excludes only the existence of natural bodies independent of perception and, more broadly speaking, the condition for their existence - bodily substance, matter. But he does not at all exclude the existence of supersensible being. Dr. a directly obvious fact for B. is that the existence (or non-existence) of sensory perceptions does not always depend on our will. Because B. does not allow the existence of c.-l. other being than the being of consciousness, i.e. spiritual being, then we should recognize the existence of some other spiritual being, on which our perceptual field depends. Empirical experience says: what we are accustomed to call the body does not behave as we want it to, but as dictated by what we again are accustomed to call the laws of nature. But since the principle of the dependence of existence on perception remains in force, the “willfulness” of the world is due to the perception of a spiritual principle other than ours. Such for B. is the existence of God. It is he who ultimately turns out to be the creator of all sensory perceptions, all carriers of consciousness and their only coordinator.
Philosophy B. met with his contemporaries very cold reception. He was accused of a tendency to affect the reader with paradoxes leading to absurd conclusions; in solipsism; and worse, in undermining the credibility of the Holy Scriptures (if esse est percipi, then how could the world exist in the first six days of creation before the appearance of Adam?). Teaching B. really included solipsism as one of its consequences (but not mandatory). Threats to discredit the Bible were partly removed by the occasionalist scheme. As for the paradoxes of B., their consideration turned out to be fruitful for further history philosophy thoughts.

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BERKELEY (Berkeley) George (March 12, 1685, near Kilkenny, Ireland - January 14, 1753, Oxford), English philosopher, representative of subjective idealism. Since 1734 Bishop in Kloin (Ireland). Main op.: "Experience of a new theory of vision" (1709, Russian per. 1912) ; "A Treatise on the Beginnings of Man. knowledge" (1710, Russian per. 1905) ; "Three conversations between Hylas and Philonus" (1713, Russian per. 1937) ; "Alsiphron, or the Petty Philosopher" (v. l-2, 1732, Russian per. 1978) ; "Seiris, or the Chain philosophy reflections and research ... " (1744, Russian per. 1978) . Philos. teaching B. imbued with the desire to refute materialism to give a justification for religion. He criticized the concept of matter as substances. basics (substances) bodies, as well as Newton's doctrine of space as the receptacle of all natural bodies, and Locke's doctrine of the origin of the concepts of matter and space. According to B., the concept of matter is based on the assumption that we can, abstracting from the particular properties of things, form an abstract idea of a substance, a substrate common to them. However, according to B., this is impossible: we do not and cannot have feelings. perception of matter as such; our perception of each thing resolves without remainder into the perception of a certain sum otd. sensations or, in B.'s terminology, "ideas". For things, "to be" always means "to be in perception." In contrast to Locke, B. argued that our mind can form a general idea of a thing, but not a general idea of matter, which science and philosophy do not need at all, because the idea of matter does not add anything to the properties of things beyond what can give feelings. perception. Using the metaphysical the one-sidedness of nominalism, which rejected the objectivity of the general in single things, B. came out with a denial of the reality of universals and the very possibility of abstract concepts. B.'s nominalism merges with empiricism. limited, with an underestimation of rational knowledge. V. opposed the distinction between primary and secondary qualities: all qualities are secondary, since their being is wholly reduced to the ability to be perceived. Recognizing the idea of separation of primary and secondary qualities as erroneous, B. denied the idea of matter based on it as a “support”, or “substratum” ("substances"), all objective qualities of bodies. Rejecting the existence of matter, B. recognized the existence of only spiritual existence, which he divided into "ideas" and "souls". "Ideas" - the subjective qualities you perceive - are passive, involuntary; the content of our sensations and perceptions is completely independent of us. On the contrary, "souls" are active, active, can be the cause. All "ideas" exist, according to B., only in the soul (both thoughts and passions, and various sensations). "Ideas" cannot be copies or similarities ext. things: an "idea" can only be similar to an "idea". Trying to reject the conclusions that are inevitable for subjective idealism, leading to solipsism, V. argued that the perceiving subject is not alone, and a thing that one subject has ceased to perceive can be perceived others subjects. But even if all subjects disappeared, things would continue to exist as the sum of "ideas" in the mind of God - the subject, which eternally exists and "invests" in consciousness otd. subjects the content of their sensations. Here B. "... approaches ... to objective idealism ..." (Lenin V.I., PSS, t. 18, With. 24) . B. did not confine himself to speaking out against atheism and materialism in philosophy. Exploiting weaknesses modern him a metaphysical and mechanics. materialism, he opposed the advanced, materialistic. ideas in science. Philosophy B., as shown by Lenin in "Materialism and Empirio-Criticism", was the prototype and one of the sources of subjective-but-idealistic. theories in bourgeois philosophy con. 19 - early 20 centuries ( see Machism). The works, ?. 1 - 9, L., 1948-57; in Russian Lane - Soch., M., 1978. B l about n s and i y P. P., B.'s teaching about reality, K.,; Ogomolov A. S., Criticism of subjective-idealistic. Philosophy J. B., M., 1959; B y x about in with to and y B. E., J. B., M., 1970; H a p with to and y I. S., Western European. philosophy.18 in., M., 1973, ch. 2; M e t z R., G. Berkeley, Stuttg., 1925; Luce A.?., Berkeley's immaterialism, L., 1945; Warnock G. J., Berkeley, L., 1953; L in A. L., G. Berkeley, P., 1959; ? 1t-c h i e A.D., G. Berkeley, ; S e ? a r s R. W., Lending a hand to Hylas, 1968.

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BERKELEY (Berkeley)
George (b. March 12, 1684, Dysart Castle, Ireland - d. Jan. 23, 1753, Oxford) - English, theologian and philosopher. taught that external world does not exist independently of perception and thought. The being of things consists only in the fact that they are perceived (esse percipi); in general, there is nothing really existing (real existiert), except for the substance of the spirit, the soul and my I. Representations (which are imprints of the divine spirit in us) are reality for us, since we are not talking about fantasies, dreams, etc. Osn. work: “Treatise concerning the principles of human knowledge”, 1710 (Russian translation “Treatise on the principles of human knowledge”, 1905).

Philosophical encyclopedic dictionary. 2010.

Berkeley, George (March 12, 1685 - January 14, 1753) - English. the philosopher is a subjective idealist. Genus. in Ireland in English noble family. Educated at Dublin University. In 1734 B. took the episcopal chair in Cloyne (Ireland). Already from a young age, B. entered the fight against the modern. him advanced thought. Watching the progress of philosophy. materialism, B. decided to strike not at K.-l. individual manifestations of materialism, but at its center. concept - the concept of matter as substances. bases (substances) tel. B. also spoke out against Newton's teachings about space as the receptacle of all natural bodies and against Locke's teachings on the origin of the concepts of matter and space by abstracting from the properties of real objects. Already in his early work "Experience of a new theory of vision" ("An essay towards a new theory of vision", 1709, Russian translation 1912) B. led to prepare. work in this direction. According to B., we cannot distract the extension of bodies in space from all other tangible and visible qualities and cannot come to the general idea of space, unrelated to any of these qualities. If the abstraction of space is impossible and even absurd, then, in his opinion, it is not otherwise with the abstraction of matter. An attempt to prove this idea B. devoted "Treatise on the principles of human knowledge" ("A treatise concerning the principles of human knowledge", 1710) and the dialogue "Three conversations between Hylas and Philonous" ("Three dialogues between Hylas and Philonous ..." , 1713, Russian translation 1937). In these Op. B. said that his main goal - the fight against atheism and, consequently, against materialism and all manifestations of materialism in science. "... Even if those arguments," B. wrote, "that we put forward against her ("matter"), were recognized as insufficiently evidentiary (as for me, I consider them quite obvious), then I am still sure that all friends of truth, peace and religion have reason to desire that these arguments be recognized as sufficient" (quoted from the book: V. I. Lenin, Soch., 4th ed., vol. 14, p. 16). According to B., the concept of matter is based on the assumption that we can, abstracting from the particular properties of things, form an abstract idea of substances common to them. substrate. But this, according to B., is impossible: we do not and cannot have feelings. perception of matter as such; our perception of each thing decomposes without a trace into the perception of a certain sum of individual sensations or, in the terminology of B., "ideas". For things, "to be" always means "to be in perception." But according to B., we cannot have a general abstract idea of matter. It cannot exist, just as there cannot be a general abstract idea of space. In contrast to Locke, B. argued that our mind can form a general idea of a thing, but not a general abstract idea of matter; philosophy and science do not need the latter. This idea, firstly, is superfluous for knowledge, since cannot add to the properties of things any more than those that open feelings in them. perception. Secondly, it cannot explain how our sensations and ideas arise. Thirdly, the abstract idea of matter is internally contradictory and therefore impossible. B. opposed the distinction between secondary qualities and primary qualities: all qualities, without exception, are secondary. Their being is wholly reduced to their ability to be perceived. since the idea of two classes of qualities, according to B., is erroneous, then the idea of matter based on it as a “support”, or “substrate” (“substance”) of all the objective qualities of bodies, is also erroneous. All ideas exist, according to B., only in the soul - not only our thoughts and passions, but also various sensations. Ideas cannot be copies or likenesses of external things, which are usually thought to exist outside the spirit. An idea can be similar only to an idea, and not to a thing that exists independently of the spirit. The doctrine of B. is the doctrine of subjective idealism (see Idealism). Rejecting the existence of matter, B. recognized the existence of only spiritual existence. At the same time, B. divided the entire area of spiritual life into two parts: into “ideas” and into “souls”. "Ideas" - the subjective qualities we perceive - are passive, involuntary. The content of our sensations and perceptions is completely independent of us. “When I open my eyes in full daylight,” says B., “it does not depend on my will whether to choose between seeing or not seeing, and also to determine which objects will be presented to my gaze; the same applies to hearing and other sensations: ideas imprinted from the outside are not creations of my will" ("The Works", v. 1, Oxford, 1901, p. 273). On the contrary, "souls", according to B., in contrast to "ideas", are active, active, can be the cause. As a supporter of subjective idealism, B. tried to reject the inevitable conclusions for him, leading to solipsism. To avoid this conclusion, B. made a number of reservations in his teaching. Although things (ie, the sum of "ideas") exist only as an object of perception, the perceiving subject, according to B., does not exist in the world alone. A thing that one subject has ceased to perceive may be perceived by other subjects. But even if all subjects disappeared, things would not turn into nothing. They would continue to exist as the sum of "ideas" in the god's mind. God is such a subject, which, being eternally existing, cannot disappear. That is why the whole world of things created by him cannot disappear. It is God, according to B., "puts" into the consciousness of individual subjects the content of sensations that arise in them when contemplating the world and individual things. Here B. "approaches ... to objective idealism" (V. I. Lenin). Like his older contemporary - the French. idealist Malebranche - B. taught about the reality of things in the mind of God. Thus, his teaching was approaching the teaching of the Neoplatonists (see Neoplatonism). B. did not confine himself to speaking out against atheism and materialism in philosophy. Using the weaknesses of modern. him a metaphysical and mechanistic. materialism, as well as the lack of clarity of certain concepts of the new mathematics, B. spoke out against materialism and advanced ideas in science. So, in mathematics, he took up arms against the infinitesimal calculus created by Leibniz and Newton. In modern physics him era B. criticized those concepts, to-rye associated with the recognition of the existence of matter, as well as with the recognition of causality and space. In the ideological struggle that took place in the first half. In the 18th century B. came out as a convinced militant reactionary in philosophy and science. His teaching is not only in modern his era, but also in the 20th century. turned out to be the ideological support for the theories of subjective idealism. Extremely clearly B. expounded the doctrine, a cut in later bourgeois. idealistic currents - empirio-criticism and others - was clothed in an extremely confusing, scholastic. form. The significance of B. in the history of philosophy was determined by Lenin, showing in "Materialism and Empiriocriticism" that one of the sources of reaction. subjectively idealistic. theories that arose in the late 19th - early. 20th century in the bourgeois science, was the subjective idealism of B. Having reduced all these theories to their prototype in the teachings of B., Lenin proved their theoretical. failure and their reactions. essence. Op.: The works, ed. by A. A. Luce and i.e. Jessop, v. 1–9, L., 1948–57. "Treatise on the beginnings of human knowledge" - osn. prod. B. First ed. - 1710, Dublin, the second - 1734, London. The first translations on it. lang. 1869, in French 1920, in Italian. 1909, in Polish. 1890. In Russian. lang. there is a translation of Ε. Φ. Debolsky (St. Petersburg, 1905). Lit.: V. I. Lenin, Materialism and empirio-criticism, Soch., 4th ed., vol. 14; Didro D., coll. soch., vol. 1, M.–L., 1935, p. 248-49, 378-79; Τürgot A. R., Letters to the abbot Cise the Elder, Selected. philosophical works, M., 1937; Smirnov A., Philosophy of Berkeley. Historical and critical essay, Warsaw, 1873; Blonsky P.P., Berkeley's Doctrine of Reality, Kyiv, [b. G.]; him, Berkeley as the founder of modern immanentism, "Questions of Philosophy and Psychology", 1910, book. 103; Deborin A., Berkeley Phenomenalism, in his book: Introduction to the Philosophy of Dialectical Materialism, P., 1916, p. 70–107; History of Philosophy, vol. 1, M., 1957, p. 443–48; Bogomolov A. S., Criticism of the subjective-idealistic philosophy of J. Berkeley, M., 1959; Jessop vol. E., A bibliography of George Berkeley, Oxf., 1934; Luce A. A., Berkeley and Malebranche. L., 1934; his, The life of George Berkeley, bishop of Cloyne, L., ; Wild J., George Berkeley, L., 1936; Warnock G. J., Berkeley, L. - Baltimore, 1953; Gueroult M., Berkeley..., P., 1956. V. Asmus. Moscow.

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Berkeley Berkeley (Berkeley) George (March 12, 1685, near Kilkenny, Ireland - January 14, 1753, Oxford) - Anglo-Irish philosopher and scientist, bishop of the Anglican Church. Born into an English noble family. Educated at the University of Dublin. In 1734 he took the episcopal chair in Cloyne (Ireland). Biggest Influence on becoming philosophical views Berkeley rendered English empiricism, represented by the works J. Locke , as well as continental philosophy in the person of the Cartesian N. Malebranche and skeptic P. Bayle . Berkeley's philosophy, called immaterialism, denies the doctrine based on the theory of general abstract ideas about the existence of an absolute material substance and recognizes the true reality exclusively for spiritual entities. In his early work An Essay towards New Theory of Vision (1709, Russian translation 1912), Berkeley, on the assumption that distance itself is not directly perceived by sight, argues that our judgments, according to by which material objects, perceived by sight, are at some distance, or outside the spirit, are entirely the results of experience; material objects, as objects of vision, only appear external to the perceiving mind, but in reality have no existence independent of the human spirit. Berkeley concludes from this that the objects of visual experience do not exist objectively. In his main philosophical writings, A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710, Russian translation 1905) and the dialogue Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, 1713 , Russian translation 1937) Berkeley develops the thesis that material things exist only when they are perceived by us. Starting from the position that general abstract ideas cannot exist, Berkeley on this basis denies that we are able, abstracting from the sensually perceived qualities of material things, to form the idea of an absolute bodily substance, which would act as a “substrate” or “support” separate sensory qualities. Physical objects are combinations of sense data (called Berkeley "ideas") that are perceived by our minds. Since the existence of an idea consists entirely in its perceptibility (esse est percipi), it cannot exist “outside our mind” (without the mind). Unlike specific individual ideas of the sensible qualities of material things, the general abstract idea of an absolute material substance is, according to Berkeley, internally contradictory, and therefore impossible. According to the doctrine of immaterialism developed by Berkeley, matter should not be considered either as 1) an absolute substance that exists outside our mind; not as 2) a “stand” or “bearer” of the objective sensible qualities of things that we do not directly perceive; not as 3) an effective cause that produces sensations and perceptions of external physical objects in us; not as 4) an occasional cause of our sensations and ideas (cf. occasionalism). Berkeley opposed Locke's division of all sensory qualities into primary and secondary; for him all qualities are secondary or subjective. Locke's concept, according to which ideas of primary qualities are copies, or reflections, of properties inherent in external material things, Berkeley considers meaningless: “I answer that an idea cannot resemble anything other than an idea; a color or figure cannot resemble anything but another color, another figure” (Soch., 1978, p. 174). Berkeley divides all mental entities into two large classes: “ideas” and “spirits”. Ideas - the sensible qualities of material things - are completely inert and inactive, there is no force or activity in them. Because of this, an idea cannot be the cause of anything. In contrast to "ideas", "spirits" are cognizing active beings. As beings that perceive ideas, spirits are called the mind, and as beings that produce ideas or act on them, they are called will. Berkeley recognizes the existence of three qualitatively heterogeneous spheres of being: the absolute Spirit, or the Creator of nature, the final “spirits” created by the absolute Spirit, and the sensory data (“ideas”) that are embedded by the absolute Spirit in the final spirits, or souls, and combinations of which constitute physical objects. outside world. For physical objects, "to be" means to be perceived (esse est percipi). To "souls" or "spirits" Berkeley ascribes a special kind of existence: for them, "to be" means to perceive sensory data and their complexes (esse est percipere). One of the central problems faced by Berkeley was the problem of the continuity of the existence of material things. Berkeley argues that material things that are not perceived by one subject continue to exist at that moment in the perceptions of other people. But even if all people disappeared, material things would not cease to exist. According to Berkeley, physical objects that are not perceived by man either actually or potentially, continue to exist continuously in the "divine mind" (in the mind of God), that is, in the absolute Spirit. Moral and ethical views of Berkeley found the most complete expression in the treatise "Alciphron, or the Petty Philosopher" (Alciphron: or the Minute Philosopher, 1732, Russian translation 1996), dedicated to the refutation of the enlightening ideas of E. Shaftesbury and B. Mandeville and the apology of Christianity. In the treatise "Seiris, or the Chain of Philosophical Reflections and Inquiries" (Siris: A Chain of Philosophical Reflexions and Inquiries, 1744, Rus. per. 1978) Berkeley as the ultimate goal philosophical knowledge puts forward an intellectual contemplation of God, interpreted by him as the Platonic highest idea, or Spirit. Op.: The Works, ed. by A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop, v. 1-9. L., 1948-57; Op. Moscow, 1978; Alkifron. Works different years. SPb., 1996. Lit.: Smirnov A. I. Philosophy of Berkeley. Historical and critical essay. Warsaw, 1873; Blonsky P.P. Berkeley's doctrine of reality. K., 1907; He is. The historical context of Berkeley's philosophy. - In: Georgy Ivanovich Chelpanov on his 60th birthday. M., 1916, p. 79-100; Bagretsov LM A few words about the origin of Berkeley's idealistic system. Kharkov, 1908; Ern WF Berkeley as the founder of modern immanentism. - “Issues of Philosophy and Psychology”, 1910, book. 103, p. 413-436; Bogomolov A. S. Criticism of the subjective-idealistic philosophy of J. Berkeley. M., 1959; Bykhovsky B. E. Berkeley. M., 1970; Jessop T. E. A Bibliography of George Berkeley. Oxf., 1934; Luce A. A. Berkeley and Malebranche. L., 1934; Idem. The Life of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne. L., 1949; Wild J. George Berkeley. L., 1936; Warnock G. J. Berkeley. L.-Balt., 1953; Wisdom J. The Unconscious Origin of Berkeley's Philosophy. L., 1953; Johnston G. A. The Development of Berkeley's Philosophy. N.Y., 1965; Ardley G. Berkeley's Renovation of Philosophy. The Hague, 1968; Olscamp P. J. The Moral Philosophy of George Berkeley. Den Haag, 1970; Park D. A. Critical Study of Berkeley's Theory of Concepts. The Hague, 1972; Pitcher G. Berkeley. Boston, 1977. T. A. Dmitriev

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George Berkeley

Berkeley was born in the south of Ireland in 1685 into an English noble family, he first studied at the school where Jonathan Swift studied before him, and at the age of 15 he entered Holy Trinity College Dublin spiritual university. In 1704, Berkeley became a bachelor of arts, and from 1707 he taught at the same college. In 1709 he was ordained a deacon. Anglican Church. At the same time, his first work, “Experiments in a New Theory of Vision,” was published.

After this work, Berkeley came out quite often, he intensively developed his new theory, rooted in Locke's sensationalism. In 1710, he published a treatise On the Principles of Human Knowledge (his main work), and in 1713 Berkeley expounded the ideas set forth in this treatise in a more popular form in his work Three Conversations between Hylas and Philonus. These are dialogues between fictional characters ("Gilas" from the Greek word +ul)h - "matter", and Philonus - "lover of the mind", "philosopher").

In 1728, he left for America on Long Island, where he wanted to establish a college for the training of preachers for missionary work in America, but this did not work out, and in 1731 he returned to his homeland. In 1732, "Antifron" was published - a theological work, an apology for Christianity. In 1734, Berkeley became a bishop of the Anglican Church and until 1752 served in the city of Klein in the south of Ireland. At this time, he practically does not write, the only work is Seiris, where he critically analyzes the mathematical ideas of Newton and Leibniz. In 1752 he was invited to Oxford, but in 1753 he died.

Berkeley saw the task of his philosophy in the apology of Christianity and the criticism of atheism. It is on this basis that his whole philosophy should be understood, otherwise we will really interpret Berkeley as a subjective idealist, which, of course, he was not. Otherwise, he would not be a Christian at all, not even a member of the Church of England, no matter how they treat it. Even the Anglicans do not undertake to assert the truth of subjective idealism and assert that there is nothing in the world apart from the cognizing subject.

So, the goal of Berkeley's philosophy is an apology for Christianity and a critique of atheism. Berkeley considered atheism and materialism his main enemy. Where does faith in the objective existence of matter, independent of man, come from? It is precisely the answer to this question that Berkeley is trying to find in his first work, An Experience in a New Theory of Vision.

Berkeley finds the reason for this belief in the conviction of the objective existence of space and criticizes the Newtonian understanding of space as a kind of receptacle for bodies. In the next work - the treatise "On the Principles of Human Knowledge" (and in "Three Talks between Hylas and Philonus") Berkeley is already more consistent and sees the reason for the existence of materialism in people's belief in the existence of matter. Berkeley devotes two of these works to the criticism of this certainty.

Berkeley first deals with the problem of general concepts. He writes that the main delusion of people is that they believe in the existence of a general concept, that a general concept is formed by means of abstraction. A person, observing various objects (say, chalk, sugar, snow), discovers the property of all these objects to be white, therefore he abstracts the property of whiteness from the bearer of this property and believes that in this way the concept of whiteness is formed. Further, a person can produce the next stage of abstraction - introduce the concept of color, etc. up to the most general concepts, the most general of which is the concept of material substance. Therefore, in order to refute the belief in the existence of matter (material substance), Berkeley first considers the problem of the formation of general concepts.

He argues that, as he ironically writes, if one of the people has the ability to abstract (the property of forming abstractions), then he is ready to meet this person, because he himself does not have such an ability. Whatever general concept Berkeley tries to imagine, he always imagines it in conjunction with some material carrier. If Berkeley tries to imagine whiteness, he imagines snow or chalk, if he tries to imagine a person in general, then he also fails - the image of a particular person always appears in his mind. Therefore, there are no general concepts - this is a mistake of philosophers, which, according to Berkeley, arises as a result of the misuse of words (more precisely, as a result of the abuse of words), since people, using words (and such words as "whiteness" and "man", of course, exist), believe that these words really mean something.

According to Berkeley, these words do not mean anything other than a specific material object. There is no person in general - there is only a specific individual person; there is no idea of a person - there is an idea of a particular person. Therefore, the word is a sign (here Berkeley agrees with Hobbes), but not a sign of a general idea that exists in our mind, but a sign of an idea corresponding to a specific subject. Therefore, there is no concept of matter, just as there is no idea of matter as the most general concept, and the fact that this concept is still harmful and contradictory, Berkeley tries to show in his treatise.

Berkeley considers his task from the point of view of the philosophy of John Locke, who, as we remember, said that there are primary and secondary qualities. Berkeley argues that there is no difference between the two. Locke (and before him Galileo and even earlier Democritus) calls the primary qualities the qualities that belong to the most material object. These are its shape, weight, dimensions, etc., and the secondary qualities (taste, color and smell) do not belong to the object, but arise in the mind of the subject perceiving these qualities.

Berkeley argues that there is no difference between primary and secondary qualities, and therefore neither one nor the other qualities belong to material objects. In his early work, "Experiments in a New Theory of Vision," Berkeley criticized only vision, believing that things do not have such a primary quality as color, and then, applying the same principles to all other qualities, he proved that the object does not have any qualities. .

Berkeley proceeds from the principle that we judge the existence of a thing on the basis of the fact that we perceive it, i.e. States that . Therefore, sensible things are things that can be perceived by the senses directly, and not through words, concepts, etc.

What do we perceive through the senses? Of course, in the senses we are given certain qualities, but not the objects themselves, therefore, sensible things are only a set of these qualities or a combination of them, but not the object itself. Berkeley considers each specific quality to show that none of them belong to the subject.

First, he considers heat and says that since strong heat and strong cold cause suffering, and suffering is a property of only a living thinking being, then heat cannot belong to an inanimate material object. For example, if a person puts one hand in cold water and the other in hot water, and then immerses both hands in warm water, that water will appear warm to one hand and hot to the other. Since the same water cannot be both warm and hot at the same time, it means that water does not have heat or cold in itself. Warmth and cold are properties of the perceiving subject.

Berkeley does the same with other secondary qualities - taste and smell. Taste and smell cannot be in an object either, they can only be in a person. The sound also cannot belong to the object itself, although it is, according to scientists, air vibrations (the bell does not sound if it is placed in a vacuum). Berkeley objects to this: if sound is vibrations of atoms or molecules of air, then we would have to see sound or feel its vibrations. If we hear a sound, then, in this way, we also distinguish the sound image that arises in our minds from those vibrations that occur in the air or in the body itself. Therefore, the sound also belongs only to the subject.

About color. If the color belongs to the subject, then, say, the cloud will be purple at sunset, and not white, as it is during the day. Since antiquity, there are other proofs of the subjectivity of color. So, a patient with jaundice perceives colors in a completely different way than a healthy person; If we look at an object painted in one color through a microscope, then we will see completely different colors there. Therefore, it cannot be said that the color belongs to the object itself - the color is a property of the subject.

But we already know these arguments, they were met by Democritus, Galileo, Locke. Berkeley, on the other hand, argues that not only secondary, but also primary qualities do not belong to objects. Indeed, the value, i.e. length and shape cannot be inherent in the object itself, since the same object can appear both large and small - we are near or far from it. There are small animals to whom one and the same thing may seem much larger than to us (a thing cannot be both big and small at the same time). Another primary quality, movement, is also not inherent in things themselves, because movement is relative and we can say that a thing moves quickly, slowly or at rest, depending on where we look at it from. Density is the resistance of the body to the force acting on it, therefore we also perceive density based on our senses, which means that it does not belong to objects. Therefore there are no primary qualities.

Another argument. How do we perceive primary qualities—say, extension, form, and movement? There cannot be a body that has extension, that is not colored by any color. We cannot perceive the density of the body without touch. Therefore, we always perceive primary qualities through secondary qualities. If the body were not painted in any color, then we would not perceive either the shape, or the movement, or the dimensions of this body. Therefore, there are neither primary nor secondary qualities, and the mistake of people who recognize the objectivity of primary qualities is that the primary qualities, when they act on a person, do not cause him any emotions, and the secondary qualities cause him a state of pleasure or displeasure. On this basis, it is concluded that secondary qualities exist in a person, and primary ones are objective. But the fact that the primary qualities evoke no pleasure and no emotion at all does not yet speak in defense of their objectivity.

What does it mean that matter is extended? What does the word “support” mean in general, which we use when speaking of a substratum, of a substance (that substance is, as it were, a support, a certain substance that is under all things - that which supports the whole variety of material things)? What is 'support', what is 'stretch under', Berkeley asks. I see specific objects, but what is under them, what supports them, I do not perceive. I perceive sensations about these objects; I have no feeling about matter. Therefore, the concept of matter does not arise on the basis of sensation, and therefore there is no material substratum (recall that for Berkeley the main principle was to exist is to be perceived).

Based on these arguments, one could conclude that neither matter nor material things exist. But it is not so. Berkeley wants to show what absurd conclusions can be reached if we assume the objective, independent existence of matter. It turns out that the existence of matter is self-contradictory: assuming that matter exists and that it affects our senses, we come to the conclusion that neither matter nor material bodies exist. But Berkeley argues that the materialist falls into his own mistake: proceeding from the existence of a material substratum, he concludes that there is no material substratum. That is, if we assume that feelings reflect the properties of the real material world, then we come to the conclusion that this world does not exist. Therefore, the concept of matter is not only redundant (since we only know the data of our sense organs and we do not need any concept of matter for this), but also contradictory, since assuming that matter exists, we come to the conclusion that no matter exists. Therefore, says Berkeley, we must proceed from completely different principles of knowledge, since we have shown that materialism is self-contradictory and leads to the negation of itself.

Berkeley argues that the whole variety of things really exists, but not as a material reality independent of my mind, but as something that exists only in the mind. Berkeley does not say "in my mind", but simply "in my mind". All people perceive the same objects in the same way - therefore, they do not exist in my mind, but in the mind in general. Therefore, if we are sure that the world exists, then there is a certain mind that generates this world. Thus Berkeley comes to the proof of the existence of God. Usually people, says Berkeley, follow a somewhat different logical chain: they believe in God and, based on their faith, conclude that the world exists. I believe in the existence of the world and conclude that there is a God.

The logic of Berkeley is understandable: to exist means to be perceived; if I perceive certain feelings in myself, then I conclude that the world exists; I also conclude that no material substance is absolutely necessary for this. Since I know that this world is perceived in the same way by other people, I understand that the world exists not only in my mind, but also in the mind of another, which embraces both this material world and our souls.

Approximately the same system of building philosophy was in Plotinus: the world exists in the Mind, we know sensual objects (the material world) insofar as each soul is contained in the world soul and has in itself ideas belonging to the universal mind. Therefore, Berkeley does not stand on the positions of subjective idealism (if anyone can be reproached for this, then, on the contrary, Berkeley's opponent, a materialist, who really, logically reasoning, comes to the conclusion that there is only a mind, only a cognizing subject, that there is no material carrier and there is no outside world at all).

According to Berkeley, the external world exists, it is real, just as every person is real, and not just the subject who knows the Self. This proves that God exists. It would be difficult to admit otherwise, realizing that Berkeley was a Christian and main goal saw his philosophy in the apology of Christianity.

Berkeley's doctrine did not receive support from the Anglican Church, but it did not cause any particular objections, since Berkeley continued his diaconal ministry, and later was even ordained a bishop.

So, Berkeley criticizes the concept of substance, but only material substance. There is no material substance - there is only a spiritual substance, it is God. God is fully active, He creates ideas and our souls. Ideas are completely passive, but our souls can be both passive and active. They are active if they are perceived from the point of view of cognizing ideas, and passive insofar as they are created by God. Therefore, there is no material world - there is only God, and nothing else. God creates souls and puts ideas into them; He creates souls in such a way that he puts the same ideas into all souls. Therefore, all souls work in the same way and perceive ideas in the same way - not only the world, but also the laws of morality, logic, aesthetics and, in general, that which cannot be attributed to the material world.

If we proceed from the belief in the existence of matter, then it is impossible to explain the cognizability of the material world, because like is cognized by like, the spirit can only cognize the spirit. If we cognize the external objective world, then this shows that we cognize the spiritual nature, and not the material one, otherwise we would not have cognized it. If there are sciences that study the laws of nature, then the laws also cannot belong to matter - matter is inert and motionless; these laws can belong only to the Creator of this world. And since we know these laws, we have one nature with the Creator and with these laws. For Berkeley it is obvious that there is no matter, that there is only spirit - the Divine Spirit and our souls, and that God creates in us ideas that connect, follow one another, and from their succession we conclude that one phenomenon is the cause of another and etc. In fact, no phenomenon is the cause of another, but the cause of everything is the Creator, Who arranges these ideas in our soul in this way, and not otherwise.

Thus, Berkeley, in his own way, fulfilled his task, showing that materialism is self-contradictory and the recognition of matter as an objective reality is superfluous and does not follow from any of our sense data.

The provisions of Berkeley, which followed from Locke's sensationalism, were developed by another English (or rather Scottish) philosopher, David Hume.

George Berkeley: philosophy, main ideas, biography

Among philosophers who profess empirical and idealistic views, one of the most famous is George Berkeley. His father was an Englishman, but George considered himself Irish, since it was there, in the south of Ireland, that he was born in 1685. From the age of fifteen, the young man began a period of college education, with which he would be connected in one way or another for a long period of his life (until 1724). In 1704, Berkeley Jr. received a bachelor's degree, and three years later - a master's degree with the right to teach in the junior teaching staff. A few years later, he becomes an Anglican priest, and then a Ph.D. and senior lecturer at the college.

Subjective idealism

Even in his youth, D. Berkeley, choosing between materialistic views and subjective idealism, took the side of the latter. He became a defender of religion and in his writings showed the dependence of a person's perception of matter on how it sees and feels the soul (mind, consciousness), formed by God. Even in his youth, works were written that became significant for the development of philosophical thought and glorified the name - George Berkeley.

Significant works of the philosopher

Among the works of the thinker were various reflections, including those with a theological bias. But one of the most interesting works is the “Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonus” (George Berkeley - philosophy), briefly about which we can say this: the author raised the question of the metaphysical perception of the relativity of comprehension of reality, as well as phenomenalism. In Motion, Berkeley challenges Newton's views on the abstract understanding of motion. George's philosophical approach is that movement cannot be independent of space and time. Not only this concept was criticized by the philosopher, but also many other categories of Newton.

A family

When George Berkeley received his inheritance, he proposed to establish a school in Bermuda where pagans would be converted to Christianity. At first, the mission was accepted and approved by Parliament in every possible way, and also supported by aristocratic circles. However, when the missionary with his associates retired to the island, she was gradually forgotten. And without proper funding, the scientist-philosopher had to stop missionary work. Gradually, he leaves his affairs and spends more time with his son. George Berkeley lived sixty-seven years and died in 1752. The city of Berkeley in one of the states of America, California, is named after him.

Berkeley ontology

Inconsistency of views

However, there is some inconsistency in the teaching of the philosopher. For example, in the same substance "I" he used the same arguments to criticize the material and to prove the indivisibility and unity of the beginning. However, his follower David Hume formalized these ideas into a theory, where he transferred the concept of matter to the spiritual component: the individual “I” is a “bundle of perceptions”. It is impossible not to tear yourself away from the materialistic view when you study the works that the philosopher George Berkeley wrote.

Continentality and the philosophy of Berkeley

Historical place in philosophy

The teaching that George Berkeley left behind, the biography of the thinker - all this is of great interest and value for the historical development of philosophy. His theory gave a new impetus, a new spiral of development in the direction of philosophical thought. Schopenhauer considers Berkeley's merits immortal and calls him the father of idealism. Thomas Reed was also for a long time under the influence of the philosophical thought that George Berkeley preached. The main ideas of the philosopher will be studied by more than one generation of thinkers. However, many of them, including Thomas Reid, subsequently began to criticize them.

Subjective idealism of J. Berkeley and agnosticism of D. Hume

According to his teaching, the monad is not sensually comprehensible: it can only be comprehended by reason. (Comparable to Plato's "world of ideas", which can only be known by reason). Each monad is a kind of independent world, reflecting the entire world order. The highest monad is God (absolute).

Leibniz's monadology is objectively idealistic. It is notable for its dialectical conjectures, among which are the ideas of a dynamic understanding of the processes of nature and of the interconnection through monads of all forms of manifestations of life: Leibniz believed that all nature is organic, living.

The philosophical system of Leibniz was the result of the creative processing of ancient, medieval and contemporary philosophy.

George Berkeley (1685-1753), an English philosopher who belongs to the traditions of subjective idealism, continued the empirical-sensualist line in European philosophy.

Berkeley insisted on sensation, that is, the combination of sensations is, according to Berkeley, the things around us. The thinker put forward the principle: "To exist is to be perceived." He wrote: “And what do we perceive if not our own ideas or sensations?”. He began to consider sensations as the only reality perceived by man.

Berkeley introduces four kinds of existence:

1 - to exist - to be perceived;

2 - to exist - to perceive;

3 – to exist in the imagination of possible perception;

4 – existence, being of things and the whole world – in God.

One of the main tasks of his philosophy, Berkeley considered the criticism of materialism and atheism.

He rejected even the very assumption of the existence of matter. Rejecting the existence of matter, he substantiates the existence of spiritual being, which he subdivides into:

1 - ideas - involuntary and passive subjective qualities perceived by us;

2 - souls - active and active, which have the ability to perceive ideas (mind), cause them or act on them (will).

Berkeley believed, therefore, that there can be no general abstract idea of matter, as well as an abstract idea of extension, space, etc. He sought to prove that the human mind cannot form a general abstract idea at all, but only a general idea of a thing.

Although Berkeley adhered to the principles of subjective idealism, but in an effort to defend his position, he decided to reinforce it by moving to an objective idealist position. In particular, the philosopher expressed such judgments: even if all perceiving subjects disappear (and to exist, according to Berkeley, means to be perceived by the subject), then not a single thing will disappear. All of them will continue to exist in the mind of God as a sum of "ideas", i.e. continue to be accepted by them.

Biographical information. George Berkeley (1685 - 1753) was an English philosopher. Born in Ireland, he graduated from Trinity College Dublin, where he studied mathematics, philosophy, logic, and classical literature.

Although the period creative activity Berkeley falls entirely on the 18th century; era of the Enlightenment, Berkeley himself cannot be attributed to the Enlightenment.

Main works. "Against a New Theory of Vision" (1709), "A Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge" (1710), "Three Conversations between Hylas and Philonus" (1713), "Alsiphron, or the Petty Philosopher" (1732), "Seiris, or the Purpose of Philosophical reflections and research" (1744).

Philosophical views. Ontology. Berkeley's philosophy is an original combination objective and subjective idealism 4 : objective, since God is recognized as the creator of reality, and subjective, since the existence of only a multitude of human consciousnesses (souls) is recognized as real. Continuing from ancient philosophy the division of being into the real intelligible world and the illusory, sensually perceived, Berkeley (like Leibniz) denies the actual existence of the material bodily world. According to Berkeley: "To exist is to be perceived"("Esseestpercipi"). Therefore, ontology as such, i.e. Berkeley, strictly speaking, has no doctrine of being at all.

Berkeley's concept can be evaluated as perfect sensationalism 5 , opposed materialistic sensationalism Locke.

Like Locke, Berkeley uses the term "idea" to characterize everything contained in our minds. He divides all ideas into "external" and "internal":

The process of cognition goes only where there are ideas. But ideas cannot be in that which is devoid of both feeling and thought.

Ideas are also divided into simple and complex. And what we habitually call things are just complex ideas consisting of a number of simple ones (for example, the idea of an apple is a collection of ideas of green color, round shape, apple flavor, etc.). All meaningful words of the language that we use denote different ideas, i.e. something in our mind and nothing outside of it. Therefore, when we speak, say, about time or space (extension), it must be taken into account that we actually mean the ideas that are in our minds. And substantiating this thesis, Berkeley makes a curious argument: if time existed outside our consciousness, why then do we feel the time of suffering as lasting long, while the time of pleasure flies by instantly? Similarly, when evaluating the length of bodies, we are dealing only with our subjective perception: distant bodies seem smaller, close ones appear larger when we look at them through lenses (glasses, telescopes, etc.), objects change their size; Moreover, different people evaluate the same object differently.

Consistently developing his approach, Berkeley criticizes theory of primary and secondary qualities(Galileo, Locke, etc.). Since there are no things that cause certain sensations in us, the division into qualities that belong to things objectively (primary ones - length, heaviness, form, etc.) and those that can be understood as a subjective perception of primary qualities (secondary - color, taste, smell, etc.). Both primary and secondary qualities are just sensations.

The connection between sensations of various types (visual, auditory, gustatory, etc.) is also is not objective: and only by virtue of experience and habit do we take a certain set of sensations for this or that thing, although this thing does not really exist. And if it existed and would be something different from this complex of sensations, then we still could not perceive it, since we perceive everything that happens from the outside only through the senses, as sensations.

Strictly speaking, we do not need the idea of things that exist objectively and outside of us in order to explain the source of sensation. As the facts of dreams and delirium of madmen prove, sensations do not necessarily come from outside, they can also arise within consciousness.

Berkeley also denies the existence of any abstract ideas, recognizing the existence of exclusively concrete ones: we do not perceive “man”, “tree” or “extension”, but always only “this person”, “this tree”, “extension of this object”. Abstract ideas, according to Berkeley, are dangerous illusions. At the same time, Berkeley opposes not so much the materialistic tendencies of the contemporary deism of Descartes, Newton, and Locke. He pays much attention to the criticism of Newton's concept of "absolute space and time", but especially attacks the concept of "matter" or "material substance". Berkeley argues that this last concept does not give us anything for understanding being, and therefore it is simply not needed. And since its acceptance leads to materialism, atheism and godlessness, it is also very harmful. Therefore, it is generally better to refuse it.

Thus, Berkeley's ontology recognizes the existence of only many human minds(souls, intellects, minds), perceiving various kinds of ideas. But then what explains the difference between the ideas that we can create in our minds at will, and those that come to us from outside without our desire? Solving this problem, Berkeley introduces God into his ontology, who sends sensations as signs to all human consciousnesses so that people can regulate their lives and save them. This step allows Berkeley to solve another problem - the problem of the stability of the world. When people cease to perceive a certain thing, it does not disappear (as follows from the previous reasoning), since this thing continues to exist in the mind of God.

The fate of teaching Berkeley's ideas had a significant impact on the further development of European philosophy, especially modern (XIX-XX centuries): the philosophy of life, empirio-criticism (Machism), phenomenology, existentialism.

Introduction p.3

1. Life and significance of the scientific heritage p.4

2. Research program and first writings. p.8

3. The philosophical concept of Berkeley. p.12

4. God, the world and man in the concept of Berkeley p.18

Conclusion p.25

References p.26

Introduction

George Berkeley is the most significant English thinker of the first half of the 18th century. He devoted himself to defending religion and idealistic philosophy against materialism, atheism and freethinking.

Berkeley criticized the concepts of matter as the material basis (substance) of bodies, as well as the theory of I. Newton about space as the receptacle of all natural bodies and the teachings of J. Locke about the origin of the concepts of matter and space.

Berkeley develops a theory of knowledge based on nominalism and phenomenalism, rich in witty argumentation and forebodings of those discoveries that, after his death, will excite and interest many philosophers for a long time to come.

The initial postulate of Berkeleianism: to exist means to be perceived. Any object, for example, an apple, really exists for me, because I see it - it is red or green, of a certain size. I can take a bite of an apple and feel the taste. Finally, one can easily determine the density of the fruit, etc. An apple, therefore, is a complex of subjective sensations and nothing more.

Berkeley's teachings were initially met with disapproval, with thinly disguised contempt and claims that the philosopher was just a madman in need of treatment. The wits of that time addressed him with a question full of malice: Mr. Berkeley, but then your wife does not exist, since you do not perceive her at some point?

1. Life and significance of the scientific heritage

An Englishman by nationality, George Berkeley, was born in March 1685 in Kilkenny, Ireland, and was the eldest of six children in the family. He was brought up at Dysert Castle near Thomastown; at the age of eleven he entered college in Kilkenny, and at the age of fifteen he became a student at Trinity College in Dublin. There he studied mathematics, philosophy, logic and the classics. In 1707 he became a college teacher; between 1707 and 1708 writes a number of notes of a critical nature ("Philosophical Notes"), which contain the main features of his philosophical ideas. In 1709, in Dublin, Berkeley published An Essay on a New Theory of Vision, and a year later, in 1710 (being only twenty-five years old), he published a Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge. (Given the importance of both the first and second works, we will analyze both in detail in the course of presenting Berkeley's philosophical views. Now I would like to note that, despite the solemn title "Treatise", the work has a small volume: 16 pages of an introductory part, 14 pages theoretical propositions, 23 pages of responses to alleged objections, and finally 37 pages of applications of the "new principle modern science".) In 1710, Berkeley, in the rank of an Anglican priest, took the position of supernumerary professor Greek at Trinity College Dublin. In 1713 he moved to London, where he published "Three conversations between Hylas and Philonus". This work, which is a real literary masterpiece, written in English, returns to the theses of the Treatise: Philonus defends the idealistic theory in a dispute with Hylas, a supporter of the doctrine of the reality of matter: "I," says Philonus, "do not hold the opinion that things change in ideas, rather, ideas change in things; and if these immediate objects of perception, from your point of view, are only appearances of things, then I count them and take them for real things themselves" (10, p. 237).

In London, Berkeley met another prominent Irishman, Jonathan Swift, who introduced him to the court and recommended him to the Earl of Peterborough. In 1714, accompanying him as chaplain, Berkeley made a long journey, during which he visited Paris and Lyon, and then traveled through Italy to Livorno. In 1716, Berkeley undertook a second long journey, which ended only in 1720. This time he accompanied George Ashe (the physically underdeveloped son of the Bishop of Clogher) first to Paris; then he went to Turin, stayed there for a while and moved to Naples, where he stayed for a long time. Later, he carefully traveled the entire region of Apulia, settled for four months on the island of Ischia, and spent the winter in Sicily. In 1718 Berkeley went to Rome. In the autumn of 1720 Berkeley returned to London; already in 1721 he defended his dissertation and received his doctorate, and after several years of teaching theology, Greek and Hebrew at Trinity College, he was appointed dean of the Cathedral in Derry.

It was at this time that he had a project - to establish a college in Bermuda in order to evangelize the "savages" of America. Berkeley was convinced that Europe was doomed to inevitable moral degradation and moral decline. In his opinion, civilization, culture and religion can be saved only by transferring them to a new soil, namely, by instilling them in young peoples. Swift's beloved Esther Vanomrie (nicknamed "Vanessa") gave Berkeley half of her property for charitable purposes, and, confident that he had convinced everyone of the nobility of his project, in 1728 he sailed from England to America. He spent three years in Rhode Island, waiting for the promised financial aid, but, since the subsidies never arrived, he returned to England in 1731 (6, p. 24).

As Bertrand Russell recalls, Berkeley is the author of the famous poem "The Movement of the Empire Chooses the Road to the West", thanks to which his name was given to the university city of Berkeley in California. During his three years in Rhode Island, Berkeley bought an estate there, built a house, and wrote Alciphron, which was published in London in 1732.

"Alsifron" - the most voluminous and, perhaps, the most beautiful of all Berkeley's works. In seven dialogues that recreate the conditions and environment of America (where the book was written), Berkeley returns to the presentation, without any changes (despite the distance of twenty years), the philosophical views that he held in his youth. Alciphron "documented Berkeley's principles in the field of ethics and philosophy of religion." This is a work specifically directed against "free-thinkers" (specifically, against Mandeville). is called a freethinker, Euphranor expounds the ideas of Berkeley himself and believes that indeed God himself "every day and everywhere speaks in the eyes of all people." From Berkeley's point of view, "freethinking" subjects "distort human nature and drop the dignity of man to the level of a miserable and insignificant life, because they are trying to determine for us a small period of time for life instead of immortality.

In 1734 Berkeley was appointed bishop of the small diocese of Cloyne, Ireland. Here, in Cloyne, devoting himself entirely to philanthropic activities and the preaching of religious morality, Berkeley lived almost until his death, which happened in 1753 (6, p. 26).

Epidemic of 1739 - 1740 forced Berkeley to write (and publish in 1744) his last work, Seyris, a series of philosophical reflections and studies concerning the merits of tar tincture and various other subjects related to each other and arising one from the other. The work begins with a statement of considerations about the beneficial properties of tar tincture, the beneficial effect of which the author experienced on himself: "As for me, a sedentary lifestyle has long and for a long time doomed me to poor health, accompanied by various ailments, and especially nervous colic, which turned my life in a heavy burden, the situation was aggravated by the fact that my sufferings were aggravated when I worked. But since I began to use tar tincture, I feel, although not completely cured of my old illness, but, nevertheless, a gradual return to health and restful sleep, and I consider this medicine the greatest of all worldly graces and I am deeply convinced that I owe my life, except, of course, to Providence, this medicine. According to Berkeley, tar tincture is recommended for fevers, pneumonia, smallpox, gout, shortness of breath, nervous breakdown and other diseases. In his book, he thinks not only about the body, but also about the mind. "Seiris", in addition to various gnoseological arguments, offers reflections on the Neoplatonic type of universe that are closely intertwined with them: "The order and course of things, the experiments that we conduct daily show us that there is a Mind that controls and puts this system into action. This the universal mind is the real agent and true cause; the lower cause serving as the medium or instrument of the mind is the pure ether, fire, or substance of light, which is applied and directed by the infinite Mind in the macrocosm, or Universe, with limitless power and faculties according to established rules. just as in the microcosm it is applied by the human mind with limited power and skill."

In the summer of 1752, Berkeley moved to Oxford, where a few months later, on January 14, 1753, he died. Already after his death, in 1871, his diary notes were published in the form of a report on a trip to Italy.

2. Research program and first writings

First mature philosophical inquiry Berkeley - "Philosophical Notes" - consists of two "Notes", "A" and "B", written by the young Berkeley between 1707 - 1708. Already in these notes we meet clearly indicated polemical goals, i.e. central nodes, from which Berkeley's philosophy would develop. The controversy will revolve around "what philosophers call matter or bodily substance", around atheism and criticism of freethinking. The central core, on the basis of which the positive provisions of Berkeley's philosophical outlook unfold, is the principle "to exist means to be perceived."

In note 290 of Notebook B, Berkeley writes: “The great danger lies in the assumption that extension can exist outside the mind, that is, it should be recognized as infinite, unchanging, eternal, etc. This would mean that God is also extended (which seems risky) or would suggest an uncreated, eternal, unchanging, infinite being other than God." And although it is true that Newton did not at all connect his mechanistic conception of the world with materialism, John Toland, in contrast to Newton, categorically rejected the idea of the need to turn to God to find out the causes of gravity and understood matter as something internal, active. Thus, Toland eliminated the need for divine intervention from phenomena. Berkeley believed that such conclusions already follow from the general meaning of the premise, according to which matter exists outside the mind (7, p. 45).

This premise, in his opinion, the real stronghold of atheism, must be destroyed in favor of the opposite doctrine, proving its superiority and effectiveness. According to this doctrine, "to exist is to be perceived." This principle simultaneously serves as the main argument for confirming the fact that extension cannot be an unthinking substance, since it is not perceived without any tangible or visible qualities. "According to Berkeley, the notorious principle is confirmed by a large number of arguments (reduction to absurdity ), for example, in the sense that it is impossible to perceive any smell if no one has previously felt it (and does not know it), "if it costs to exist before being perceived, then we will never be able to know what it is."

The denial of the existence of matter, the assertion that only the souls of people and God exist - this is what the new apologetics of Berkeley strove from the very beginning, which really refutes some of the main scientific and philosophical ideas of its time. Berkeley, however, refutes by analyzing from within, and not by a priori rejection. Here one should look for the novelty of Berkeley, who reinforced his denial of matter huge amount cunning and talented arguments (B. Russell). And, as it turns out later, these cleverly developed arguments will have a very noticeable impact on the subsequent development of scientific and philosophical theories.

1. All meaningful words serve to denote ideas.

2. All knowledge is carried out around our ideas.

3. All ideas come either from the outside world or from within.

4. If they come from outside, then, then, from the senses, and then they are called sensations.

5. If they appear from within, they represent the actions of the mind and are called thoughts.

6. The devoid of feelings cannot have any sensations.

7. One who is devoid of thinking cannot have any thoughts.

According to Berkeley, if words are to be given any meaning, they must serve ideas. And all our ideas are sensations, or the effects of the mind on sensations: "All ideas are either simple ideas, or created from simple ideas." Therefore: it is necessary to rely on sensations. This is the basic imperative of Berkeley's epistemology. However, if one adheres to the notorious imperative, then its first two immediate consequences will turn out to be really important: a). "Time is a sensation, which means that it exists only in the mind"; indeed: "Why is the time of suffering always longer than the time of pleasure?"; b). "Extension is sensation, which means that it is not outside the mind"; "It has been proved that primary ideas do not exist in matter, just as it has been proved that secondary ideas do not exist in matter"; “The assertion that extension can exist in something unthinking is a contradiction,” in the sense that, in order to be able to speak of extension, one must experience whether a thing extends itself or is extended by someone; With). The same can be said about motion: "Movement apart from a moving thing is unthinkable."

Ideas - secondary and primary - are sensations. And there are no sensations outside the mind. Thus, outside consciousness there is nothing: "Nothing really exists, except for people, that is, conscious beings; everything else is not so much existence as modes of existence of individuals." We don't really see "things"; and what really is, most likely, "ideas", within which we see "things": "Has a person ever seen, besides his ideas, other things in order to be able to compare them with each other and make the first similar to the second? Berkeley asks himself this question. For we do not understand "things in themselves" to such a degree as to be able to compare them with our "ideas": what we understand and what we possess are always and only ideas. "There is nothing understandable but ideas." Berkeley is amazed that people do not see such an obvious truth: "there is no extension without thinking substance." Only minds exist; in the minds there are ideas, and ideas are reduced to sensations. But, on the other hand, Berkeley states: "I do not reject substance. I should not be accused of excluding substance from the rational world. I only reject philosophical meaning the word "substance". Ask some person who is not yet corrupted by this jargon what he understands by bodily substance or the substance of any body. In response, he will list volume, mass, hardness, and similar tangible qualities. This I support and want to keep" (6, p. 81).

With all this, Berkeley, having excluded the idea of the existence of matter, does not at all consider that he has impoverished the world. Everything remains as it was before, only the interpretation of the world and reality changes: "I suggest that any person imagine a perception without ideas, or some idea without perception." We have ideas in our minds. Undoubtedly, there is a mind with its ideas, therefore "to exist means to perceive or be perceived", but "the horse is in the stable, and the books are in the university, as before." However, Berkeley assures: “I stand for reality more than any other of those philosophers who have caused a lot of doubt, but they themselves know for sure only that we can be mistaken. I am saying the exact opposite. In short, do not worry, you do not lose anything. Any thing, real or chimerical, you can understand or imagine in some wild, strange and absurd way, but you will be able to do it. In my opinion, you can enjoy reality: I do not intend to take it away from you.

3. The philosophical concept of Berkeley.

In 1709, Berkeley publishes his "Experience in a New Theory of Vision" specifically with the aim of refuting the general preconceived (in his opinion) opinion. "My idea is to show how we perceive the distance, size and position of objects through vision." He focused precisely on this, because "the distance, size and position of objects are the most obvious, and therefore important, features the outside world; they are some of the most significant and noteworthy aspects of a putative external, independent of us reality with the objects that exist in it.

And the result, according to Berkeley, successfully achieved, was to prove that the distance, size and position of objects are not at all primary, objective (i.e., independent of the subject) qualities of objects, but rather our interpretations. In fact: "When we look at a closely located object with both eyes, then, as it approaches or moves away from us, we change the direction of our gaze, reducing or increasing the gap between the pupils; this change in the direction of gaze or movement of the eyes is accompanied by a sensation, and it is this which gives the mind an idea (idea) of a greater or lesser distance. Attention should also be paid to the fact that "an object located at a certain distance from the eyes, at which the pupils are quite noticeably dilated, gradually approaches the eyes and becomes less clearly distinguishable; the closer it approaches, the more vaguely, blurry its image; and as this is observed to occur regularly, a habitual connection arises in the mind between distance and varying degrees of fuzziness of the image, and the relationship is established in such a way that a greater fuzziness of the image is always associated with a smaller distance, and sharper outlines are observed from a greater distance from the object. In addition, “when an object is at some distance and then moves closer to the eyes, we cannot avoid, at least for a short time, that the image does not become more blurry, even with great eye strain. replaces vague vision, helping the mind to estimate the distance from the object; it is considered the closer, the greater the effort or strain of vision in order to obtain a clearer vision "(12).

So the perception of distance does not reflect real distance; such perception does not convey the image of the external world, since the distance depends on the form of the subject's activity. Against this theory of vision, we could effectively use the rules of geometric optics, for which space, measured from a distance, would have to be considered something objective. However, Berkeley reminds us that if these rules of geometrical optics were valid, then it would follow that everyone's perception of distance should be the same. But it is evident that the matter is otherwise when one reflects on the fact that the perception of distance varies from individual to individual, and that in the same individual it changes with the accumulation of experience. The desire to explain vision "through geometry", according to Berkeley, is just a "fantasy" or "caprice". Just as it would be a great mistake to assume that the connection that unites visual impressions with tactile sensations refers, if not directly to external bodies, then to the nature of these ideas. Indeed, in the usual display of things real world visual ideas and tactile sensations seem to be fused together in a "natural" and "indissoluble" way (9).

Nevertheless, epistemological reasoning is able to show us that the notorious connection is neither natural, nor indissoluble, nor causal. Berkeley cites as an example a case discussed by Locke, from the optics of Molinet, - the story of one blind from birth, who, thanks to an operation, gained the ability to see, became sighted. So, will this blind man, who before the operation created an idea of the world around him with the help of tactile sensations, after the operation be able to correlate and connect the visual representation of an object with his previous tactile sensations, which created in him a certain image of this object? The answer to this question is unequivocally - NO.

Indeed, what similarity and what connection exists between the sensations of light and color, on the one hand, and the sensations of resistance or constriction, on the other? There is no natural, objective, obvious connection that would help to connect sensations of one type with sensations of another type. Only experience, that is, exercise, practice and habit, can show us the constant coexistence of some sensations with others. The connection between different types of sensations does not belong to the realm of logic or objectivity: it is only a matter of experience. Only human soul establishes a connection between the "tips" of the diverse content of different types of sensations. Thus, the soul creates "things" and gives form to "things". The coincidence of tactile sensations with visual representations (images) has no other explanation than practice and experience. Both one and the other are signs of the language of nature, which God sends to the senses and reason so that a person learns to regulate his actions necessary to maintain life, and conform them to circumstances so as not to endanger his life. So vision is a tool for preserving life, but by no means a means of proving the reality of the external world. According to Berkeley, " objective reality arises before us only on the basis of interpretation, the interpretation of "signs" by sensations, the only ones known initially. And only when we establish a certain connection between the different classes of perceived mappings and consider them in accordance with the mutual dependence that has developed between them, only then can we consider that the first step in the construction of reality has been taken.

De Ruggiero rightly recalls that Berkeley wanted to oppose his "Theory of Vision" as scientific treatise Descartes' Dioptrics, Barrow's Lectures on Optics, Newton's Optics and Molina's Dioptrics. The topic was extremely relevant and won the attention of scientists, despite the attempt to complicate it with a heap of metaphysical and epistemological problems. But Berkeley was really interested in the notorious heaps of a specific nature. In one of his letters to Sir John Percival in March 1710, he states that the Essay on a New Theory of Vision will most likely be useless, but adds that he hopes to show in the next treatise that the Essay, "by showing the emptiness and falsity many areas of speculative science, will serve as an incentive to a deep study of religion and useful things. The work Berkeley mentions in a letter to Sir Percival is A Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge (6, p. 56).

In 1710, the "Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge" comes out of print, the most notable work Berkeley, the first part of which (and the only one to be published) is entitled as follows: "Part One, in which the main causes of error and difficulty in the sciences are examined, as well as the foundations of skepticism, atheism and unbelief." And yet, the main fallacy that Berkeley wants to eradicate is the substantial-materialistic image of the universe. According to Berkeley, main reason This error is in the belief in the meaning and value of abstract ideas and the subsequent conviction associated with it that, along with secondary qualities, there are also primary ones. The main targets of Berkeley and his "Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge" were Newton and Locke, namely: the Newtonian theory of the universe, consisting of a material substance independent of consciousness, and Locke's psychology, which admits, for example, that most of our knowledge consists of abstract ideas. .

Just like Locke, Berkeley supports the view that our knowledge is the knowledge of ideas, not facts. "At any consideration of the objects of human knowledge, it becomes obvious that these are either ideas imprinted by the senses in this moment, or ideas perceived when attention is paid to the emotions and activities of the mind; or, finally, ideas formed with the help of imagination and memory by combining, dividing, or just presenting ideas originally obtained by the two previous methods. " Therefore, the objects of our knowledge are ideas. Where do these ideas come from? Berkeley answers the question without hesitation: "With by means of sight I acquire the ideas of light and colors with all their shades and intensities. With the help of touch, I feel hardness and softness, heat and cold, movement and resistance, and so on, and all this may be in more or less quantity and to a greater or lesser extent. Smell brings me smells, taste brings me sensations of taste; hearing conveys to the mind sounds in all their variety of tone and combinations. "Thus, ideas are sensations. And the latter come from the senses.

It is because of the primary coexistence or constant stable combination of ideas that what we call things, or objects, appears: "Therefore, it is seen that some of these sensations appear together, they are marked by one common name and, as a result, they are considered one single thing. Thus, for example, observing for a while that a certain color is always accompanied by a certain taste, and they are accompanied by a certain smell, shape and density, people consider all these sensations as one single thing, different from the others, denoted by the name "apple", while other collections of ideas form a stone, a tree, a book, and other tangible things, which, being pleasant or unpleasant, arouse in us the feelings of love, hatred, joy, anger, etc." (6, p. 62).

Necks are sensations, and objects (or bodies) are complexes or stable permanent combinations of sensations. In addition, according to Berkeley, there are no abstract ideas, such as: a person, length, color, etc. In a word, Berkeley rejects the theory according to which human mind has the ability to abstract. We perceive only ideas, and every idea is only a single sensation. We do not perceive "man" but "this man"; we have the sensation not of "color" but of "this color" having "this shade"; to the same extent we hear not "sound" in general, but "this sound". "What are light and colors, heat and cold, extension and forms - in a word, everything that we see and touch, if not a multitude of sensations, concepts, ideas or impressions of the senses? And is it possible to separate, even if only in mind, any of them from perception? Therefore, if I do not have the opportunity to see or touch any thing, I cannot really feel it, nor can I understand how a thing or a felt object differs from feeling or perceiving this thing or this subject". After all, every sensation is precisely unique, and not abstract. I cannot have the idea of a triangle unless at the same time I am thinking of a scalene triangle, an isosceles triangle, or an equilateral triangle. "Man" is only a word: our sensations, memories or impressions, that is, our ideas, usually concern one particular person. Abstract ideas are illusions, moreover, dangerous illusions, because they encourage us to engage in ontologization, to "create" substances or substrates that are beyond our sensations. They push to invent fantastic worlds of entities ("man", "color", "material bodies", etc.), forcing us to assume that they really exist.

This is where Berkeley's nominalism comes from. From this concept, he, among other things, will draw interesting conclusions that "played" against the philosophy of science of his time. In short: we only know ideas; they coincide with the impressions received through the senses; these sense impressions are always singular, i.e., individual and concrete; consequently, Locke's theory of abstraction is erroneous. And only when we take a particular idea and use it to give an idea of all ideas similar to it, only then do we call such a particular idea general. However, the general idea is by no means an abstract idea, leaving aside all the distinctive features perceived by our senses. We are not familiar with "man" in general, but we are always familiar with this or that (concrete, particular) person; we do not know what "extension" is, but one or another extended thing is always known; we do not know "house" in general, but we always know this or that house, etc. (7, p. 70)

In fact, it is like this: from time to time we get individual, concrete and distinct sensations, which, constantly appearing together, contribute to the emergence of the idea of a house, a person, a river, or an extension. This means that Locke's thesis of abstract ideas, the belief in a substance independent of our sensations, should be discarded. It is Locke's theory that is responsible for the "strangely widespread opinion" that "houses, mountains, rivers - in a word, all sensible objects have a real or natural being, different from the ideas perceived by the mind." However, Berkeley recalls: “However great the confidence and approval with which this principle has hitherto been accepted, nonetheless, anyone who will be in a position to question it will find (if I am not mistaken) that this theory concludes in an obvious contradiction. Indeed, what are the above objects, if not things that we perceive with the senses? And what can we perceive, besides our own ideas or sensations?

4. God, the world and man in the concept of Berkeley

After the removal of matter and the reaffirmation of the existence of the spirit or soul of man, the project for the defense of religion made good progress, but was not completed. The world that Berkeley is creating still lacks the presence of God. And this is how Berkeley completes and completes his project. There is a human spirit, and "it is a simple being, invisible, acting: because it perceives ideas, it is called 'intellect'; because it generates ideas and acts on the world, it is called 'will.'" Nevertheless, Berkeley notes: "As far as I understand, the words "will", "intellect", "reason", "soul", "spirit" do not designate ideas; they mean something that is strikingly different from ideas and can neither be similar to any idea, nor be represented by any idea, because it is an active force. "So there is a spirit, consciousness, i.e. mind. And objects knowledge, in other words, ideas are in the mind.

If the external world (the world in which the real value of ideas could be tested) is but an illusion, how can we distinguish between ideas that depend on our imagination and those that, on the contrary, cannot appear at will? Berkeley gets out of the situation by resourcefully turning, as usual, a stumbling block into a driving force of reasoning. He explains that "whatever my power over my own thoughts, I consider that ideas perceived directly from the senses do not depend in any way on my will. When I clear light I open my eyes, I have no choice - to see or not to see, to determine which objects should fall into my field of vision; the same happens with hearing and other senses: all the ideas imprinted by them are not creations of my will. This means that there is some other will or another consciousness, a spirit that generates them" (7, p. 102).

Ideas born of the senses are stronger, livelier, brighter, more distinct than those created by the imagination. In addition, they have stability, orderliness and connectedness. They do not appear by chance, as often happens with representations caused by the human will, but in a regular way, that is, in an ordered sequence. "And yet, where does this stability, orderliness of non-randomly caused ideas come from? What is their cause and basis? On this a question decisive for his philosophical system, Berkeley answers as follows: "... amazing coherence proves the wisdom and benevolence of its Author. And the constant, unchanging rules, according to which the Mind, on which we depend, excites perceptions in us through the senses, are called "natural laws." We shall learn these laws through experience, which will show us that certain perceptions, in the ordinary course of things, are accompanied by certain ideas."

So, the cause of stability, orderliness and connectedness of perceptions is God; it is God, by immutable, permanent rules, that calls forth ideas in us. It gives us a certain foresight, thanks to which we are able to direct our actions depending on the needs dictated by life. Without this ability, we will constantly find ourselves in hopeless situations, our life will turn into hell: we will not be able to use a single thing without getting hurt or hurting ourselves. We will not know that food nourishes, that sleep restores strength, that fire warms, that the only way to reap the harvest of grain is to sow it at the right time; we will not know at all that certain measures lead to certain results. We know all this, not because we have discovered any necessary connection between our ideas, but only because of the observance of the laws established by nature, without which we would become uncertain and confused, and a grown man in Everyday life just as he would not know how to behave like a newborn baby" (7, p. 109).

This means that our ideas are not randomly accumulated by our minds. They demonstrate "consistent and uniform functioning" aimed at preserving life. Our knowledge is a tool for preserving life. And the "consistent and uniform functioning" of perceptions, according to Berkeley, "clearly proves the goodness and wisdom of the spirit-ruler, whose will lies in the laws of nature." However, instead of being guided by his instructions, we wander in search of secondary causes.

Despite such an interpretation, Berkeley still does not intend to take anything from nature from its richness and brightness of colors: “Everything that we see, hear, touch, or in any way understand and think, remains as stable and constant as before; there is a certain nature of things by which the distinction between reality and chimeras retains all its force. Berkeley's world tends to be permanent, a world that we experience and in which we have to live forever. "Everything that is said in Holy Scripture on behalf of the common people against the opinion of scientists, I support it. In all matters, I stand on the side of the crowd. "Berkeley does not tear anything out of our world. The only thing he denies is what philosophers call matter or bodily substance. However, having discarded matter or bodily substance, humanity does not suffer damage and does not increases their suffering. The denial of matter does not impoverish life, and people will not even notice and guess what they have abandoned. The purpose of the denial of matter is only that atheists have nothing more to justify and justify their "unbelief". , squares, gardens with plants, rivers and mountains... From his point of view, only matter does not exist.

If the world is only a collection of human ideas, Bertrand Russell asks, what about the continuity of the existence of the world? Do not things cease to exist whenever a person ceases to perceive them? To answer these questions, Berkeley again resorts to the help of God: The world when it is not perceived this person or other people, continues to exist in the perception of God; Eternal Spirit by its influence on the souls of people causes the appearance in them of perceptions and their alternation, otherwise what are called natural objects would exist "glimpses", "leaps".

Nominalism (according to which in objective reality nothing corresponds to general concepts, and they are only names for individual objects; our knowledge is woven from specific individual sensations and ideas) and phenomenalism (according to which only phenomena such as color, taste, sound, etc. p., and essence is unknowable; it separates phenomena from essence) - these are the two epistemological foundations on which the project of Berkeley's new apologetics rests and develops. And yet, despite the fact that nominalism and phenomenalism in Berkeley play an openly apologetic role, in his philosophical system they lead to very important consequences in terms of the philosophy of physics. The consequences mentioned "have a surprisingly modern character. First of all, it is about the newly discovered and reintroduced concepts used during the discussion on modern physics by Ernst Mach, Heinrich Hertz and, later, by some philosophers and physicists, in different time influenced by Mach (Bertrand Russell, Philipp Frank, Richard von Mises, Moritz Schlick, Werner Heisenberg, etc.)." although he disagrees with him in principle. Popper cannot agree with Berkeley and his instrumentalism. As a realist, he sees in scientific theories not only tools for conjecture, but also truthful explanatory descriptions of reality, "even if unreliable").

In the "Analyst", or reasoning addressed to the "non-believer mathematician", and "Philosophical Notes" Berkeley writes: "Newton's calculus of fluxions is useless", "One cannot discuss things about which we have not the slightest idea. Therefore, one cannot discuss the differential calculus and on the calculus of infinitesimal quantities. Notes on mathematics, scattered throughout Berkeley's various writings, appear constantly. Exclusively the philosophy of physics, Berkeley devoted his treatise On Motion. Once again confirming one of the basic principles of his theory of knowledge, Berkeley writes: "It is unworthy of a philosopher to pronounce words that mean nothing." Newton's "absolute space" and "absolute time" have no meaning and therefore they have no place in a serious physical theory. "As for absolute space, that specter that haunts mechanistic philosophers and geometers, it is enough to note that its existence has not been proven by reasoning, nor perceived by the senses"; and for the purposes of mechanistic philosophy, it is enough to replace "absolute space" by "relative space", defined by areas of the sky with constant stars; the same is true of absolute motion. A body can be considered moving under a certain condition: "It is required ... that it change its position or distance relative to some other body, since "it is impossible to distinguish or measure any movement without the help of sensible objects" ". Everything that has been said so far about "absolute space" and "absolute motion" is also valid in relation to the concepts of "gravity" and "force". If we say that "gravity" is an "essential quality" inseparable from the nature of bodies, then we are only uttering a meaningless word: what we see is not gravity at all as component essences of bodies, but bodies moving relative to other bodies. Nor can we speak of force as the real cause of motion: who has ever seen this real cause? And why reintroduce "hidden qualities" into physical theory? "The real effective causes of motion ... of bodies in no way belong to the field of mechanics or experimental science. And they cannot even shed even a little light on these phenomena ...". Berkeley's reflections and his concept are commented by Popper: "They cannot shed light, because to speak of the 'true and real nature', of the 'intrinsic qualities' or of the 'real essence' of bodies, is empty talk. There is nothing physical to be placed behind physical bodies, no hidden physical reality. Everything is a surface, physical bodies are reduced to their properties. Their reality is the way they fit together" (6, p. 93).

Of course, Berkeley by no means denied the fact that Newtonian mechanics leads to correct results and that it is able to make accurate guesses. He denies the fact that Newton's theory is suitable for investigations into the nature or essence of bodies.

In fact, explains Berkeley, it is necessary to distinguish between mathematical hypotheses, conceived as tools for explanation and conjecture, and theories, involving the study of the nature of bodies. According to Berkeley, Newton's theory is simply a set of mathematical hypotheses for the development of research: "Everything that is asserted regarding the forces inherent in bodies, both the forces of attraction and repulsion, should be considered only as a mathematical hypothesis, and not as something that really exists in nature. ". Newtonian mechanics is required to be able to draw conclusions from the premises that could "save" or at least take into account the phenomena. Berkeley argues that this would be sufficient even if Newton's theory fails to describe the true reality of the world.

Conclusion

Berkeley is an attractive writer with a graceful style (he wrote many of his works before the age of 28!). He was not only a priest (bishop in Cloyne, Ireland) and a philosopher, but also a psychologist. Berkeley sought to prove that we perceive only the properties of things, i.e. how these things affect our senses, but we do not grasp the essence of the thing itself, and yet the properties are very relative to the perceiving subject. Sense impressions are phenomena of the psyche. If you have one hand cold and the other warm, dip your hands in warm water and you will feel cold with one hand and warm with the other. Berkeley proves the right idea - about the relativity of our perceptions, their dependence on the state of the subject.

All this is true, but this does not save Berkeley from extreme conclusions leading to subjective idealism, of which we are accustomed to regard him as an apologist. But he is a priest who sincerely believed in God, and by this very fact he is rather an objective idealist! Therefore, he cannot be accused (as is usually done) of solipsism. Solipsism is a subjective idealism brought to extreme conclusions: the recognition of only one's Self as the only reality - there is nothing outside of me!

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Secondary School No. 3 Essay on the topic "The Fundamentals of George Berkeley" Pupil 11kl. Makarova Kirill Kohtla-Jarve

George Berkeley (1685-1753)

“The only advantage I claim is that I have always thought for myself.”

“If my teaching, I mean immaterialism, is well received, this whole philosophy of Epicurus, Hobbes, Spinoza, etc., which has shown itself to be an outspoken opponent of religion, collapses.”

“More than other philosophers, I adhere to reality… Let it not be said that I discard existence. For I am only establishing the meaning of the word as far as I understand it.”

(George Berkeley)

“In a strange way, the opinion prevails among people that houses, mountains, rivers - in a word, all sensible objects have an existence, natural or real, in contrast to the fact that our mind perceives them. For what are these things if not our own ideas or sensations? And what do we perceive if not our own ideas or sensations? And would it not be a complete contradiction to admit that any combination of them exists without being perceived?

“To exist is to be perceived” (“Esse est percipi”)

(George Berkeley)

In 1705, eight students from Trinity College, Dublin organized a secret circle to study “ new philosophy". To discuss issues that interested them, they met every Friday at 5 pm for at least three hours, as stated by the charter they had developed, which determined the rules and distribution of duties. Those who were absent and late for the meeting were fined. The circle was inspired by 20-year-old George Berkeley. Berkeley entered the history of cognition as a subverter of matter: “God is my witness that I was and still remain fully convinced of the non-existence of matter.” None of the philosophers concealed his understanding of “matter”. But none of them dared to say anything about her that they risked giving birth to the original mind of George Berkeley in their depths. “I have no reasonable basis for believing in the existence of matter. I have no immediate intuition for her; and I cannot directly, on the basis of my sensations, ideas, concepts, actions and passions, conclude about the existence of a non-thinking, non-perceiving, inactive substance - neither with the help of a correct deduction, nor with the help of a mandatory conclusion. From an outsider's point of view, when I, for example, dig the earth, it may seem that two natural objects interact here: the earth and I. It really is. But! But this is not the only way. My interaction with nature is my trace in it and in it, that is, I am exchanged nature. And the last reasoning is not a game of the mind or theoretical pampering, but the most philosophical approach and the principle of philosophical analytics. Berkeley does not care how other people see his interaction with the environment. He wants to comprehend what the world around him is like in relation to him, to Berkeley.

This moment is important. He is not idle! When I am an object of vision of someone from the outside, he looks at me as if I were an ordinary mortal formation. Knowing that I was born and now I live, he is already mentally trying on a line on the right for the first date and somehow quite naturally waits for my death to give him the second, final, figure. For him, this is a common thing - the death of another.

But for me, my death is not just the death of another living being. This is my care. My departure is forever. This is my departure forever from life! And although I understand everything “about death”, I don’t want to come to terms with my death and I will never be able to. It is from this outburst of human individuality, agitated by a lively anxiety about the familiar, the trivial and the ordinary, that philosophy begins. But if this is true, and this is undeniably true, then Berkeley is a philosopher and a profound philosopher. He turned his gaze to what for others had become a kind of common place, so common that, like the habit of the music of the heavenly spheres in the Pythagorean cosmic orchestra, they ceased to perceive and, accordingly, to feel.

Berkeley stirred up all subsequent philosophy. Without reference to it today it is impossible to imagine any discussion about matter. Enviable fate! He became a giant because he was not afraid to be the first.

Disagreeing with the common views on matter, Berkeley in his century repeated the philosophical feat of Zeno of Elea, substituting himself for the criticism and disagreement with him of everyone who gets acquainted with the teachings of Berkeley and his arguments. But be that as it may, the formulation "There is no known without a knower"; namely, in it one should summarize the cognitive revolution accomplished by Berkeley, live for the glory of the proud courage of the spirit and for the glory of philosophy, which lives only by choosing the edge of problems for itself.

Teachings of George Berkeley

1. We need only draw back the veil of words to clearly see the most magnificent tree of knowledge, the fruits of which are beautiful and accessible to our hand.

2. Those obstacles and difficulties that delay and burden the spirit in its search for truth do not stem from the darkness or confusion of objects or from a natural lack of mind, but rather from false principles ...

3. Nothing can be more obvious than the existence of God.

4. Nothing but ideas is perceived.

5. By idea I mean any thing that is felt or imagined.

6. There are innate ideas, that is, ideas created with us.

7. Existence, extension, etc. are abstract, that is, they are not ideas: they are only words unknown and not needed by the common people.

8. All our knowledge and thinking is limited to our ideas alone.

9. All things we know are, firstly, thoughts, secondly, the ability to perceive thoughts, thirdly, the ability to cause thoughts.

10. There can be no reasoning about things about which we have no ideas.

11. In accordance with my principles, there is reality, there are things, material nature.

12. The difference between an idea and its perception was one of the main reasons for the imagination of material substances.

13. The assumption that things are different from ideas leads away from the truth ...

14. I am more certain of the existence and reality of bodies than Mr. Locke, since he only claims what he calls sensory knowledge, while I believe that by representing bodies as combinations of forces in an unknown substratum, I have a demonstrative knowledge of them.

15. Discard the material substance... and understand by the body that which is directly seen and felt.

16. I deny ... so that I can form a general concept, diverting it from particular ones.

17. It is obvious to me that various sensations or ideas cannot exist otherwise than in the spirit that perceives them.

18. Bodies exist outside of consciousness, i.e. they are not consciousness (mind), but they differ from it.

19. As for, they are stored in my system.

20. I approve of the axiom of the scholastics: there is nothing in the intellect that was not previously in the senses.

21. We know the substance of the body. We do not know the substance of the spirit, it is unknowable.

22. I do not deny the existence of any thing that we can perceive by means of sensation or reflex.

23. That the things I see with my eyes or touch with my hands really exist, I have no doubt at all.

24. The external world does exist and is outside our minds, but only as a system of ideas created and constantly perceived by the universal spirit - God.

25. The eye or, if it is correctly expressed, the spirit perceives ...

No matter:

· The only thing whose existence we deny is what philosophers call matter, or bodily substance.

· Obviously, the very concept of what is called matter or bodily substance contains a contradiction.

And when, by our will or by themselves, they are called into the imagination, they are called in a more precise sense of the word ideas or images of things. (2, p. 166) Defending the principle of subjective idealism, Berkeley wants to avoid solipsism, i.e. the conclusion that there is only one single perceiving subject. (5, p. 375). Therefore, contrary to the initial position of subjective idealism, he claims that ...

That which is perceived or imagined, but not that which is conceivable. The concept is reduced by him to representation, rational to empirical; general to particular. The second, from what Berkeley relied on when building his philosophical concept, was Lockean sensationalism. Locke divided qualities into two kinds, one of which is recognized as primary, inherent in things in themselves, and the second is considered ...

The importance of the empiric-nominalistic tradition, the initial premise of his philosophy - the statement of one's own existence on the basis of a reflexive act - makes one recall R. Descartes. It does not need proof, is immediately obvious, and fully meets the requirements of Cartesian rational methodology. B., like Descartes, considers the subject, some I as a carrier of consciousness, ...

Predestined in nature and for which they were created from the beginning with inexpressible wisdom, should not be considered the best way to explain them. "The Philosophy of George Berkeley George Berkeley (1685-1753) gained importance in philosophy by his denial of the existence of matter. He argued that material objects exist only by being perceived Ronald Knox's Limerick so...

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